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Origins of Objectivity

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2010)

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  1. The puzzle of cross‐modal shape experience.E. J. Green - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):867-896.
    Thepuzzle of cross‐modal shape experienceis the puzzle of reconciling the apparent differences between our visual and haptic experiences of shape with their apparent similarities. This paper proposes that we can resolve the cross‐modal puzzle by reflecting on another puzzle. Thepuzzle of perspectival characterchallenges us to reconcile the variability of shape experience through shifts in perspective with its constancy. An attractive approach to the latter puzzle holds that shape experience is complex, involving bothperspectivalaspects andconstantaspects. I argue here that parallel distinctions between (...)
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  • From Molecules to Perception: Philosophical Investigations of Smell.Ann-Sophie Barwich & Barry C. Smith - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (11):e12883.
    Theories of perception have traditionally dismissed the sense of smell as a notoriously variable and highly subjective sense, mainly because it does not easily fit into accounts of perception based on visual experience. So far, philosophical questions about the objects of olfactory perception have started by considering the nature of olfactory experience. However, there is no philosophically neutral or agreed conception of olfactory experience: it all depends on what one thinks odors are. We examine the existing philosophical methodology for addressing (...)
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  • Animal vs. human rationality-cum-conceptuality: a philosophical perspective on developmental psychology.Yakir Levin & Itzhak Aharon - 2022 - Mind and Society 21 (1):63-88.
    In this paper, we first extract from Susan Carey’s seminal account of the origin of concepts a notion of rationality, which is applicable to human infants and non-human animals; significantly different from the notions of rationality prevalent in behavioral ecology and yet, like these notions, amenable to empirical testing; conceptually more fundamental than the latter notions. Relatedly, this notion underlies a proto-conceptuality ascribable, by a key component of Carey’s account, to human infants and non-human animals. Based on a Kantian-inspired analysis (...)
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  • Long-arm functional individuation of computation.Nir Fresco - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13993-14016.
    A single physical process may often be described equally well as computing several different mathematical functions—none of which is explanatorily privileged. How, then, should the computational identity of a physical system be determined? Some computational mechanists hold that computation is individuated only by either narrow physical or functional properties. Even if some individuative role is attributed to environmental factors, it is rather limited. The computational semanticist holds that computation is individuated, at least in part, by semantic properties. She claims that (...)
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  • Sizes, ratios, approximations: On what and how the ANS represents.Brian Ball - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:e180.
    Clarke and Beck propose that the approximate number system (ANS) represents rational numbers. The evidence cited supports only the view that it represents ratios (and positive integers). Rational numbers are extensive magnitudes (i.e., sizes), whereas ratios are intensities. It is also argued that WHAT a system represents and HOW it does so are not as independent of one another as the authors assume.
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  • (1 other version)Extended Modal Realism — A New Solution to Problems Related to Non-existence.Andrew Thomas - 2021 - Dissertation, Durham University
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  • A Dual Proposal Of Minimal Conditions For Intentionality.Sérgio Farias de Souza Filho - 2022 - Synthese 200 (115):1-22.
    Naturalist theories of representation have been attacked on the grounds of being too liberal on the minimal conditions for intentionality: they treat several states that are not representational as genuine representations. Behind this attack lies the problem of demarcation: what are the minimal conditions for intentionality that a state should satisfy to be genuinely representational? What are the limits of intentionality? This paper develops a dual proposal to solve this problem. First, I defend the explanatory role criterion in order to (...)
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  • Stability by Degrees: Conceptions of Constancy from the History of Perceptual Psychology.Louise Daoust - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (1):1-22.
    Do the physical facts of the viewed environment account for the ordinary experiences we have of that environment? According to standard philosophical views, distal facts do account for our experiences, a phenomenon explained by appeal to perceptual constancy, the phenomenal stability of objects and environmental properties notwithstanding physical changes in proximal stimulation. This essay reviews a significant but neglected research tradition in experimental psychology according to which percepts systematically do not correspond to mind-independent distal facts. Instead, stability of percept values (...)
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  • The representations of the approximate number system.Stefan Buijsman - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):300-317.
    The Approximate Number System (ANS) is a system that allows us to distinguish between collections based on the number of items, though only if the ratio between numbers is high enough. One of the questions that has been raised is what the representations involved in this system represent. I point to two important constraints for any account: (a) it doesn’t involve numbers, and (b) it can account for the approximate nature of the ANS. Furthermore, I argue that representations of pure (...)
