- Center indifference and skepticism.David Builes - 2024 - Noûs 58 (3):778-798.details
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Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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Mushy Akrasia: Why Mushy Credences Are Rationally Permissible.Rachel Fraser - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):79-106.details
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Comparative Opinion Loss.Benjamin Eva & Reuben Stern - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):613-637.details
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Knowledge and Asymmetric Loss.Alexander Dinges - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1055-1076.details
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XII—Deferring to Doubt.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):269-290.details
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Are You Now or Have You Ever Been an Impermissivist? --- A conversation among friends and enemies of epistemic freedom.Sophie Horowitz, Sinan Dogramaci & Miriam Schoenfield - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Matthias Steup, Ernest Sosa & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations of the Impossibility Theorems.Ted Poston - 2022 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):83-111.details
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How to Read a Representor.Edward Elliott - forthcoming - Ergo.details
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Do credences model guesses?Sophie Horowitz - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Proper scoring rules in epistemic decision theory.Maomei Wang - 2020 - Dissertation, Lingnan Universitydetails
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