- Rational Agency without Self‐Knowledge: Could ‘We’ Replace ‘I’?Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):3-33.details
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Persons, Stages, and Tensed Belief.Nicholas Rimell - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):577-593.details
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Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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The Donkey Problem.Mark Heller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):83-101.details
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Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence?Mark Moyer - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):401-423.details
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Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.details
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Branching and (in)determinism.Jiri Benovsky - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (2):151-173.details
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Quasi-supplementation, plenitudinous coincidentalism, and gunk.Cody Gilmore - forthcoming - In Robert K. Garcia (ed.), Substance: New Essays. Philosophia Verlag.details
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Photographic Representation and Depiction of Temporal Extension.Jiri Benovsky - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (2):194-213.details
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Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Why Four-Dimensionalism Explains Coincidence.Maya Eddon - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):721-728.details
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Does Four-dimensionalism explain coincidence?∗.Mark Moyer - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):479-488.details
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Vague Singulars, Semantic Indecision, and the Metaphysics of Persons.Donald P. Smith - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):569-585.details
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A unified theory of truth and reference.Barry Smith & Berit Brogaard - 2000 - Logique Et Analyse 43 (169-170):49–93.details
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Temporal parts.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):730–748.details
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Special Relativity, Coexistence And Temporal Parts: A Reply To Gilmore.Yuri Balashov - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (1):1-40.details
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On vagueness, 4d and diachronic universalism.Yuri Balashov - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):523 – 531.details
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Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’.Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Philosophical Topics 30 (1):189-207.details
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Defending coincidence: An explanation of a sort.Mark Moyer - unknowndetails
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No objects, no problem?Matthew McGrath - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):457 – 486.details
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