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  • Kant on cognition and knowledge.Eric Watkins & Marcus Willaschek - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3195-3213.
    Even though Kant’s theory of cognition (Erkenntnis) is central to his Critique of Pure Reason, it has rarely been asked what exactly Kant means by the term “cognition”. Against the widespread assumption that cognition (in the most relevant sense of that term) can be identified with knowledge or if not, that knowledge is at least a species of cognition, we argue that the concepts of cognition and knowledge in Kant are not only distinct, but even disjunct. To show this, we (...)
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  • Object files and unconscious perception: a reply to Quilty-Dunn.Ian Phillips - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):293-301.
    A wealth of cases – most notably blindsight and priming under inattention or suppression – have convinced philosophers and scientists alike that perception occurs outside awareness. In recent work (Phillips 2016a, 2018; Phillips and Block 2017, Peters et al. 2017), I dispute this consensus, arguing that any putative case of unconscious perception faces a dilemma. The dilemma divides over how absence of awareness is established. If subjective reports are used, we face the problem of the criterion: the concern that such (...)
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  • Accuracy Conditions, Functions, Perceptual Discrimination.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):739-754.
    I am deeply indebted to Alex Byrne, Jonathan Cohen and Matthew McGrath for their careful, constructive, and penetrating comments on The Unity of Perception and I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify my view further.
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  • Epistemic agency and the self-knowledge of reason: on the contemporary relevance of Kant’s method of faculty analysis.Thomas Land - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3137-3154.
    Each of Kant’s three Critiques offers an account of the nature of a mental faculty and arrives at this account by means of a procedure I call ‘faculty analysis’. Faculty analysis is often regarded as among the least defensible aspects of Kant’s position; as a consequence, philosophers seeking to inherit Kantian ideas tend to transpose them into a different methodological context. I argue that this is a mistake: in fact faculty analysis is a live option for philosophical inquiry today. My (...)
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  • Minimal perception: Responding to the challenges of perceptual constancy and veridicality with plants.Matthew Sims - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (7):1024-1048.
    Plant predictive processing suggests that plants anticipatorily perceive their environment. This hypothesis runs up against a challenge which takes the form of two constraints on per- ception advanced by Tyler Burge: the veridicality constraint and the constancy constraint. This paper argues that the veridicality constraint can be satisfied by assuming a general account of predictive processing. To show how the constancy constraint may be fulfilled, an ecologically informed account of invariant pick-up is developed and given a place within plant predictive (...)
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  • What Do False-Belief Tests Show?Pierre Jacob - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):1-20.
    In a paper published in Psychological Review, Tyler Burge has offered a unified non-mentalistic account of a wide range of social cognitive developmental findings. His proposal is that far from attributing mental states, young children attribute to humans the same kind of internal generic states of sensory registration that biologists attribute to e.g. snails and ticks. Burge’s proposal deserves close attention: it is especially challenging because it departs from both the mentalistic and all the non-mentalistic accounts of the data so (...)
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  • Visual phenomenology versus visuomotor imagery: How can we be aware of action properties?Gabriele Ferretti - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3309-3338.
    Here is a crucial question in the contemporary philosophy of perception: how can we be aware of action properties? According to the perceptual view, we consciously see them: they are present in our visual phenomenology. However, this view faces some problems. First, I review these problems. Then, I propose an alternative view, according to which we are aware of action properties because we imagine them through a special form of imagery, which I call visuomotor imagery. My account is to be (...)
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  • A Critique of Olfactory Objects.Ann-Sophie Barwich - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
    Does the sense of smell involve the perception of odor objects? General discussion of perceptual objecthood centers on three criteria: stimulus representation; perceptual constancy; and figure-ground segregation. These criteria, derived from theories of vision, have been applied to olfaction in recent philosophical debates about psychology. An inherent problem with such framing of olfactory objecthood is that philosophers explicitly ignore the constitutive factors of the sensory systems that underpin the implementation of these criteria. The biological basis of odor coding is fundamentally (...)
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  • Do Constancy Mechanisms Save Distal Content?Justin Garson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):409-417.
    In this journal, Schulte develops a novel solution to the problem of distal content: by virtue of what is a mental representation about a distal object rather than a more proximal cause of that representation? Schulte maintains that in order for a representation to have a distal content, it must be produced by a constancy mechanism, along with two other conditions. I raise three objections to his solution. First, a core component of Schulte's solution is just a restrictive version of (...)
