This article takes a novel approach to explaining the causes of unethical behavior in organizations. Instead of explaining the unethical behavior of employees in terms of their bad organization, this article examines how a good organization can lead to employees’ unethical behavior. The main idea is that the more ethical an organization becomes, the higher, in some respects, is the likelihood of unethical behavior. This is due to four threatening forces that become stronger when an organization becomes more ethical. These (...) forces are the upward, downward, backward, and forward forces. Each of these forces is illustrated with two effects and each effect is explained by a specific theory. The effects are the effects of the gold digger, high-jump bar, retreating-cat, forbidden-fruit, cheese slicer, moving-spotlight, repeat-prescription, and keeping-up appearances. This paradox of ethics, when goodness breeds badness, opens new research directions. (shrink)

I broadly explore the question by examining several common criticisms of CEO pay through both philosophical and empirical lenses. While some criticisms appear to be unfounded, the analysis shows not only that current compensation practices are problematic both from the standpoint of distributive justice and fairness, but also that incentive pay ultimately exacerbates the very agency problem it is purported to solve.

In the last decade, many problematic cases of scientific conduct have been diagnosed; some of which involve outright fraud others are more subtle. These and similar problems can be interpreted as caused by lack of scientific objectivity. The current philosophical theories of objectivity do not provide scientists with conceptualizations that can be effectively put into practice in remedying these issues. We propose a novel way of thinking about objectivity for individual scientists; a negative and dynamic approach.We provide a philosophical conceptualization (...) of objectivity that is informed by empirical research. In particular, it is our intention to take the first steps in providing an empirically and methodologically informed inventory of factors that impair the scientific practice. The inventory will be compiled into a negative conceptualization, which could in principle be used by individual scientists to assess objectivity of scientific practice. We propose a preliminary outline of a usable and testable instrument for indicating the objectivity of scientific practice. (shrink)

Information theorists often construe new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) as leveling mechanisms, regulating power relations at a distance by arming stakeholders with information and enhanced agency. Management theorists have claimed that transparency cultivates stakeholder trust, distinguishes a business from its competition, and attracts new clients, investors, and employees, making it key to future growth and prosperity. Synthesizing these claims, we encounter an increasingly common view: If corporations voluntarily adopted new ICTs in order to foster transparency, trust, and growth, while (...) embracing the redistributions of power they bring about, both corporations and stakeholders would benefit. The common view is short-sighted, however. In order to realize mutual benefit, transparency can not be conceived merely as efficient or economical. The implementation and use of new ICTs will be morally unsatisfactory unless they stably protect stakeholders. Moreover, without such protections, transparency is unlikely to produce lasting trust and growth. More specifically, corporate disclosures ought to be guided by a theory of stakeholder rights to know about threats or risks to stakeholders’ basic interests. Such rights are necessary moral protections for stakeholders in any business environment. Respect for transparency rights is not simply value added to a corporation’s line of goods and services, but a condition of a corporation’s justifiable claim to create value rather than harm, wrong, or injustice in its dealings. (shrink)

Growing recognition in both the psychological and management literature of the concept of “good people” has caused a paradigm shift in our understanding of wrongful behavior: Wrongdoings that were previously assumed to be based on conscious choice—that is, deliberate decisions—are often the product of intuitive processes that prevent people from recognizing the wrongfulness of their behavior. Several leading scholars have dubbed this process as an ethical “blind spot.” This study explores the main implications of the good people paradigm on the (...) regulation of employees’ conflicts of interest. In two experiments, we examined the efficacy of traditional deterrence- and morality-based interventions in encouraging people to maintain their professional integrity and objectivity at the cost of their own self-interest. Results demonstrate that while the manipulated conflict was likely to “corrupt” people under intuitive/automatic mindset, explicit/deliberative mechanisms had a much larger constraining effect overall on participants’ judgment than did implicit measures, with no differences between deterrence and morality. The findings demonstrate how little is needed to compromise the employees’ ethical integrity, but they also suggest that a modest explicit/deliberative intervention can easily prevent much of the wrongdoing that may otherwise result. (shrink)

This article argues that positioning disclosure as a primary remedy in addressing the ethical problems posed by conflicts of interest in medicine and health is an error. Instead, bioethical resources should be devoted to the problems associated with sequestration, defined as the elimination of relationships between commercial industries and health professionals in all cases where it is remotely feasible. The argument begins by arguing that adopting Andrew Stark’s conceptual framework for COIs leads to advantages in understanding COIs and in ordering (...) priorities for intervention. The article then draws on prior work establishing that COIs are, under ordinary epidemiologic standards, properly regarded as population health hazards. This justifies attention to possible remedies, of which disclosure generates by far the most analysis. Such primacy is unwarranted given the extensive evidence suggesting that disclosure as a remedy for COIs is at best ineffective. ‘At best’ is justified because the evidence also shows that disclosure may have a perverse effect, intensifying biased behaviors. Expending significant attention on an ineffective or even deleterious intervention is unjustified and also crowds out devotion of resources to the real problems that attend sequestration. Therefore, disclosure ought to be regarded as a lower priority among possible COI interventions. (shrink)

