This paper turns to pragmatism for strategies to assist with the timely implementation of conservation efforts, as it provides tools to unfreeze policy decision making so that stakeholders, from farmers to wildlife organizations, can readily address impacts associated with climate induced non-human migration. The first section of this essay introduces readers to the topic of climate induced migration and provides an overview of how agriculture could either inhibit or help facilitate migrating species. The second section then applies Thompson’s analysis of (...) water policy, specifically his triangular structure of libertarianism, utilitarianism, and egalitarianism, to the problem of non-human climate refugees to identify positions that could be taken, as producers, policy makers, and other stakeholders determine if they should adopt strategies to assist migrating species. This analysis ends with the argument that the field of applied ethics, while useful for identifying key policy positions, can provide little insight to stakeholders facing issues associated with climate induced migration. The final section of the paper turns to pragmatism for strategies that could help guide wildlife conservation decisions on the ground. It is the author’s hope that a wide range of readers will find this paper useful, as it brings together work in environmental ethics, wildlife conservation literature, and public policy. (shrink)

The transgressive ontological character of hybrids—entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects—calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of “moral considerability” and related to it the idea of “intrinsic value” understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of (...) moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of “functional value,” which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being’s identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability. (shrink)

The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct (...) normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism and non-analogy-based nature-considerism. I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former. The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of its unique complexity, and its indispensability. I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them. Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region. (shrink)

This study addresses two questions: (1) what visions of nature do lay people subscribe to? (2) to what extent do these visions reflect those of professional philosophers? Four philosophical images of the human-nature relationship were discussed with respondents; Master, Steward, Partner and Participant. Respondents recognise these images, but prefer to construct their own. Elements of their images are (1) that humans are part of nature, but (2) that they are responsible for nature as well. This study indicates that empirical philosophy (...) can contribute to the further development of environmental philosophy. Through an empirical turn we can discover people's own voice. (shrink)

Traditionally floods have been understood to be acts of God or nature, with localised impacts afflicting those who choose to live or to invest capital in lowland and coastal locations. This central idea of causation, located outside human agency, survives somewhat precariously today, but is reflected in the lack of any right to protection from flooding in England and Wales. However in 1930 new legislation institutionalised a social framing of the impact of floods as part of a wider national problem. (...) This related the interests of lowland agriculture and land drainage to the national economic and military interest. Modernising and expanding agricultural production was a political priority from the 1930s to the 1980s. The cost of preventing flooding and draining land was transferred from the affected landowners to the nation as a whole. River and coastal engineering was central to the new policy, and by the early 1970s much of the riverine and coastal environment was radically altered by flood defence structures and associated land drainage. As a result of food over-production and conflicts with conservation interests in the early 1980s, the emphasis has shifted from drainage to flood defence, while risk reduction and environmentalist values have also been promoted. The institutional arrangements from 1930 largely survive, however, and a new coherent social framing has failed to emerge. It is argued that for a risk-oriented framing to succeed, new assumptions about causation and a new ethical outlook are now needed. Emphasis on flood 'control' rather than 'defence', and a shift in priorities from economic benefits towards human rights and intrinsic value in nature are proposed as key elements in such a reframing. (shrink)

Katie McShane, while accepting my 'convergence hypothesis' (the view that anthropocentrists and nonanthropocentrists will tend to propose similar policies), argues that nonanthropocentrism is nevertheless superior because it allows conservationists to have a deeper emotional commitment to natural objects than can anthropocentrists. I question this reasoning on two bases. First, McShane assumes a philosophically tendentious distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value – a distinction that presupposes a dualistic worldview. Second, I question why McShane believes anthropocentrists – weak anthropocentrists, that is – (...) cannot 'love' or 'feel awe' toward natural objects. Her argument, that is, only works against strong anthropocentrism, which I never advocated. (shrink)

Explorations of the boundaries between human culture and non-human nature have clear ethical dimensions. Developing both from philosophical arguments about the value of such boundaries and recent empirical work following the traffic across them, we seek to complement these discussions through a consideration of how these boundaries can be enacted by ourselves, as researchers, and the methods we employ. As part of an agenda seeking to reconsider organic agency within geographical narrative, we have been exploring different techniques for documenting the (...) ways in which such agencies are encountered. Specifically, we are interested in plants and the ways in which they might be researched in new ways by human geographers. Based on two particular pieces of research into human-plant dealings, our aim is one of exploring their lively presence as part of a performative environmental ethics enacted, in part, through the very practice of the research encounter. (shrink)

