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  1. Constitution and kind membership.Michael C. Rea - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 97 (2):169-193.
    A bronze statue is a lump of bronze – or so it might appear. But appearances are not always to be trusted, and this one is notoriously problematic. To see why, imagine a bronze statue (perhaps a statue of David) and ask yourself: Which lump of bronze is the statue? Presumably, it is the lump that makes up the statue (or, as we say, the lump that constitutes the statue). After all, why should the statue be any other lump of (...)
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  • Esistenza e Persistenza.Damiano Costa - 2018 - Milan, IT: Mimesis.
    Nel nostro universo, qualunque cosa, dalla più piccola particella alla più smisurata galassia, esiste in un qualche tempo e in un qualche luogo. Ma cosa significa esistere in un qualche tempo? Il fenomeno dell’esistenza temporale gioca un ruolo fondamentale nella comprensione dell’universo e di noi stessi quali creature temporali. Eppure è un fenomeno profondamente misterioso. L’esistenza temporale è da intendersi come una relazione? Che legami ha con l’esistenza dell’ontologia? L’esistenza temporale e la localizzazione spaziale sono due fenomeni essenzialmente differenti o (...)
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  • Boring Ontological Realism.Meghan Sullivan - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (3):399-413.
    Boring ontological realists hold that objects exist at times and persist over time without having substantive essences. Boring realism is a consequence of the minimal A-theory of time and the most sensible formulations of necessitism. This kind of realism is at odds with a ubiquitous realist thesis, which I call the persistenceessence link. This essay surveys some examples of the persistence-essence link and argues that it is best understood as a thesis about grounding. If we understand the link in terms (...)
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  • Identity Over Time, Constitution and the Problem of Personal Identity.Benjamin L. Curtis & Harold W. Noonan - 2015 - In Steven M. Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness: Toward a Science and Theory. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. pp. 348-371.
    What am I? And what is my relationship to the thing I call ‘my body’? Thus each of us can pose for himself the philosophical problems of the nature of the self and the relationship between a person and his body. One answer to the question about the relationship between a person and the thing he calls ‘his body’ is that they are two things composed of the same matter at the same time (like a clay statue and the piece (...)
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  • Magical Antirealism.William R. Carter & John E. Bahde - 1998 - American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):305 - 325.
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  • (1 other version)Temporal Overlap is Not Coincidence.Mark Heller - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):362-380.
    The best reason to believe in temporal parts is to avoid commitment to coincidence—roughly, two objects occupying exactly the same space at exactly the same time. Most anti-coincidence arguments for temporal parts are fission arguments. Gaining some notice, however, are vagueness arguments. One goal of this paper is to clarify the way a temporal-parts ontology avoids coincidence, and another is to clarify the vagueness argument, highlighting the fact that it too is an anti-coincidence argument. The temporal-parts alternative to coincidence has (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Metaphysics of Identity.André Gallois - 2016 - New York: Routledge.
    The philosophy problem of identity and the related problem of change go back to the ancient Greek philosophers and fascinated later figures including Leibniz, Locke and Hume. Heraclitus argued that one could not swim in the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. When is a river not the same river? If one removes one plank at a time when is a ship no longer a ship? What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? This book (...)
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  • Critical Notice: Thomas Sattig’s The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the ordinary world, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.Simon J. Evnine - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):142-157.
    This critical notice describes some of Thomas Sattig’s book The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the Ordinary World and raises several critical issues about it.
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  • Reply to Critics.Jeff Speaks - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):492-506.
    Replies to critics (Janet Levin, Casey O'Callaghan, and Adam Pautz) for a book symposium on _The Phenomenal and the Representational_.
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  • The direct relational model of object perception.Nicolas J. Bullot - unknown
    This text aims at presenting a general characterization of the act of perceiving a particular object, in a framework in which perception is conceived of as a mental and cognitive faculty having specific functions that other faculties such as imagination and memory do not possess. I introduce the problem of determining the occurrence of singular perception of a physical object, as opposed to the occurrence of other mental states or attitudes. I propose that clarifying this occurrence problem requires making explicit (...)
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  • Material Constitution is Ad Hoc.Jeroen Smid - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):305-325.
    The idea that two objects can coincide—by sharing all their proper parts, or matter—yet be non-identical, results in the “Problem of Coincident Objects”: in what relation do objects stand if they are not identical but share all their proper parts? One solution is to introduce material constitution. In this paper, I argue that this is ad hoc since, first, this solution cannot be generalized to solve similar problems, and, second, there are pseudo cases of coincidence that should not trigger the (...)
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  • Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence?Mark Moyer - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):401-423.