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  • Experience and reasoning: challenging the a priori/a posteriori distinction.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1127-1148.
    Williamson and others have recently argued against the significance of the a priori/a posteriori distinction. My aim in this paper is to explain, defend, and expand upon one of these arguments. In the first section, I develop in some detail a line of argument sketched in Williamson. In the second section, I consider two replies to Williamson and show that they miss the structure of the challenge, as I understand it. The problem for defenders of the distinction is to find (...)
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  • Naturalizing Qualia.Alessandra Buccella - 2017 - Phenomenology and Mind 12:152 - 161.
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  • Phillips on Unconscious Perception and Overflow.Nicholas D’Aloisio-Montilla - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):649-662.
    Phillips argues that Block faces a “serious internal challenge” in defending the claim that unconscious perception is of the same fundamental kind as conscious perception. This challenge is said to result from Block’s commitment to phenomenal overflow. However, in this paper, I demonstrate that Phillips’ rejection of overflow likewise renders his view on unconscious perception “internally challenged” and therefore equally problematic.
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  • Emotions, concepts and the indeterminacy of natural kinds.Henry Taylor - 2020 - Synthese 197 (5):2073-2093.
    A central question for philosophical psychology is which mental faculties form natural kinds. There is hot debate over the kind status of faculties as diverse as consciousness, seeing, concepts, emotions, constancy and the senses. In this paper, I take emotions and concepts as my main focus, and argue that questions over the kind status of these faculties are complicated by the undeservedly overlooked fact that natural kinds are indeterminate in certain ways. I will show that indeterminacy issues have led to (...)
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  • Neural Representations Observed.Eric Thomson & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):191-235.
    The historical debate on representation in cognitive science and neuroscience construes representations as theoretical posits and discusses the degree to which we have reason to posit them. We reject the premise of that debate. We argue that experimental neuroscientists routinely observe and manipulate neural representations in their laboratory. Therefore, neural representations are as real as neurons, action potentials, or any other well-established entities in our ontology.
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  • Reasons for emotion and moral motivation.Reid Blackman - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):805-827.
    Internalism about normative reasons is the view that an agent’s normative reasons depend on her motivational constitution. On the assumption that there are reasons for emotion I argue that externalism about reasons for emotion entails that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated and internalism about reasons for emotion is implausible. If the arguments are sound we can conclude that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated. Resisting this conclusion requires either justifying internalism about reasons for (...)
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  • What Do Object Files Pick Out?Edwin Green - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (2):177-200.
    Many authors have posited an “object file” system, which underlies perceptual selection and tracking of objects. Several have proposed that this system internalizes principles specifying what counts as an object and relies on them during tracking. Here I consider a popular view on which the object file system is tuned to entities that satisfy principles of three-dimensionality, cohesion, and boundedness. I argue that the evidence gathered in support of this view is consistent with a more permissive view on which object (...)
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  • Précis of Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):217-234.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 217 - 234 The paper presents the key themes of my _Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology_. It focuses, in particular, on the moderate account of perceptual justification, the constitutive response put forward against Humean skepticism, epistemic relativism, the closure principle, the transmission of warrant principle, as well as on the applications of the extended rationality view to the case of the principle of the uniformity of nature, testimony, and the justification of basic laws (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Replies to Commentators.Annalisa Coliva - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (4):281-295.
    _ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 281 - 295 The paper contains the replies to the comments made by Alan Millar, Yuval Avnur, Giorgio Volpe, and Maria Baghramian on my _Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology_. It addresses, in particular, the nature of perceptual justification, the truth of hinges, my response to Humean skepticism and the issue of epistemic relativism.
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  • II—Perceptiveness.José Filipe Silva - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):43-61.
    Augustine is often credited for upholding a theory of active perception, whereby our acquaintance with ordinary material objects and their properties cannot be explained by the causal efficaciousness of these objects. In a previous work, I attempted to connect this theory with the account of perception found in his treatise On the Trinity. Mark Kalderon has challenged this ‘reconciliationist’ reading, claiming that in this work Augustine admits to a strong causal role of the object in bringing about perceptual experiences. In (...)
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  • (1 other version)The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual content.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (5):601-620.
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  • On representational content and format in core numerical cognition.Brian Ball - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):119-139.
    Carey has argued that there is a system of core numerical cognition – the analog magnitude system – in which cardinal numbers are explicitly represented in iconic format. While the existence of this system is beyond doubt, this paper aims to show that its representations cannot have the combination of features attributed to them by Carey. According to the argument from abstractness, the representation of the cardinal number of a collection of individuals as such requires the representation of individuals as (...)
