Chalmers argues that zombies are possible and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on physical facts, which shows the falsity of materialism. The crucial step in this argument – that zombies are possible – follows from their conceivability and hence depends on assuming that conceivability implies possibility. But while Chalmers’s defense of this assumption – call it the conceivability principle – is the key part of his argument, it has not been well understood. As I see it, Chalmers’s defense of (...) the conceivability principle comes in his response to the so-called objection from a posteriori necessity. The defense aims at showing that there is no gap between conceivability and possibility since no such gap can be generated by necessary a posteriori truths. I will argue that while Chalmers is right to the extent that there is no gap between conceivability and possibility within the standard Kripkean model of a posteriori necessity, his general conclusion is not justified. This is because the conceivability principle might be inconsistent with a posteriori necessity understood in some non-Kripkean way and Chalmers has not shown that no such alternative understanding of a posteriori necessity is available. (shrink)

Chalmers argues that ideal conceivability (conceivability on ideal rational reflection) entails possibility and on this basis assumes that zombies are possible and, therefore, that materialism is false. I argue that the paradigm cases of conceivability intuitions that Chalmers takes to be reliable guides to possibility are not only conceptually coherent, even on ideal rational reflection, but in addition have some rational explanation. The conceivability of zombies, however, has no rational explanation. So it is not ad hoc to deny that the (...) conceivability of zombies entails possibility. (shrink)

According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide. The most common objection towards such view invokes the so-called Grounding Problem according to which the strong pluralist needs to explain what the grounds are for supposed modal differences between the coincidents. As recognized in the literature, the failure to provide an answer to the Grounding Problem critically undermines the plausibility of strong pluralism. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that strong pluralists cannot provide an (...) explanation of the Grounding Problem. In this paper, we argue that strong pluralism can be motivated independently of the successful answer to the Grounding Problem. In order to achieve that aim, we provide a haecceitistic interpretation of strong pluralism according to which strong pluralism should be read as a position committed to the existence of primitive individuals, i.e., the individuals that have their criteria of individuation independently of their qualitative profiles. That said, we do not aim at defending haecceitism. Instead, our aim is rather modest: we want to provide a new way for the strong pluralist to supplement his view to make it more watertight. (shrink)

According to grounding necessitarianism if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter. Proponents of grounding contingentism argue against this claim, stating that it is possible for the former facts to obtain without necessitating the latter. In this article I discuss a recent argument from restricted accidental generalisations provided by contingentists that advances such possibility. I argue that grounding necessitarianism can be defended against it. To achieve this aim, I postulate a relationship between grounding (...) and essence by introducing a notion of individual essences understood as a set of essential properties that individuate its bearer. According to a proposed view grounding holds in virtue of identities of its relata, which are in turn determined by their respective individual essences. From there I claim that if grounding holds in virtue of the individual essences of its relata, then it is possible to resist the objection from restricted accidental generalisations and maintain a view that grounds necessitates what is grounded. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss a connection between quidditism and the Lewisian principle of recombination. I begin by reconstructing a typical characterisation of a Lewisian principle of recombination, followed by an explanation of quidditism. In the remainder, I argue that a proponent of a Lewisian principle of recombination cannot endorse quidditism without some important modifications of her view.

The paper is a survey of contemporary quidditism, understood as two interrelated metaphysicalpositions — recombinatorial quidditism, which is an account of the nature of possibilities, andindividuation quidditism, which is concerned with the problem of how to individuate properties.I have three aims: to examine the commitments and consequences of both views, to investigatethe relationships between them, and to sketch the logic of the dispute between structuralism andquidditism. I explain how these views relate to Ramseyan humility, according to which we cannotknow the (...) fundamental structure of the world. (shrink)

In this article I defend a view according to which facts that express metaphysical grounding are grounded in essences of properties involved into a given grounding relationship. To justify this view, first, I present some reasons for a claim that metaphysical grounding is grounded. In the next step I discuss two theories that explain what are the grounds for grounding: a theory that involves a notion of a superinternal relation and a theory that uses a notion of essences of properties. (...) I argue that later theory is preferable over the former. (shrink)