    Puzzles about persistence and change through time, i.e., about identity across time, have foundered on confusion about what it is for ‘two things’ to be have ‘the same thing’ at a time. This is most directly seen in the dispute over whether material objects can occupy exactly the same place at the same time. This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against several arguments to the contrary. Distinguishing a temporally relative from an absolute sense of ‘the same’, we see (...)
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  • The Metaphysics of Mass Expressions.Mark Steen - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Runggaldier on the Cohabitation of Material Objects.Christof Rapp - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):371 - 375.
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  • Philosophical Methodology in Modal Epistemology.Dana Goswick - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):183-195.
    This paper examines the legitimacy of two common methodologies within philosophy: thought experiments and conceptual analysis. In particular, I examine the uses to which these two methodologies have been put within modal epistemology. I argue that, although both methods can be used to reveal conditional essentialist claims (e.g. necessarily: if x is water, then x is H20), neither can be used to reveal the de re essentialists claims (e.g. x is water and x is essentially H20) they’re often taken to (...)
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  • Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the 'Standard Account'.E. J. Lowe - 1995 - Analysis 55 (3):171 - 178.
    E. J. Lowe; Coinciding objects: in defence of the ‘standard account’, Analysis, Volume 55, Issue 3, 1 July 1995, Pages 171–178, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/5.
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  • Sleeping Beauty and direct inference.Joel Pust - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):290-293.
    One argument for the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem rests on direct inference from objective probabilities. In this paper, I consider a particularly clear version of this argument by John Pollock and his colleagues (The Oscar Seminar 2008). I argue that such a direct inference is defeated by the fact that Beauty has an equally good reason to conclude on the basis of direct inference that the probability of heads is 1/2. Hence, neither thirders nor halfers can find (...)
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  • Constituted simples?Jens Johansson - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):87-89.
    Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble. I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.
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  • Coincident objects: Could a ‘stuff ontology’ help?Dean W. Zimmerman - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):19–27.
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  • Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions.Dirk Franken - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-26.
    In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions. The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object’s physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments – the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions – which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a (...)
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  • Things and de re modality.Tony Roy - 2000 - Noûs 34 (1):56–84.
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  • Sign Levels: Language and Its Evolutionary Antecedents.D. S. Clarke - 2004 - Springer.
    Since the revolution in philosophic method that began about a century ago, the focus of philosophic attention has been on language as used both in daily conversation and in specialized institutional activities such as science, law, and the arts. But language is an extremely complex and varied means of communication, and the study of it has been increasingly incorporated into such empirical disciplines as linguistics, psycho linguistics, and cognitive psychology. It is becoming less clear what aspects of language remain as (...)
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  • Theon's Tale: Does a Cambridge Change Result in a Substantial Change?Arda Denkel - 1995 - Analysis 55 (3):166 - 170.
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  • Familiar Objects and the Sorites of Decomposition.Crawford L. Elder - 2000 - American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):79 - 89.
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  • Supervenience and Co-Location.Michael Rea - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):367 - 375.
    Co-location is compatible with the doctrine of microphysical supervenience. Microphysical supervenience involves intrinsic qualitative properties that supervene on microphysical structures. Two different objects, such as Socrates and the lump of tissue of which he is constituted, can be co-located objects that supervene on different sets of properties. Some of the properties are shared, but others, such as the human-determining properties or the lump-determining properties, supervene only on one object or the other. Therefore, properties at the same location can be arranged (...)
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  • The Lump and the Ledger: Material Coincidence at Little-to-No Cost.Jonah Goldwater - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):789-812.
    This paper aims to make headway on two related issues—one methodological, the other substantive. The former concerns cost–benefit analyses when applied to metaphysical theory choice. The latter concerns material coincidence, i.e., multiple objects occupying the same space at the same time, such as the statue and the clay from which it’s made. The issues are entwined as many reject coincidence on the grounds that it’s costly. I argue this judgment is unjustified. More generally, I set out and defend a framework (...)
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  • (1 other version)Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects.Crawford L. Elder - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):317-331.
    How can a parcel of matter, or collection of particles, simultaneously compose three different objects, characterized by different modal properties? If the statue is gouged it still exists, but not exactly that piece of gold which originally occupied the statue’s borders, and the (mass of) gold within that piece can survive dispersal, while the piece cannot. The solution to this “problem of coinciding objects”, this paper argues, is that there is, in that space, only the statue. The properties which the (...)
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  • (1 other version)McGrath on universalism.Michael C. Rea - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):200–203.