Essentialists like J. Baird Callicott have argued that one cannot have an environmental ethic unless one adopts the nonanthropocentric principle, which holds that things other than humans can be morally considerable in their own right, typically because they are thought to be intrinsically valuable. Pragmatists like Bryan Norton reject this; they claim that environmental ethics has no core or essence, and hence that the nonanthropocentric principle is not essential to an environmental ethic. Norton advances as an alternative the Convergence Hypothesis, (...) which says that there are many different ways of justifying environmental principles and policies. In this paper I show that pragmatists and essentialists are arguing past one another because they fail to note two crucial points. First, they often propose different accounts of which principles constitute an environmental ethic and so they disagree about which principles must be justified. The nonanthropocentric principle may be required to justify the principles that Callicott believe to be constitutive of an environmental ethic, but it may be unnecessary to justify those principles that pragmatists think are constitutive. Second, essentialists and pragmatists often overlook the distinction to be made between the adequacy of a justification and its epistemic or rhetorical preferability. The nonanthropocentric principle may not be needed to provide an adequate justification of the constitutive principles and judgements, but a justification that contains the nonanthropocentric principle might nevertheless be epistemically preferable. (shrink)

I will discuss two themes that can be found in Mark Sagoff's most recent book, Price, Principle, and the Environment. Built from pieces fashioned in his entertaining and incisive critical es...

Environmental ethicists have devoted considerable attention to discussing whether anthropocentric or nonanthropocentric arguments provide more appropriate means for defending environmental protection. This paper argues that philosophers, scientists, and policy makers should pay more attention to a particular type of anthropocentric argument. These anthropocentric indirect arguments defend actions or policies that benefit the environment, but they justify the policies based on beneficial effects on humans that are not caused by their environmental benefits. AIAs appear to have numerous appealing characteristics, and their (...) weaknesses do not provide compelling reasons to avoid them. Elucidating these arguments should inspire social scientists and philosophers to study the range of situations in which AIAs can be ethically and effectively employed and the extent to which they increase or diminish public support for environmentalism. (shrink)

Most environmental philosophers have had little use for 'conventional' philosophical and political thought. This is unfortunate, because these traditions can greatly contribute to environmental ethics and policy discussions. One mainstream concept of potential value for environmental philosophy is the notion of the public interest. Yet even though the public interest is widely acknowledged to be a powerful ethical standard in public affairs and public policy, there has been little agreement on its descriptive meaning. A particularly intriguing account of the concept (...) in the literature, however, may be found in the work of the American pragmatist John Dewey. Dewey argued that the public interest was to be continuously constructed through the process of free, cooperative inquiry into the shared good of the democratic community. This Deweyan model of the public interest has much to offer environmental philosophers who are interested in making connections between normative arguments and environmental policy discourse, and it holds great promise for enhancing environmental philosophy's role and impact in public life. (shrink)

This paper explores the idea of 'respect for nature' in the Earth Charter. It maintains that the Earth Charter proposes a broadly holistic environmental ethic where, in situations of conflict, species are given ethical priority over the lives of individual sentient organisms. The paper considers policy implications of this perspective, looking by means of example at the current European environmental policy dispute about the ruddy and white-headed duck. Questions about the value of species and biological diversity this raises are explored. (...) The paper concludes that the principle of valuing individual animal lives should be given more prominence in Earth Charter principles. (shrink)

Anthropocentric indirect arguments , which call for specific policies or actions because of human benefits that are correlated with but not caused by benefits to the environment, are gaining increasing traction with those who take a pragmatic approach to environmental protection. I contend that nonanthropocentrists might remain justifiably uneasy about AIAs because such arguments fail to challenge prevailing speciesist moral attitudes. I close by considering whether Elliott can address this concern of nonanthropocentrists by appealing to the ability of AIAs to (...) engender an intrinsic concern for the environment in the people they persuade. (shrink)