Istnieje spór w obrębie filozofii sięgający już starożytności i polemiki Platona z Sofistami, dotyczący ugruntowania metafizyki jako dziedziny autonomicznej, która byłaby zdolna do badania swoistych elementów rzeczywistości, przysługujących tylko i wyłącznie metafizyce. We wstępnych rozważaniach przedstawiamy sposób, w jaki ten spór można rozumieć oraz jak można go rozwiązać. Tezą metafilozoficzną naszych analiz będzie stwierdzenie, że w celu ugruntowania metafizyki musimy wskazać na swoiste doświadczenie, które mogłoby zapewnić bezpośredni dostęp poznawczy do abstrakcyjnego przedmiotu metafizyki. W niniejszych badaniach, rolę tego doświadczenia będzie (...) pełnić intuicja, którą utożsamiamy z poznaniem apriorycznym – ujmowanym jednak nie jako poznanie pojęciowe bądź dedukcyjne – lecz jako poznanie naoczne, które (używając języka fenomenologii) źródłowo (materialnie) prezentuje nam swoistą sferę przedmiotową. By lepiej zrozumieć zjawisko intuitywnego poznania do którego bardzo często filozofowie implicite się odnosili (rzadziej zaś wprost) zrekonstruujemy stanowisko E. Chudnoffa. W trakcie rekonstrukcji skupimy się na najistotniejszych cechach poznania intuitywnego, które będą kluczem zarówno do zrozumienia wielości tradycyjnych już odniesień i niejawnych odwoływań do intuicji, jak i sposobem poprzez który możliwe stanie się ustalenie warunków możliwości ugruntowania metafizyki jako dziedziny autonomicznego badania rzeczywistości. (shrink)

A standard contemporary formulation of essentialism defines essential properties with a help of a concept of possible worlds. It is often argued that in order to use possible worlds effectively, facts about transworld identity of individuals need to be determined. In this paper I discuss how essentialist might attempt the issue of transworld identity of individuals. Specifically, I analyze a connection between essentialism and the two theories that explain the transworld identity issue, that is, haecceitism and antihaecceitism. I provide a (...) detailed analysis of different variants of antihaecceitism and argue, that all of them are incompatible with basic intuitions that stay behind essentialism. In contrast to that, I defend a position that essentialism ought to be combined with some form of haecceitism. In the remainder of this paper I provide the two ways through which essentialist might be a haecceitist. (shrink)

It is said that transcendental phenomenology faces an unavoidable aporia, according to which it is perfectly justified to accept the claim that the transcendental ego constitutes the sense of all external being, including other subjects, as well as the claim that other subjects constitute the sense of all external objects, since they are a community of transcendental egos. The essence of the aporia is that it is impossible to accept both of these claims if one accepts the conceptual schema of (...) transcendental phenomenology. In the article, I present an interpretation of transcendental phenomenology which allows one to avoid such consequences. Firstly, the static theory of intersubjectivity presented in Ideas of Pure Phenomenology and Carthesian Meditations is reconstructed and analyzed. Attention is devoted to the issues of phenomenological reduction and constitution of sense. Afterwards, it is argued that one should distinguish two kinds of constitutive processes: one understood as an activity of the sole transcendental ego (self), and the second one as an activity of the community of transcendental egos. It is claimed that both processes are mutually connected. Moreover, it seems that the second kind of constitution is metaphysically prior then the former one. This claim will allow one to overcome solipsistic interpretations of transcendental phenomenology and to overcome the aporia presented. (shrink)

W artykule rozważana jest koncepcja nagiego substratu w kontekście problemu indywiduacji. Głównym celem tekstu jest obrona teorii nagiego substratu (TNS) przed klasycznymi oraz współczesnymi zarzutami. Tok rozważań jest następujący: Autor we wstępie definiuje problem jednostkowienia i systematyzuje obecną dyskusję nad tym zagadnieniem. Następnie skupia się na porównaniu teorii wiązki i teorii nagiego substratu, ujętych jako alternatywne wyjaśnienia jednostkowości przedmiotów. Celem porównania dwóch teorii jest przedstawienie motywacji stojących za przyjęciem TNS. Głównym elementem tekstu jest punkt 2, w którym analizuje podstawowe założenia (...) TNS oraz odpiera wytaczane wobec niej zarzuty. Autor wykazuje, że warunkiem możliwości przezwyciężenia zarzutów z przeludnienia i regresu jest modyfikacja TNS i postulat teorii identyczności. (shrink)

