- Computational indeterminacy and explanations in cognitive science.Philippos Papayannopoulos, Nir Fresco & Oron Shagrir - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (6):1-30.details
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On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-21.details
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Long-arm functional individuation of computation.Nir Fresco - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13993-14016.details
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Towards a Bayesian Account of Perceptual Competence.Tim Butzer - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1043-1061.details
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A new argument for the incompatibility of content externalism with justification internalism.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2333-2353.details
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Perspectival Externalism Is the Antidote to Radical Skepticism.Lisa Miracchi - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):363-379.details
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How Can We Know that We're Not Brains in Vats?Keith DeRose - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.details
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Les explications fonctionnelles.Karen Neander - 2009 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 1 (1):5-34.details
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Semantic Properties and the Computational Model of Mind.Randall Kirk Campbell - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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On the proper treatment of Smolensky.Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):31-32.details
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Developmental psychology for the twenty-first century.David Estes - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):715-716.details
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Redescription of intentionality.Norman H. Freeman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):717-718.details
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Causes and intentions.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):519-520.details
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Levels of Explanation Vindicated.Víctor M. Verdejo & Daniel Quesada - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):77-88.details
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Explaining computation without semantics: Keeping it simple.Nir Fresco - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (2):165-181.details
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Andy Clark, jesús Ezquerro, and jesús M. Larrazabal (eds.), Philosophy and cognitive science: Catergories, consciousness, and reasoning. [REVIEW]Bipin Indurkhya - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (3):430-435.details
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Gibt es ein problem der intentionalität?Ansgar Beckermann - unknowndetails
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Why constitution is not identity.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (12):599-621.details
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Why neural correlates of consciousness are fine, but not enough.Ruediger Vaas - 1999 - Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (3):121-141.details
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Why we view the brain as a computer.Oron Shagrir - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):393-416.details
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The implications of an externalist theory of rule-following behavior for robot cognition.Diane Proudfoot - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):283-308.details
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Two views of realization.Robert A. Wilson - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (1):1-31.details
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Husserl and externalism.A. David Smith - 2008 - Synthese 160 (3):313-333.details
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Functional role and intentionality.Amir Horowitz - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):197-218.details
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Content: Covariation, control, and contingency.J. Christopher Maloney - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):241-90.details
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Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism.Henry Jackman - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburghdetails
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Unity of consciousness and bi-level externalism.Bernard W. Kobes - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (5):528-544.details
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On Two Different Kinds of Computational Indeterminacy.Philippos Papayannopoulos, Nir Fresco & Oron Shagrir - 2022 - The Monist 105 (2):229-246.details
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Carsten Herrmann-Pillath and Ivan Boldyrev's Hegel, institutions and economics: performing the social. London: Routledge, 2014, 264 pp. [REVIEW]Don Ross - 2015 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 8 (1):98.details
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Flesh matters: The body in cognition.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (1):3-20.details
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Incrementality and Intention-Recognition in Utterance Processing.Eleni Gregoromichelaki, Ruth Kempson, Matthew Purver, Gregory Mills, Ronnie Cann, Wilfried Meyer-Viol & Patrick G. T. Healey - 2011 - Dialogue and Discourse 2 (1):199-232.details
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Epistemological challenges for connectionism.John McCarthy - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):44-44.details
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Is Smolensky's treatment of connectionism on the level?Carol E. Cleland - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):27-28.details
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Some assumptions underlying Smolensky's treatment of connectionism.Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):29-31.details
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Dynamic systems and the “subsymbolic level”.Walter J. Freeman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):33-34.details
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External representation: An issue for cognition.Jiajie Zhang - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):774-775.details
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Lessons from evolution for artificial intelligence?Rudi Lutz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):766-766.details
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Evolution needs a modern theory of the mind.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):759-760.details
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From mimetic to mythic culture: Stimulus equivalence effects and prelinguistic cognition.P. J. Hampson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):763-763.details
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Where redescriptions come from.David R. Olson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):725-725.details
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A Fodorian guide to Switzerland: Jung and Piaget combined?Péter Bodor & Csaba Pléh - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):709-710.details
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A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: More Mama, more milk, and more mouse.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):55-65.details
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From embodied to extended cognition.John A. Teske - 2013 - Zygon 48 (3):759-787.details
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The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Georges Rey - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Intentionality and the ecological approach.H. Loorendejong - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (1):91–109.details
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Considering empty worlds as actual.Laura Schroeter - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):331-347.details
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In defence of narrow mindedness.Frances Egan - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.details
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Itiswhat you think: Intentional potency and anti‐individualism.Brendan J. Lalor - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):165-78.details
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Does matter mind content?Veronica Gómez Sánchez - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Editors' Introduction: Miscommunication.Patrick G. T. Healey, Jan P. de Ruiter & Gregory J. Mills - 2018 - Topics in Cognitive Science 10 (2):264-278.details
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