In this paper I discuss two attempts to challenge mainstream liberal education, by Hannah Arendt and by contemporary Israeli philosopher Hanan Alexander. Arendt and Alexander both identify problems in liberal-secular modern politics and present alternatives based on reconnecting politics and education to tradition. I analyze their positions and bring them into a dialogue that suggests a complex conception of education that avoids many of the pitfalls of modern liberal thought. First, I outline Arendt and Alexander’s educational views and discuss their (...) similarities, arguing that both may be understood as opposed to the modern attempt to adopt a «view from nowhere» at the world. Next, I suggest that Alexander’s view may benefit from adopting Arendt’s conceptions of tradition and authority. In the consecutive section, I argue that Alexander sheds light on significant problems in Arendt’s approach to education, problems his understanding of critical dialogue can help solve. The succeeding section joins the two views together to form an approach I call «critical traditionalism», and examines it against prevailing approaches to political education. I conclude by pointing to an important point overlooked by both Arendt and Alexander, namely the need for internal political struggle within each tradition. (shrink)

In this article, I distinguish personal autonomy from heteronomy, and consider whether autonomy provides a suitable basis for liberalism. I argue that liberal government should not promote autonomy in all its citizens, on the grounds that not all members of liberal democracies require autonomy for a good life. I then outline an alternative option that I call a liberalism of conscience, describing how it better respects heteronomous citizens. I subsequently clarify how a liberalism of conscience is different than, and superior (...) to, autonomy‐based versions of liberalism. (shrink)

In his thought-provoking book, Why Law Matters, Alon Harel defends two key claims: one ontological, the other axiological. First, he argues that constitutions and judicial review are necessary constituents of a just society. Second, he suggests that these institutions are not only means to the realization of worthy ends, but also non-instrumentally valuable. I agree with Harel that constitutions and judicial review have more than instrumental value, but I am not persuaded by his arguments in support of this conclusion. I (...) argue that Harel’s ontological claim is unsustainable, and that his axiological claim needs revision. Regarding the former, I show that constitutions and judicial review are only contingent constituents of a just society. Regarding the latter, I contest Harel’s specific account of the value of constitutions and judicial review. Harel grounds the non-instrumental value of constitutions in freedom as non-domination but, upon scrutiny, it emerges that their non-instrumental value lies elsewhere. Further, Harel holds that the non-instrumental value of judicial review stems from its embodying a right to a fair hearing. I argue that this right has non-instrumental value only under a particular set of circumstances. I thus conclude, contrary to Harel, that the non-instrumental value of judicial review is contingent on those circumstances obtaining. (shrink)

This article examines conceptions of autonomy outlined by Dearden, Callan, Dewey and Kerr and distinguishes between five conceptions, namely, belief autonomy, action autonomy, interest autonomy, purpose autonomy and social autonomy. While Kerr criticizes conceptions of autonomy which are not explicitly moral, this article argues that the emphasis in some philosophical literature has simply emphasized self-regarding virtues more than other-regarding virtues. Purpose autonomy is considered a rich conception of autonomy because it not only builds upon children’s interests but provides the initiative (...) and continuity to sustain interest even in challenging circumstances. (shrink)

Drawing on recent debates about the relationship between propositional and practical knowledge, this article is concerned with broad concepts of agency. Specifically, it is concerned with agency that involves the forming and putting into effect of intentions over relatively extended periods, particularly in work contexts (called, for want of a better term, ?project management?). The main focus of interest is thus not on ?know-how? in the sense of ability to perform types of tasks but on the ability to form and (...) carry through projects. Much, although by no means all, of the limited literature on this topic assumes that such abilities are largely independent of social interaction. This article will challenge that assumption. The article concludes with a reflection on the implications of an adequate account of project management ability for contemporary debates on the relationship between propositional and practical knowledge, and examines the implications for vocational and professional education that prepares people for this type of broadly based agency for their personal development. (shrink)

Liberal philosophers of education often concentrate on issues of accommodation and recognition coming from minority cultures within pluralistic societies. While this remains an important task, I argue that there are troubling currents within the mainstream culture that merit philosophical critique by liberals. In this thesis I situate the educational platform of liberal philosopher Eamonn Callan within critiques coming from social theorists concerned with the growing influence of the market in our culture. I argue that unless these critiques are taken seriously (...) liberals will have trouble translating their educational ideals into feasible modes of practice. I conclude by suggesting three ways in which this dialogue between liberals and social theorists can address these troubling currents. (shrink)

The development of a conception of critical pedagogy is itself an aspect of the development of critical rationality within late modern societies, closely connected with the role of education in developing critical rationality. The role of critique pervades all aspects of life: for people as citizens, workers and self-determining private individuals. Late modern societies depend on a critically minded population for their viability, for the democratic management of a competing balance of interests and for a capacity for rapid renewal. These (...) requirements put a demand on the education system for the development of critical rationality. However, its development contains within itself the seeds, not just of renewal, but of transformation or even anarchy. This is discussed in relation to three major aspects of education—liberal, civic and vocational—and it is argued that there is a tension within each that arises from the requirement of critique for their successful functioning as educational practices in liberal societies and from the implausibility of developing forms of critique that are inherently self-limiting. Societies that espouse the development of critical rationality as a key educational aim exist in a state of tension and of uncertainty as to the extent to which it can be developed. Attempts to limit critique to consideration only of what is worthwhile are bound to be futile. On the other hand, education must be concerned with preparation for the worthwhile. Critique thus performs the important function of ensuring that our conception of the worthwhile does not remain fixed, but is itself an agent of social change. This paper explores this issue and argues that the problem of reconciling preparation for social participation with preparation for critical engagement exists in all three spheres. The problems may not be resolvable ones but should encourage continual awareness of the scope and limits of educational critique in liberal societies. (shrink)