According to actualism about possible worlds everything that exists is actual. Possible worlds and individuals are actually existing abstract parts of the actual world. Aristotelian actualism is a view that there are only actual individuals but no possible ones, nor their individual abstract representatives. Because of that, our actualist account of modality should differ depending on whether it concerns actual individuals or possible ones. The main goal of the dissertation is to develop a metaphysical framework for Aristotelian actualism. Chapter 1 (...) explains basic issues associated with the possible world approach to modality. I overview modal realist and actualist views on possible worlds and explain why I support the actualist approach. Subsequently, I introduce a distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian actualism, and discuss some semantic issues associated with actualism as such. In Chapter 2 I argue that Aristotelian actualism, modeled on linguistic ersatzism, is preferable over its Platonic counterpart. Subsequently, I propose a metaphysical framework for Aristotelian ersatzism which is based on a claim that our modal concepts work differently for actual and possible individuals. In order to explain that claim I introduce three specific differences concerning modal features of actual and possible individuals: (a) Representational Difference, according to which actual and possible individuals are represented differently by possible worlds; (b) Metaphysical Difference, according to which actual and possible individuals are represented by possible worlds as having different metaphysical nature; (c) Modal Difference, which says while there are singular and contingent possibilities involving actual individuals, all possibilities about possible individuals are general and necessary. I propose to interpret those differences in terms of the doctrines of haecceitism, antihaecceitism and existentialism. There is however no consensus on how those views should be characterized. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus on providing a precise characterization of those doctrines. Chapter 3 focuses on the doctrines of modal haecceitism and antihaecceitism, which I view as opposite accounts of how possible worlds represent possibilities. According to modal haecceitism what possible worlds say about particular individuals does not supervene on what they say qualitatively. Modal antihaecceitism is a denial of such a claim. Chapter 4 concerns metaphysical haecceitism and antihaecceitism, which I take to be alternative accounts of the fundamental structure of reality. For the metaphysical haecceitist reality contains irreducible singular facts, while for the metaphysical antihaecceitist reality is purely qualitative and general. Chapter 5 focuses on an argument between existentialists and antiexistentialists. Existentialists claim that there are contingent singular propositions, while antiexistentialists deny that. I defend existentialism against antiexistentialist counterarguments, as well as criticize some of the antiexistentialist accounts of singular propositions modeled on the notion of individual essence. In Chapter 6, by appealing to the results of investigations conducted in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I reconsider Representational, Metaphysical and Modal Differences. According to a view that I propose: (a) Representational Difference entails (extreme) modal haecceitism for actual individuals but (extreme) modal antihaecceitism for possible individuals; (b) Metaphysical Difference entails metaphysical haecceitism (individualism) for actual individuals, but metaphysical antihaecceitism (generalism) for possible individuals; finally (c) Modal Difference entails existentialism: while there are singular and contingent possibilities involving actual individuals, all possibilities about possible individuals are general and necessary. In Chapter 6, I also explain the implications of those views for the various issues, including transworld identity, essentialism, or the modal status of modal space. Lastly, Chapter 7 overviews some semantic and metaphysical applications of Aristotelian ersatzism. I explain how it manages to accommodate Kripkean semantics and how it is able to account for the possibilities of indiscernibles, alien individuals and iterated modalities. I also address some possible objections to my proposal, including an issue of implicit representation and the Humphrey objection. (shrink)

This article examines Karol Wojtyła’s concept of participation and alienation by starting the discussion on his personalist anthropology, leading to his structure of the human community. Wojtyła’s personalist anthropology reveals to us the nature of the human person as a unique, unrepeatable personal subjectivity. According to Wojtyła, the human act takes us to the knowledge and understanding of the person’s interiority and simultaneously allows us to have a glimpse of the human person’s specific complexity. Then, I analyze the correlation (...) between person-action in living and acting with other persons. Here, I attempt to demonstrate that if our existence has to acquire any human significance, it is that, rather than alienation, which makes such a unique experience possible. Finally, I explored the impact of the failure to grasp a genuine understanding of the human person and the capacity to participate in the humanity of other persons, setting a profound sense of alienation that dehumanizes us to our very core. This paper aims to answer the following questions: Given the actions that can be performed ‘together with others,’ how does the person’s acting with others affect the dynamic correlation of the action with the person? What is the significance of this participation for the personalistic value of the action? Why is alienation antithetical to participation? (shrink)