Examples of patients with anorexia nervosa, depression or borderline personality disorder who have decision-making capacity as currently operationalized, but refuse treatment, are discussed. It appears counterintuitive to respect their treatment refusal because their wish seems to be fuelled by their illness and the consequences of their refusal of treatment are severe. Some proposed solutions have focused on broadening the criteria for decision-making capacity, either in general or for specific patient groups, but these adjustments might discriminate against particular groups of patients (...) and render the process less transparent. Other solutions focus on preferences expressed when patients are not ill, but this information is often not available. The reason for such difficulties with assessing decision-making capacity is that the underlying psychological processes of normal decision-making are not well known and one cannot differentiate between unwise decisions caused by an illness or other factors. The proposed alternative, set out in this paper, is to allow compulsory treatment of patients with decision-making capacity in cases of an emergency, if the refusal is potentially life threatening, but only for a time-limited period. The argument is also made for investigating hindsight agreement, in particular after compulsory measures. -/- . (shrink)

The primary claim of this paper is that intellectual conflicts of interest (COIs) exist but are of lower ethical priority than COIs flowing from relationships between health professionals and commercial industry characterized by financial exchange. The paper begins by defining intellectual COIs and framing them in the context of scholarship on non-financial COIs. However, the paper explains that the crucial distinction is not between financial and non-financial COIs but is rather between motivations for bias that flow from relationships and those (...) that do not. While commitments to particular ideas or perspectives can cause all manner of cognitive bias, that fact does not justify denying the enormous power that relationships featuring pecuniary gain have on professional behaviour in term of care, policy, or both. Sufficient reason exists to take both intellectual COIs and financial COIs seriously, but this paper demonstrates why the latter is of higher ethical priority. Multiple reasons will be provided, but the primary rationale grounding the claim is that intellectual COIs may provide reasons to suspect cognitive bias but they do not typically involve a loss of trust in a social role. The same cannot be said for COIs flowing from relationships between health professionals and commercial industries involving financial exchange. The paper then assumes arguendo that the primary rationale is mistaken and proceeds to show why the claims that intellectual COIs are more significant than relationship-based COIs are dubious on their own merits. The final section of the paper summarizes and concludes. (shrink)

Patient visits are an important opportunity for general practitioners to discuss the risks of smoking and cessation strategies. In Australia, the guidelines on cessation published by the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners represent a key resource for GPs in this regard. The predominant message of the Guidelines is that pharmacotherapy should be recommended as first-line therapy for smokers expressing an interest in quitting. This, however, ignores established evidence about the success of unassisted quitting. Our analysis of the Guidelines identifies (...) a number of potential conflicts of interest which may have affected the advice provided. These include extensive funding by the pharmaceutical industry of sources cited to support the recommendations, and relations between members of the Guidelines Content Advisory Group and the pharmaceutical industry. Recommendations issued by professional bodies have enormous potential impact upon public health and there is a need for the highest levels of scrutiny and transparency in their development. Information about research cited in guidelines should include funding sources, and developers should be free of obvious conflicts of interest. Smoking remains the leading preventable cause of global mortality. Concerns related to pharmaceutical industry funding of research, scientific integrity and recommendations on smoking cessation by medical advisory groups clearly have implications beyond Australia. (shrink)

In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art.Every physician-patient encounter is a conflict of interest. Every physician-payer encounter is also a conflict of interest.Wide-spread criticism of the pharmaceutical industry’s extravagant marketing practices and some doctors’ undignified, even appalling eagerness to stuff themselves, their pockets and their offices with the industry’s “stuff,” prompted physician groups, the drug and device industry itself to institute reforms designed better to limit industry influence on physicians.But according to Troyen Brennan and his (...) coauthors, the reforms, while reducing some of the most egregious instances of industry influence peddling and physicians’ self-debasement, were doomed fundamentally, for three reasons. First, they were based on common sense but incorrect assumptions about the mechanism of industry influence and on myths about the efficacy of disclosure as an ethical disinfectant. Second, they relied on voluntary adherence and so failed to pinpoint responsibility for monitoring compliance and enforcement. (shrink)