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  • Thinking About Different Nonexistents of the Same Kind: Reid's Account of the Imagination and its Nonexistent Objects.Marina Folescu - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):627-649.
    How is it that, as fiction readers, we are nonplussed by J. K. Rowling's prescription to imagine Ronan, Bane, and Magorian, three different centaurs of the Forbidden Forrest at Hogwarts? It is usually held in the philosophical literature on fictional discourse that singular imaginings of fictional objects are impossible, given the blatant nonexistence of such objects. In this paper, I have a dual purpose: on the one hand, to show that, without being committed to Meinongeanism, we can explain the phenomenon (...)
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  • Defeating looks.Kathrin Glüer - 2016 - Synthese 195 (7):2985-3012.
    In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called “phenomenal” or “looks-content”. I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility (...)
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  • Sociality, Expression, and This Thing called Language.Dorit Bar-On - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):56-79.
    Davidson’s well-known language skepticism—the claim that there is no such a thing as a language—has recognizably Gricean underpinnings, some of which also underlie his continuity skepticism—the claim that there can be no philosophically illuminating account of the emergence of language and thought. My first aim in this paper is to highlight aspects of the complicated relationship between central Davidsonian and Gricean ideas concerning language. After a brief review of Davidson’s two skeptical claims and their Gricean underpinnings, I provide my own (...)
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  • Epistemology and Radically Extended Cognition.Benjamin Jarvis - 2015 - Episteme 12 (4):459-478.
    This paper concerns the relationship between epistemology and radically extended cognition. Radically extended cognition (REC) – as advanced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers – is cognition that is partly located outside the biological boundaries of the cognizing subject. Epistemologists have begun to wonder whether REC has any consequences for theories of knowledge. For instance, while Duncan Pritchard suggests that REC might have implications for which virtue epistemology is acceptable, J. Adam Carter wonders whether REC threatens anti-luck epistemology. In this (...)
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  • Management Communication in Leadership Relations: A Philosophical Model of Understanding and Contextual Agreement.Halvor Nordby - 2014 - Philosophy of Management 13 (2):75-100.
    It has been a fundamental assumption in management theory that communication is a key condition for successful management. This assumption has been linked to Habermas’ model of communicative rationality, but it is very difficult for managers to implement this model in real-life leadership relations. The reason is that practical obstacles, resource limitations and knowledge gaps make it impossible to achieve Habermas’ ideal aim of ‘shared horizons’. The article argues that it is possible for managers to meet fundamental communication conditions in (...)
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  • Non‐conceptual knowledge.Frank Hofmann - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):184-208.
    The paper is an investigation into the prospects of an epistemology of non-conceptual knowledge. According to the orthodox view, knowledge requires concepts and belief. I present several arguments to the effect that there is non-conceptual, non-doxastic knowledge, the obvious candidate for such knowledge being non-conceptual perception. Non-conceptual perception seems to be allowed for by cognitive scientists and it exhibits the central role features of knowledge—it plays the knowledge role: it respects an anti-luck condition, it is an achievement, it enables one (...)
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  • Innate a nd Learned: Carey, Mad Dog Nativism, and the Poverty of Stimuli and Analogies.Georges Rey - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (2):109-132.
    In her recent (2009) book, The Origins of Concepts, Susan Carey argues that what she calls ‘Quinean Bootstrapping’ and processes of analogy in children show that the expressive power of a mind can be increased in ways that refute Jerry Fodor's (1975, 2008) ‘Mad Dog’ view that all concepts are innate. I argue that it is doubtful any evidence about the manifestation of concepts in children will bear upon the logico-semantic issues of expressive power. Analogy and bootstrapping may be ways (...)
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  • (1 other version)Newton as Philosopher.Lisa Downing - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):124-129.
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  • Neural representations not needed - no more pleas, please.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):241-256.
    Colombo (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2012) argues that we have compelling reasons to posit neural representations because doing so yields unique explanatory purchase in central cases of social norm compliance. We aim to show that there is no positive substance to Colombo’s plea—nothing that ought to move us to endorse representationalism in this domain, on any level. We point out that exposing the vices of the phenomenological arguments against representationalism does not, on its own, advance the case for representationalism (...)
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  • Embedded Seeing: Vision in the Natural World.Nicoletta Orlandi - 2011 - Noûs 47 (4):727-747.