The objective of this work is to investigate Karol Wojtyła’s meta-ethics. Following the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition, he maintains that ethics is a science. Contrary to the Aristotelian tradition, which conceives ethics as a practical science, Wojtyła sustains that ethics is also a science with theoretical objectivity. He posits the human “experience of morality,” in a specific sense, the moral experience of “I ought to do x”, as the ground for the objectivity of ethics as science. He also critiques (...) the understanding of experience as merely a sense-perception and appearance/phenomenon in empiricism and phenomenalism. However, it maintains the phenomenological understanding of experience as “lived-experience.” Thus, this work is an attempt to flesh out Karol Wojtyla's meta-ethics by investigating the following: 1. Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy of Person as an Efficacious Moral Person. 2. Wojtyła’s Objectivity of Experience as Subjective Fact. 3. Exposition of his Understanding of Ethics. 4. Discussion of the experience of “I ought to do x”: As the Moral Ground in Karol Wojtyła’s Meta-Ethics. 5. A critical Evaluation and Conclusion. (shrink)

This work contends that the metaphysical understanding of the human person, simply as a rational and free being is incomprehensive, and for a comprehensive understanding of the human person, there is a need to understand the human person as a conscious being in action and in relationship within and without itself due to the shared consciousness of 「仁。」To guide this philosophical investigation, the writer posits the research question: How can the philosophy of Karol Wojtyła on the human person help (...) to deepen the understanding of the Confucian philosophy of person as 「仁者」? Thus, in this research the writer has three main tasks. The first task is to substantially investigate and expound the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła. The second task is to investigate and expose the Confucian concept of 「仁。」The third task is to discourse the human person by the means of a re-interpretation of the concept of 「仁者」as the Wojtyłian concept of “Person-revealed-in-Action.” So, the entire Part One of this work, is aimed at achieving the first task, and the entire Part Two, is aimed at achieving the second and the third tasks of the investigation. The Philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła, is substantially influenced by the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, and the Philosophy of Max Scheler. Hence, the writer creates the background for the exposition of Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology by presenting a discourse on Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler. And to understand the concept of persona in Thomas Aquinas there is a need to discuss the philosophical anthropology of Socrates-Plato, Aristotle and Boethius. On the other hand, to understand the phenomenology of Max Scheler, which Karol Wojtyła employed in his analysis of human experience and action, the writer briefly exposes the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl the founder of phenomenological movement and the phenomenology of Heidegger the student of Husserl and the contemporary of Max Scheler. Hence, the writer considers an exposition of the concept of 「仁，」from the perspective of textual analysis of the meaning of 仁 as it is found in three classical text: 《 論語》, 《中庸 》and《孟子》. These three Confucian classics all consider 「仁」as not just an important concept in Confucianism, but as the concept that defines the human person, as the quiddity of the human person. The writer therefore, synthesizes Wojtyła’s concept of “person-revealed-in-action”, and the Confucian concept of 「仁者，」to affirm a philosophy of person that is indeed wholistic and comprehensive. This philosophy of person, the writer gives the name: “Jenism.” “Jenism” then, is the concept of the human person (人) understood from a synthesis of the Wojtyłian concept of human action and the Confucian understanding of 「仁。」This understanding of the human person, does not only explain the metaphysical quiddity of the human person, but also explains the specific difference of the human life. The writer, therefore, is persuaded to think that a philosophy of person has been developed that is capable of responding to the philosophical anthropological problematics of our contemporary times. Especially, with problematics that are related to Ethics, Bioethics, Human Dignity and Artificial Intelligence. (shrink)