We investigate how a broker firm’s initial public offering affects its analysts’ fiduciary duty of providing independent and objective recommendations. We find that the analysts of newly listed broker firms issue more positively biased recommendations in the first 2 to 3 years after their employers’ IPO than before the IPO. The increase in the recommendation bias is greater among analysts of affiliated brokers and brokers that raise additional capital after their IPO than among other analysts. Newly listed broker firms experience (...) significant increases in revenue and trading commission, and the increases are positively related to recommendation bias, after controlling for many other factors. More importantly, recommendation bias decreases as newly listed broker firms season and as the importance of trading commission declines. This suggests that public exposure through a broker firm’s IPO does not enhance the integrity and professional conduct of its financial analysts. Rather, economic incentives make financial analysts more accepting of unethical behavior. The overall results imply that the public trading of financial gatekeepers compromises the ethical relationship between financial service professionals and society in general. (shrink)

We argue that although halal certification could potentially reduce the high transaction costs related to buying Islamic financial products, in practice these costs are just replaced by transaction costs relating to the certification itself. It takes considerable time (2–3 months) and money (USD 122.000) to obtain a halal certification. Partially, this is because the market is highly concentrated and non-contestable. About 20 individual Sharia scholars control more than half the market, with the top 3 earning an estimated USD 4.5 million (...) in fees per year. Moreover, this market seems plagued with problems, most notably a strong incentive for excessively lenient certification, lack of consensus on what is considered halal and sub-standard governance practices. We discuss solutions to these problems and conclude that a neutral non-profit government entity should assume the role of halal certifiers. (shrink)

Recent professional guidelines published by the General Medical Council instruct physicians in the UK to be honest and open in any financial agreements they have with their patients and third parties. These guidelines are in addition to a European policy addressing disclosure of physician financial interests in the industry. Similarly, In the US, a national open payments program as well as Federal regulations under the Affordable Care Act re-address the issue of disclosure of physician financial interests in America. These new (...) professional and legal changes make us rethink the fiduciary duties of providers working under new organizational and financial schemes, specifically their clinical fidelity and their moral and professional obligations to act in the best interests of patients. The article describes the legal changes providing the background for such proposals and offers a prima facie ethical analysis of these evolving issues. It is argued that although disclosure of conflicting interest may increase trust it may not necessarily be beneficial to patients nor accord with their expectations and needs. Due to the extra burden associated with disclosure as well as its implications on the medical profession and the therapeutic relationship, it should be held that transparency of physician financial interest should not result in mandatory disclosure of such interest by physicians. It could lead, as some initiatives in Europe and the US already demonstrate, to voluntary or mandatory disclosure schemes carried out by the industry itself. Such schemes should be in addition to medical education and the address of the more general phenomenon of physician conflict of interest in ethical codes and ethical training of the parties involved. (shrink)

Investigator and institutional financial conflicts of interest have raised concerns about both the integrity of clinical research and protecting the rights and welfare of research participants. In response, professional groups and governmental bodies have issued guidance for managing conflicts of interest to minimize their potential untoward effects. Although a variety of approaches have been offered, a common protection is to disclose financial interests in research to potential research participants as part of the recruitment and informed consent process. This approach reinforces (...) a basic norm of candor, ideally allowing potential research participants to evaluate whether financial interests should affect their decision to participate in research. Disclosure to potential research participants is viewed as an alternative to having regulators or research institutions limit or prohibit all financial interests in research, assuming that not all such interests are unacceptable. (shrink)

This paper argues that consumer demand for unethical behavior such as fraud can impact employee turnover through market and psychological forces. Widespread conditions of unethical demand can improve career prospects for employees of unethical firms through higher income and stability associated with firm financial health. Similarly, unethical employees enjoy increased tenure from the financial and psychological rewards of prosocial behavior toward customers demanding corrupt or unethical behavior. We specifically examine the well-documented unethical demand for fraud in the vehicle emissions testing (...) industry, and its impact on employee tenure. We use data from tests conducted by several thousand licensed inspectors to demonstrate that fraudulent employees and employees of fraudulent firms enjoy longer tenure. These results suggest further work to separate the multiple psychological and economic mechanisms likely driving our findings. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 9, Page 14-15, September 2011.

A conflict of interest is a situation in which a person has competing loyalties or interests that make it difficult to fulfil his or her duties impartially. Conflict of interest is not categorically improper in itself but requires proper management. A SCOPUS literature search was performed for publications on the efficacy/safety of Phospho-Di-Esterase Inhibitors for treating erectile dysfunction. A categorization tool was used to review and classify the publications as supportive/not-supportive for the discussed active ingredient and reporting or not reporting (...) a COI for that specific drug or for the remaining PDEIs. Multivariable binary logistic regression was performed. In the 419 selected records the prevalence of supportive opinions was higher when a COI for the index label was declared. The CoOpCaT showed good internal consistency, discriminative validity and intra/inter-rater agreement. The strongest predictor for a supportive opinion was the total number of financial COIs for the index label. A mild protective effect of the total number of financial COIs for any competitor label was noted. Financial COIs have frequently been associated with bias, and the measures currently adopted to restrain it lack effectiveness. Some evidence for monitoring and/or compensating this bias is reported here, but the ultimate solution remains distant. (shrink)