오늘날 문명의 발달로 전례 없는 환경이나 생명 관련 문제들이 발생하고 있어 많은 사람들이 그것들에 대해 고민을 하고 있다. 그런데 사실 이 두 문제는 별개의 문제가 아니고 아주 밀접하게 연관되어 있기에 같이 논의되어야 한다. 환경은 생명을 가진 존재들을 둘러싼 것을 지칭하는 말이고 그 환경에 둘러싸인 것이 바로 생명이기 때문이다. 그런데 생명의 정체를 밝히는 작업은 간단치가 않다. 그럼에도 이런저런 이유들로 사람들은 보통 생명이라는 현상은 그 자체 소중히 여겨야 할 가치를 가지는 것으로 이야기한다. 그러한 가치를 사람들은 흔히 본래적 가치라고 한다. 환경 윤리와 철학에서 (...) 논의되는 주요 문제들의 큰 줄기는 바로 여기에서 출발한다. 생명이 가치를 가지고 그래서 소중히 여겨져야 한다면 그것을 유지시키기 위한 조건들로서 그 주위를 둘러싸고 있는 환경의 어떤 것들도 어떻게든 소중한 것으로 여겨져야 하기 때문이다. 그래서 환경 윤리 및 철학적 논의에서 소중히 여겨야 하는 대상의 범위는 인간 생명에서 시작해서 그 생명을 가능케 하는 존재인 다른 생물적 환경이나 무생물적 환경에까지 점점 확장된다. 그리고 이러한 존재들의 위상 및 가치에 대해서 면밀히 검토하는 것이 환경 철학과 윤리의 핵심적인 주제가 된다. 물론 이러한 과정에서 생명의 정의, 생명의 범위 그리고 생명의 가치와 관련한 여러 철학적 문제들이 등장하게 되지만, 무엇보다도 주목해보아야 할 문제 중의 하나는 그러한 것들에 가치를 부여하고 소중히 여기는 데서 발생하는 각 개체생명들 간의 갈등 또는 각각의 개체생명과 전체생명들이라고 할 수 있는 ‘온생명’이나 ‘생태계들’과 같은 전체들 간의 갈등의 문제이다. 여기에서는 이러한 문제들을 몇몇 철학적 논의들을 통해 검토해 볼 것이다. 그리고 끝으로는 인간의 생존과 지구생존의 위기를 맞고 있는 오늘날 이러한 논의들이 가지는 윤리적 함축 및 그것의 실천가능성에 대해 간략하게 탐색하면서 이러한 문제의 효과적인 해결을 위한 앞으로의 작업방향을 제시한다. (shrink)

Ever since environmental ethics began to take form as an academic discipline in the early 1970s, the notion of intrinsic value has occupied a prominent position within the field. Recently, however, various types of critique have emerged within EE against invoking this notion. Contrary to these critiques, I argue that appeals to intrinsic value are not problematic, given the reason-implying sense of 'intrinsic value' that is most relevant to EE. I further argue that also those who criticise 'intrinsic-value-talk' in EE (...) actually need this reason-implying concept of intrinsic value. However, once we realise that this is the sense of 'intrinsic value' that is most relevant to EE, it also becomes clear that it is the concept of a reason, rather than that of intrinsic value, that is most important to EE. (shrink)

While it is commonly acknowledged that the ecosystemic, and the inter- and intra-specific diversity of natural life is under threat of being irremediably lost, there is much less awareness that the diversity in agro-ecosystems is also under threat. This paper is focused on the biodiverse agro-ecosystems generated by landraces (LRs), i.e., farmer-developed populations of cultivated species that show among- and within-population diversity and are linked to traditional cultures. The aim of this work is to arouse concern about their loss, to (...) explain how they can be conserved, and to discuss values that support maintaining and/or restoring on-farm agro-biodiversity. Although agriculture has relied on biodiverse agro-ecosystems for millennia, most of them have disappeared or are disappearing due to profound transformations in the socio-economic context. This is discussed with particular reference to the European situation. The positive values of LRs and LR systems that support their conservation are discussed along with possible objections. The conservation of LRs and LR systems can be well justified on ethical grounds. In particular, the complex intertwining of the biological and cultural contexts of LR systems, which continuously creates new adaptive responses to the changing socio-economic and eco-physical processes, is a value that strongly motivates conservation, particularly when the needs of future generations are considered. (shrink)

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) evaluates actions in terms of negative consequences (costs) and positive consequences (benefits). Though much has been said on CBA, little attention has been paid to the types of values held by costs and benefits. This paper introduces a simple typology of values in CBA and applies it to three forms of CBA: the common, money-based CBA, CBA based in social welfare, and CBA based in intrinsic value. The latter extends CBA beyond its usual anthropocentric domain. Adequate handling (...) of value typology in CBA avoids analytical mistakes and connects CBA to its consequentialist roots. (shrink)