In Gaudium et Spes, the Catholic Church describes marital discernment as the married couple’s “common reflection and effort… [that] involves a consideration of their own good and the good of their children” and also as “an estimation of the good of the family… [that necessitates] prudent reflection and common decision.” With this description, we can say that the Catholic Church expects and desires married couples to resolve marital and family conflicts by coming together in discernment. And yet, how should married (...) couples discern? How should they exercise marital discernment? Since one cannot just go on discerning blindly without minding some rules, without following some basic steps, Ricoeur would emphasize that “discernment calls for a hermeneutics.” But how should hermeneutics be integrated into the process of marital discernment? This paper makes an attempt to integrate hermeneutics into the process of marital discernment by drawing some key principles from Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology and Karol Wojtyła’s phenomenology of spousal love. In so doing, this paper considers how the dynamics of marital discernment can be rendered more balanced, and hence more effective, in attaining conflict resolution within the family. (shrink)

Human beings by nature are rational beings. They are endowed with the gift of intellect in order to known, discern, and examine their self, reality, and God. The proper end of man’s intellectual endeavor is the Truth. However, attaining the truth is not an immediate and simple endeavor. The history of man reveals how various thinkers have debated and argued concerning the truth. Especially during the medieval and enlightenment period where the critical clash between faith and reason took place. The (...) medieval period thinkers emphasized the authority of faith in understanding the truth who is God. on the other hand, the enlightenment thinkers abandoned the eligibility of faith and solely relied on the capacity of reason. hence, the problem is: Which among these two modes of learning – faith and reason - will enable man to elevate himself towards the truth? This controversy was being addressed by Pope John Paul II on his encyclical letter Fides et Ratio. In the letter, he emphasized the mutual relationship between faith and reason. These two are distinct yet complementary factors in journeying towards the truth. This relationship is also understood under the context of Aristotle’s theory of the golden mean. This theory suggests that man should strike the mean and avoid the two vices: excess and defect. By moderation, man will become virtuous. Applying to the dialogue between faith and reason, man should avoid exceeding in giving authority to either of the two. Excess in faith would result to fideism and excess in reason would result to rationalism. Hence, man should observe moderation in order to have a harmonious dialogue between faith and reason. In this paper, the researcher will expose the relevance of Aristotle’s theory of moderation towards harmonizing the dialogue between faith and reason as seen in the Fides et Ratio of Karol Wojtyla. First, the researcher will discuss Aristotle’s theory of the Golden Mean; second, the researcher will expose the relationship between faith and reason in Pope John Paul II’s fides et ratio; and third will be the application of Aristotelian Moderation in the context of the dialogical encounter between faith and reason. -/- . (shrink)

This article contains the interpretation of Karol Wojtyla's report entitled "The Personality Structure of Self-Determination» and the basic aspects of Wojtyla's personality act theory. The topic of personal self-determination is central for contemporary Thomistic philosophical anthropology. The development of this topic by Karol Wojtyla includes realistic phenomenological notion of experience and classical Thomistic principles of act and potency. The philosophical analysis of experience of the effectiveness of personality emphasizes multidimensional orientation of the article. Consideration of personality’s self-determination brings (...) axiological, ethical and theological aspects to philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

The article aims at showing that the philosophical personalism of Pope John Paul II stems from the common sense approach to reality. First, it presents Karol Wojtyla as a framer of the Lublin Philosophical School, to which he was affiliated for 24 years before being elected Pope John Paul II; it shows Wojtyla’s role in establishing this original philosophical School by his contribution to its endorsement of Thomism, its way of doing philosophy, and its classically understood personalism. Secondly, it (...) identifies a purpose of Wojtyla’s use of the phenomenological method in his personalism and reconstructs Wojtyla’s possible answer to the question whether there is a link between moral sense and common sense in human experience. (shrink)

The Polish philosophy of mathematics in the 19th century is not a well-researched topic. For this period, only five philosophers are usually mentioned, namely Jan Śniadecki, Józef Maria Hoene-Wroński, Henryk Struve, Samuel Dickstein, and Edward Stamm. This limited and incomplete perspective does not allow us to develop a well-balanced picture of the Polish philosophy of mathematics and gauge its influence on 19th- and 20th-century Polish philosophy in general. To somewhat complete our picture of the history of the Polish philosophy of (...) mathematics in those times, we here present the profiles of some lesser-known Polish Romantic philosophers of the 19th century, namely Karol Libelt, Bronisław Trentowski, and Józef Kremer. We discuss their contributions to the philosophy of mathematics and their metaphysical perspectives, and we also show how their metaphysical ideas have found some continuity in the studies of some Catholic philosophers. (shrink)

