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  1. Truth-Predicates Still Not Like Pronouns: A Reply to Salis.Arvid Båve - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1421-1429.
    I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth. In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about ’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.
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  • From One to Many: Recent Work on Truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.
    In this paper, we offer a brief, critical survey of contemporary work on truth. We begin by reflecting on the distinction between substantivist and deflationary truth theories. We then turn to three new kinds of truth theory—Kevin Scharp's replacement theory, John MacFarlane's relativism, and the alethic pluralism pioneered by Michael Lynch and Crispin Wright. We argue that despite their considerable differences, these theories exhibit a common "pluralizing tendency" with respect to truth. In the final section, we look at the underinvestigated (...)
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  • Semantic Dispositionalism Without Exceptions.Arvid Båve - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    Semantic dispositionalism is roughly the view that meaning a certain thing by a word, or possessing a certain concept, consists in being disposed to do something, e.g., infer a certain way. Its main problem is that it seems to have so many and disparate exceptions. People can fail to infer as required due to lack of logical acumen, intoxication, confusion, deviant theories, neural malfunctioning, and so on. I present a theory stating possession conditions of concepts that are counterfactuals, rather than (...)
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  • The Naïve Conception of Properties.Benjamin Schnieder - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):322-342.
    The semantic rules that govern ordinary property discourse appear to give rise to a version of Russell's antinomy. Do we therefore have an inconsistent conception of properties? This paper firstly develops a consistent conception of properties and secondly argues that we may indeed interpret ordinary property discourse as expressing the consistent conception rather than an inconsistent one.
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