    Mereological Universalism is the thesis that, for any disjoint Xs, the Xs automatically compose something. In his book, Material Beings, Peter van Inwagen provides an argument against Universalism that relies on the following crucial premiss: (F) If Universalism is true, then the Xs cannot ever compose two objects, either simultaneously or successively.1 I have argued elsewhere (Rea 1998) that van Inwagen’s defence of (F) fails because it relies on the false assumption that Universalism is incompatible with the view that, for (...)
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  • (1 other version)Coincidence and principles of composition.Samuel Levey - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):1–10.
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  • Alexander's dictum and the reality of familiar objects.Crawford L. Elder - 2003 - Topoi 22 (2):163-171.
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  • Rea on universalism.Matthew McGrath - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):69–76.
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  • (2 other versions)Dion’s Left Foot.W. R. Carter - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):371-379.
    Two recent papers by Michael Burke bearing upon the persistence of people and commonplace things illustrate the fact that the quest for synchronic ontological economy is likely to encourage a disturbing diachronic proliferation of entities. This discussion argues that Burke's promise of ontological economy is seriously compromised by the fact that his proposed metaphysic does violence to standard intuitions concerning the persistence of people and commonplace things. In effect, Burke would have us achieve synchronic economy (rejection of coincident entities) by (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Constitution of Persons by Bodies.Dean W. Zimmerman - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):295-338.
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  • Coincident Objects: Could a Stuff Ontology Help.D. Zimmerman - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):19-27.
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  • Meta-ontology and accidental unity.Patrick Toner - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):550–561.
    My wife and I and our three children may stand in various relations: being a family, being a basketball team, and so on. I show that Frege's doctrine of existence, when coupled with this simple point, easily solves the problem of material constitution and blocks the overdetermination argument for eliminativism. It does all this work while providing a plausible and clear reductionistic account of material objects. These seem to be very good reasons for accepting Frege's doctrine of existence.
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  • (1 other version)Monism and Material Constitution.Mark Jago Stephen Barker - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):189-204.
    Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We motivate (...)
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  • なぜ種性質ではなく種別概念が擁護されたのか.Hiroshi Ohata - 2024 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 56 (2):89.
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  • The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument.Frederick C. Doepke - 1996 - Open Court Publishing Company.
    The main contribution of this work is to develop the account of material constitution presented in Spatially Coinciding Objects (Ratio 24, 1982) and a series of related articles. This account was merely ‘analytical’ in that it applied generously to ‘putative’ examples of distinct entities (individuals, pluralities and masses of stuff) in the same place at the same time. The account herein is ‘critical’ in that it seeks justification for recognizing the existence of entities constituted in addition to the entities that (...)
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  • Constitution and Identity.John Biro - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1127-1138.
    A widely held view has it that sometimes there is more than one thing in exactly the same place, as is the case, allegedly, with a clay statue. There is the statue, but there also is a piece of clay—both obviously in the same place yet distinct in virtue of their differing properties, if only modal ones. Those holding this view—pluralists—often describe the relation between such objects as one of constitution, with the piece of clay being said to constitute the (...)
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  • Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism.Michael B. Burke - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):457 - 467.
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  • An Ontology for Event Semantics.Christopher Jude Pinon - 1995 - Dissertation, Stanford University
    Event semantics takes eventualities, understood as events, processes, and states, to be basic objects in reality, not set-theoretic constructions from something else . I defend this view and argue that events, processes, and states form pairwise disjoint sorts, having the ontological status of atoms, aggregates, and mass objects, respectively. Aggregates are composed of atoms, whereas mass objects are not. Two intermediate groupings of eventualities are important in this mereological characterization: occurrences, comprising events and processes, and eventuality chunks, comprising processes and (...)
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  • (1 other version)"Realism and the Problem of" Infimae Species".Crawford Elder - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):111 - 127.
    Modal conventionalism is the view that two crucial forms of sameness are mind-dependent. There is no phenomenon of sameness in kind, on this view, except in virtue of our conventions for individuating nature’s kinds; there is no phenomenon of numerical sameness across time, for an individual member of some natural kind, except in virtue of our conventions for individuating such members.1 Modal conventionalism has its realist opponents. These opponents have argued, following Kripke’s lead more than thirty years ago (Kripke 1972), (...)
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  • Objects, Their Parts, and Essences.Karol Polcyn - 2012 - Filozofia Nauki 20 (3).
    According to some philosophical views, parts of objects (either three-dimen¬sional or four-dimensional) and whole objects are distinct entities. This raises the question of how to identify objects and their parts across possible worlds. By the principle of the necessity of diversity, the distinctness of objects and their parts must be preserved across possible worlds and this, paradoxically, seems to imply that in other possible worlds objects cannot be temporally or spatially different from what they actually are. For example, it seems (...)
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