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  • Embodying the False-Belief Tasks.Michael Wilby - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):519-540.
    Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition—in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others’ thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion (...)
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  • (1 other version)Rule-Following II: Recent Work and New Puzzles.Indrek Reiland - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (5):e12976.
    ‘Rule-following’ is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem both guided and “normatively” constrained by something general in performing particular actions. Understanding the phenomenon is important because of its connection to meaning, representation, and content. This article gives an overview of the philosophical discussion of rule-following with emphasis on Kripke’s skeptical paradox and recent work on possible solutions. Part I of this two-part contribution was devoted to the basic issues from Wittgenstein to Kripke. Part II is about (...)
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  • Cognitive functions are not reducible to biological ones: the case of minimal visual perception.Argyris Arnellos & Alvaro Moreno - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (4):1-25.
    We argue that cognitive functions are not reducible to biological functionality. Since only neural animals can develop complex forms of agency, we assume that genuinely cognitive processes are deeply related with the activity of the nervous system. We first analyze the significance of the appearance of the nervous system in certain multicellular organisms, arguing that it has changed the logic of their biological organization. Then, we focus on the appearance of specifically cognitive capacities within the nervous system. Considering a case (...)
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  • What We Talk About When We Talk About This Being Blue.Matthias Neuber - 2022 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 14 (1).
    The relationship between American pragmatism and American critical realism needs to be reconsidered. The two currents shared many aspects, but there were also significant differences. One of these differences pertains to the object of perception or, more precisely, to the question of what we talk about when we talk about this, for example, being blue. By re-addressing that question, some light can be shed on the historical development of analytic philosophy in the United States during the first half of the (...)
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  • Susanna Schellenberg on perception.Christopher S. Hill - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (2):208-218.
    Schellenberg's book The unity of perception is full of innovative ideas and challenges to preconceptions. This discussion endorses several of Schellenberg's main contentions, but it also challenges her handling of several key topics, such as hallucinations and perceptual awareness of particulars, and it expresses doubts about the informativeness of her main analytic tool, the notion of a perceptual capacity.
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  • Inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation.Simon A. B. Brown - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):495-514.
    Recent influential accounts of temporal representation—the use of mental representations with explicit temporal contents, such as before and after relations and durations—sharply distinguish representation from mere sensitivity. A common, important picture of inter-temporal rationality is that it consists in maximizing total expected discounted utility across time. By analyzing reinforcement learning algorithms, this article shows that, given such notions of temporal representation and inter-temporal rationality, it would be possible for an agent to achieve inter-temporal rationality without temporal representation. It then explores (...)
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  • Strange beliefs: essays on delusion formation.Federico Bongiorno Dr - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
    This thesis is set out as a collection of self-standing essays. Throughout these essays, I try to illuminate a number of controversies surrounding the way in which delusions are formed, and relatedly, their nature and epistemic standing. In Chapter 2, after an introductory chapter, I flesh out a new ‘endorsement’ approach to the Capgras delusion, the main idea being that the delusion is formed by endorsing the content of a metaphorical-perceptual state in which a loved one is represented metaphorically as (...)
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  • Numerical cognition needs more and better distinctions, not fewer.Hilary Barth & Anna Shusterman - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44.
    We agree that the approximate number system truly represents number. We endorse the authors' conclusions on the arguments from confounds, congruency, and imprecision, although we disagree with many claims along the way. Here, we discuss some complications with the meanings that undergird theories in numerical cognition, and with the language we use to communicate those theories.
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  • Crane and the mark of the mental.Andrea Raimondi - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):683-693.
    Brentano’s suggestion that intentionality is the mark of the mental is typically spelled out in terms of the thesis that all and only mental states are intentional. An influential objection is that intentionality is not necessary for mentality. What about the idea that only mental states are intentional? In his 2008 paper published in Analysis, Nes shows that on a popular characterization of intentionality, notably defended by Crane, some non-mental states come out as intentional. Crane replies that the concept of (...)
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  • Interpreting Degree Semantics.Alexis Wellwood - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
    Contemporary research in compositional, truth-conditional semantics often takes judgments of the relative unacceptability of certain phrasal combinations as evidence for lexical semantics. For example, observing that completely full sounds perfectly natural whereas completely tall does not has been used to motivate a distinction whereby the lexical entry for full but not for tall specifies a scalar endpoint. So far, such inferences seem unobjectionable. In general, however, applying this methodology can lead to dubious conclusions. For example, observing that slightly bent is (...)
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