ObjectiveWe argue that people often fail to perceive and process stimuli easily available to them. In other words, we challenge the tacit assumption that awareness is unbounded and provide evidence that humans regularly fail to see and use stimuli and information easily available to them. We call this phenomenon “bounded awareness” (Bazerman and Chugh in Frontiers of social psychology: negotiations, Psychology Press: College Park 2005). Findings We begin by first describing perceptual mental processes in which obvious information is missed—that is, (...) simply not seen—by the visual perceiver. Inattentional blindness and change blindness are examples. We then extend this phenomenon to decision making and forecasting, using evidence about focalism to illustrate how people over focus on some information and fail to use other easily available information. We next examine how these processes of bounded awareness may extend to other important domains and across levels of analysis, such as information-sharing in groups, decision making in negotiators, and in competitive bidding situations such as auctions.ConclusionsBounded awareness is a phenomenon that encompasses a variety of psychological processes, all of which lead to the same error: a failure to see, seek, use, or share important and relevant information that is easily seen, sought, used, or shared. (shrink)

I discuss under what conditions the objection that an expert’s argument is biased by her self-interest can be a meaningful and sound argumentative move. I suggest replacing the idea of bias qua self-interest by that of a conflict of interests, exploit the distinction between an expert context and a public context, and hold that the objection can be meaningful. Yet, the evaluation is overall negative, because the motivational role of self-interest for human behavior remains unclear. Moreover, if recent social-psychological results (...) from the “heuristics and biases” program are accepted, it is plausible to assume that humans also satisfice (rather than optimize/maximize) when identifying and then acting in their self-interest. My thesis is: insofar as the objection is sound with a particular audience, it is not needed; and insofar as the objection is needed, it is unsound. (shrink)

The research investigates the impacts of the 2008 GFC on the securities market supervision by identifying how securities regulators have responded to the GFC, adapted to the post-crisis market conditions, and developed a more responsive supervisory structure. Implications for emerging markets are drawn based on research finding analysis. Quantitative survey research and qualitative techniques with focus group interviews and documentary research are employed in a mixed-methodology under the paradigm of critical realism to generalize the crisis impacts on SMS. Findings of (...) the research include: the GFC has generated impacts on all areas of SMS framework. Discussion is focused on a paradigm shift in SMS philosophy, re-construction of SMS architecture, emerging of risk-based approach, involvement of securities regulators in macro-prudential supervision, disputable roles of self-regulatory organizations in market conduct oversight, and re-regulation of securities products, market intermediaries, market gatekeepers and SROs; post-crisis SMS responsiveness improvement was a result of post-crisis policy reform; and developed markets and emerging markets followed the same trend of post-crisis SMS reform but their ways diverged in some areas. Post-crisis SMS paradigm shift, prevalence of integration model, choices of developed and emerging markets between twin-peaks and integration, post-crisis diminishing roles of SROs, emergence of central banks, divergence of developed markets and emerging markets in policies are explained. Critical implications were developed for emerging markets, including: comprehending the post-crisis SMS paradigm shift and developing a new SMS philosophy; dealing with the dilemma of SMS restructuring post-crisis; identifying the tasks and challenges of applying risk-based approach; and, establishing a culture of responsive SMS. Contribution of this research is significant in terms of theory, body of knowledge, methodology and literature: the research is the first that describes a comprehensive theoretical framework of SMS, defines the concept of SMS responsiveness and develops a complete SMS framework. A new SMS philosophy is recommended through analysis of research findings; the research helps to reveal the actual impacts of the 2008 GFC on SMS, develops regulatory implications and recommends components of a responsive SMS framework.; the research outcomes justifies employment of mixed methodologies; and the research also provides qualitative and quantitative data that supplements the literature of the GFC and securities supervision. Empirical evidence of the research is theoretically justified, meaningful, realistic, and discrete and is capable of verification in any further research contexts. (shrink)

Academic-industry collaborations and the conflicts of interest (COI) arising out of them are not new. However, as industry funding for research in the life and health sciences has increased and scandals involving financial COI are brought to the public’s attention, demands for disclosure have grown. In a March 2008 American Council on Science and Health report by Ronald Bailey, he argues that the focus on COI—especially financial COI—is obsessive and likely to be more detrimental to scientific progress and public health (...) than COI themselves. In response, we argue that downplaying the potential negative impact of COI arising out of academic-industry relationships is no less harmful than overreacting to it. (shrink)