The Polish philosophy of mathematics in the 19th century had its origins in the Romantic period under the influence of the then-predominant idealist philosophies. The decline of Romantic philosophy precipitated changes in general philosophy, but what is less well known is how it triggered changes in the philosophy of mathematics. In this paper, we discuss how the Polish philosophy of mathematics evolved from the metaphysical approach that had been formed during the Romantic era to the more modern positivistic paradigm. These (...) evolutionary changes are attributed to the philosophers Henryk Struve, Antoni Molicki and Julian Ochorowicz, and mathematicians Karol Hertz and Samuel Dickstein. We also show how implicit ideas (i.e., those not declared openly) from the area between the philosophy of science and general philosophy played a crucial role in the paradigm shift in the Polish philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

The article aims at demonstrating that, by his teaching on human person and his action, St. John Paul II (also known as Karol Wojtyła) implicitly contributed to a resolution of the most serious problem of contemporary philosophy, which consists in separating wisdom from love and substituting wisdom with understanding or knowledge. The author concludes that John Paul II makes a persuasive contribution to recover philosophy as the love of wisdom by (1) identifying truth in the area of freedom, self-fulfillment (...) and conscience, and (2) appealing to man’s honesty and happiness. (shrink)

Artykuł przedstawia historię sporów i polemik naukowych na temat teorii ewolucji oraz publikacji Karola Darwina, jakie miały miejsce w w Polsce w drugiej połowie XIX wieku.

When future historians chronicle the twentieth century, they will see phenomenology as one of the preeminent social and ethical philosophies of its age. The phenomenological movement not only produced systematic reflection on common moral concerns such as distinguishing right from wrong and explaining the status of values; it also called on philosophy to renew European societies facing crisis, an aim that inspired thinkers in interwar Europe as well as later communist bloc dissidents. Despite this legacy, phenomenology continues to be largely (...) discounted as esoteric and solipsistic, the last gasp of a Cartesian dream to base knowledge on the isolated rational mind. Intellectual histories tend to cite Husserl's epistemological influence on philosophies like existentialism and deconstruction without considering his social or ethical imprint. And while a few recent scholars have begun to note phenomenology's wider ethical resonance, especially in French social thought, its image as stubbornly academic continues to hold sway. _The Far Reaches_ challenges that image by tracing the first history of phenomenological ethics and social thought in Central Europe, from its founders Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl through its reception in East Central Europe by dissident thinkers such as Jan Patocka, Karol Wojtyla, and Václav Havel. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to situate the ethics of Karol Wojtyla in the context of personalist philosophy - a 20th century philosophical and theological movement that seeks to investigate reality from the point of view of the human person. Personalism places persons and personal relationships at the center of theory and practice and explores the significance of personhood across disciplines and traditions. In terms of methodology, personalism takes into consideration the data gathered by empirical sciences and our (...) lived experiences as part of our community. While not to be thought of exclusively as a moral philosophy, most personalist philosophies place strong emphasis on ethical concerns. Personalist philosophers maintain that experience ought to be the starting point for the philosophical analysis of the person. At the outset, it must be clarified that this paper is not a systematization of the ethics of Wojtyla per se for there is no such thing as Wojtyla's ethics that can be set apart from other ethical systems in general or from Christian ethics in particular. Wojtyla did not develop his own “original” ethical system or philosophy. As many critics have pointed out, Wojtyla’s philosophical project can be best described as incomplete. His work is a picture of Aristotelian-Thomism enriched by phenomenological analysis of the human person. He develops a phenomenology of the subject grounded on a personalist principle. (shrink)

