In a recent paper in this journal, Carter and Peterson raise two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for anyone aspiring to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle trades on an application of epistemic contextualism to the precautionary principle; the second puzzle concerns the compatibility of the precautionary principle with the de minimis rule. In this note, I argue that neither puzzle should worry defenders of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle can be shown to be an instance of the (...) familiar but conceptually harmless challenge of adjudicating between relevant interests to reach assessments of threats when applying the precautionary principle. The second puzzle can be shown to rely on a subtle but crucial misrepresentation of the relevant probabilities at play when applying the precautionary principle. (shrink)

In light of the potential long-term societal and economic benefits of novel nano-enabled products, there is an evident need for research and development to focus on closing the gap in nano-materials safety. Concurrent reflection on the impact of decision-making tools, which may lack the capability to assist sophisticated judgements around the risks and benefits of the introduction of novel products, is essential. This paper addresses the potential for extant decision support tools to default to a precautionary principle position in the (...) face of uncertainty. A more utilitarian-based approach could be facilitated by adding simple methods to formulate realistic hypotheses, which would assist non-specialists to make more nuanced decisions in terms of managing the risks of introducing new NMs. A decision support analytical framework is applied to identify the potential risks and benefits of novel nano-enabled products such as textiles with in-built enhanced antimicrobial activity for the prevention of nosocomial infections produced by spray or sonochemical coating possesses. While the results demonstrate valuable societal and environmental benefits compared to conventional products, due to uncertainty regarding the possible hazard to humans, sizable risks were identified in some cases due to the precautionary principle. (shrink)

A challenge faced by defenders of the precautionary principle is to clarify when the evidence that a harmful event might occur suffices to regard this prospect as a real possibility. Plausible versions of the principle must articulate some epistemic threshold, or de minimis requirement, which specifies when precautionary measures are justified. Critics have argued that formulating such a threshold is problematic in the context of the precautionary principle. First, this is because the precautionary principle appears to be ambiguous about the (...) distinction between risk and uncertainty: should the principle merely be invoked when evidential probabilities are absent, or also when probabilities have low epistemic credentials? Secondly, defenders of the precautionary principle face an aggregation puzzle: in judging whether or not the de minimis requirement has been met, how should first-order evidential probabilities and their second-order epistemic standing be aggregated? This article argues that the ambiguity can be resolved, and the epistemological puzzle can be solved. Focusing on decisions in the context of climate uncertainty, I advance a version of the precautionary principle that serves as a plausible decision rule, to be adopted in situations where its main alternative—cost–benefit analysis—does not deliver. (shrink)