The question whether compulsory schooling is justifiable or not has been treated at considerable length by critics, defenders, and positions in-between. What these treatments—about paternalism and autonomy and institutionalization and more—have not directly analyzed is a question that precedes the issue of overall justification: the preliminary question of time. Does it matter when compulsion takes place? Furthermore, does the timing of compulsion matter to the question of overall justification? I will argue that it does matter, but for reasons not directly (...) related to the question of overall justification. (shrink)

Existing conceptions of autonomy tend to fall to one of two criticisms: they either fail to capture our intuitive understanding that autonomy implies an ability to act congruently with the demands of justice and equality, or they are unclear as to whether particular actions must be good by some standard to be considered autonomous. In this article I propose a conception of autonomy that is clear on both these fronts, and I show how this description is useful for both clarifying (...) what educators must do to teach for autonomy, and for resolving currently problematic issues in the literature on autonomy. (shrink)

This thesis explores the meaning and educational implications of respect in liberal multicultural democracies. Significantly, I examine respect from a philosophical perspective as a civic virtue, and hence as a central aim of civic education.

Autonomy as a personal ideal presupposes a conception of the self who owns and rules in a life that exemplifies the ideal. Philosophical discussion of autonomy continues to be injuenced by the thesis that the governing core of the self resides in our capacities for disengaged rational reflection, even when the thesis is not explicitly avowed. This conception of autonomy is shown to be inadequate because it alienates us from what matters in our lives. An alternative conception of autonomy is (...) presented that accords a substantial role to rejection and choice within an autonomous life without falling preq, to the charge of alienation. Some divergent implications of the two rival conceptions of autonomy for an understanding of liberal education are examined. Finally, the question of the value of autonomy from a social perspective is briefly discussed. (shrink)

Fears of alienation and anomie in liberal societies have driven many writers to emphasize care and commitment as essential ingredients of human well-being and as educational aims. Conceiving autonomy to be incompatible with these values, they have concluded that autonomy should be replaced with alternative conceptions of human well-being and of education that emphasize care and commitment. The claim I will try to defend in this paper is that, in contrast to these views, there is no contradiction between autonomy on (...) the one hand and care and commitment on the other; hence acknowledgment of the importance of the latter pair of values need not lead to the rejection of the ideal of autonomy. (shrink)

(2004). ‘Flexible Control’: Towards a conception of personal autonomy for postmodern education. Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 3-17.

This paper argues for a conception of autonomy that takes social oppression seriously without sapping autonomy of its valuable focus on individual self-direction. Building on recent work in relational accounts of autonomy, the paper argues that current conceptions of autonomy from liberal, feminist and critical theorists do not adequately account for the social features of belief formation. The paper then develops an alternative conception of relational autonomy that focuses on how autonomy contains both individualistic and social epistemic features. Rather than (...) consider autonomy to reside in an impenetrable inner citadel, a place immune from external influences, the paper argues that we must acknowledge the hermeneutic relationship between individual and social processes of belief adjudication. Taking such an argument seriously results in the need to alter our conception of autonomy and the schooling needed to foster its growth. (shrink)

This paper reviews Constructivism and the sources of its influence overIsraeli educational discourse. Then, it describes examples ofConstructivists projects in the teaching of sciences and technology inIsrael (Sela, Media Plus), as well as a project that is based on theConstructivist approach to teaching (Together), and several Constructivistexperimental schools, followed by a summary of the obstacles to theimplementation of such projects. Next, it stresses two basic flaws in theConstructivist view and introduces a post-constructivist educationalparadigm, the Autonomy Oriented Education (AOE), which uses (...) `reflectionon experiments in living' as its major tool and aims to enable thedevelopment of autonomous, belonging and moral individuals. (shrink)

Gerry Gaden; Rehabilitating Responsibility, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 27–38, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-975.

Education is increasingly coming under the shadow of economics. In this article we engage in ideology critique by applying a critical realist analysis to conventional economic models and the teaching of students. Through a historical and philosophical interrogation, we argue that the current curriculum suffers from a diminutive understanding of human being. We argue that economics education has for a long time now worked with a highly abstracted and decontextualized idea of human being that has absented other dimensions of human (...) concerns. We examine the current English Advanced level economic curriculum and the revised curriculum which will be taught from September 2015. Using an understanding of the dynamics of structure and agency and that economics operates in open systems, we argue for retroduction as an appropriate methodology. (shrink)

Whether Aboriginal people should have special educational rights is a question that has simmered and occasionally boiled over during the past four decades. This dispute remains largely unresolved due to perceived tensions that exist between liberal values and minority rights. Will Kymlicka attempts to resolve this conflict by claiming that the liberal concept of autonomy can be used as a starting point for minority rights. However, there are several questions that are inadequately answered in his theory. Namely, why is autonomy (...) so important? What is the significance of a particular culture? Should a liberal society support cultures that are illiberal? In response to these questions I will demonstrate that the liberal concept of autonomy requires that adequately restrictive cultures be protected. From this it is possible to develop a cohesive theory of minority rights that can be used to defend Aboriginal control of formal education. (shrink)