The tradition of realist phenomenology was founded in around 1902 by a group of students in Munich interested in the newly published Logical Investigations of Edmund Husserl. Initial members of the group included Johannes Daubert, Alexander Pfänder, Adolf Reinach and Max Scheler. With Reinach’s move to Göttingen the group acquired two new prominent members – Edith Stein and Roman Ingarden. The group’s method turned on Husserl’s idea that we are in possession a priori (which is to say: non-inductive) knowledge of (...) entities (for example, colors, tones, values, shapes) of a range of different sorts. Pfänder applied this method in his descriptive psychology of willing and motivation, Reinach (anticipating the later speech act theory) to what he called ‘social acts’, Stein to the ontology of communities, and Ingarden to works of art and aesthetic phenomena. The movement latter, through Ingarden, lived on in Poland, where it influenced the young Karol Wojtyła. (shrink)

¿Cómo objetivar la subjetividad sin caer en subjetivismos inmanentistas ni en objetivismos ajenos a la existencia personal? Desde el realismo filosófico la clave parece encontrarse en la adecuada articulación entre conciencia y subjetividad. Estudiaremos las teorías de la conciencia de Antonio Millán-Puelles y Karol Wojtyła desde la onto-fenomenología para hallar el modo de superar esta aporía. -/- How to objectify subjectivity without falling into either immanent subjectivisms or objectivisms foreign to personal existence? From the perspective of realist philosophy the (...) key seems to be found in an appropriate articulation between consciousness and subjectivity. We are going to study the theories of consciousness in Antonio Millán-Puelles and Karol Wojtyła from onto-phenomenology in order to find the way to overcome this aporia. (shrink)

In the article I reconstruct Karol Wojtyła’s argument against atheism. According to Wojtyła, an atheist is unjust because of not rendering absolute honour to God. In my opinion the argument is sound if one applies it to theists or negative atheists and if one presupposes that there are moral obligations to only supposed persons. The argument meets some objections. A discussion of them leads me to an interpretation of the theism-atheism controversy as being the conflict of two imperatives: the (...) imperative of justice and the imperative of evidence. (shrink)

Доповідь «Особова структура самовизначення» представлена 23 IV 1974 р. у Неаполі на Конгресі до 700-ліття смерті св. Томи, організованого 17–24 квітня 1974 р. в Римі-Неаполі заходами ордену домініканців; доповідь також виголошена 12 березня 1974 р. в рамках XVII Філософського тижня KUL (загальна тема тижня: «Актуальність томізму. До 700-ліття смерті св. Томи»). Переклад здійснено Інною Савинською за Wojtyla Karol. Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne. – Lublin: KUL. – 2000. – s. 422–432.

Переклад з польської доповіді Кароля Войтили "Особова структура самовизначення", представлена 23 IV 1974 р. у Неаполі на Конгресі до 700-ліття смерті св. Томи, організованого 17–24 квітня 1974 р. в Римі-Неаполі заходами ордену домініканців; доповідь також виголошена 12 березня 1974 р. в рамках XVII Філософського тижня KUL (загальна тема тижня: «Актуальність томізму. До 700-ліття смерті св. Томи»). Переклад здійснено Інною Савинською за Wojtyla Karol. Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne. – Lublin: KUL. – 2000. – s. 422–432.

Доповідь «Особова структура самовизначення» представлена 23 IV 1974 р. у Неаполі на Конгресі до 700-ліття смерті св. Томи, організованого 17–24 квітня 1974 р. в Римі-Неаполі заходами ордену домініканців; доповідь також виголошена 12 березня 1974 р. в рамках XVII Філософського тижня KUL (загальна тема тижня: «Актуальність томізму. До 700-ліття смерті св. Томи»). Переклад здійснено Інною Савинською за Wojtyla Karol. Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne. – Lublin: KUL. – 2000. – s. 422–432.

This paper reconnects the personal and the biological by extending the reach of parental causality. First, it argues that the reproductive act is profitably understood in personal terms as an “invitation” to new life and that the egg and sperm are “ambassadors” or “delegates,” because they represent the potential mother and father and are naturally endowed with causal powers to bring about motherhood and fatherhood, two of the most significant roles a person may have. Second, it argues that even though (...) God alone can create a spiritual soul, the human parents are not just the causes of their child’s body; they are the secondary causes of the whole child. In this way, God acts as a kind of “sponsor” who enables the acceptance of the invitation issued by the parents, and he accepts it on behalf of the new human person that comes to be thanks to their invitation. (shrink)