The importance of the outlined problem lies in the fact that professional training of future fine arts teachers should take into account the trends of recent general scientific, socio-cultural and moral-aesthetic processes. Analysis of the professional training system in the context of the requirements of postmodern society gives grounds to claim that it requires significant updating. In particular, individualization and democratization of education, interdisciplinarity, departure from traditional patterns of professional training, rethinking of pedagogical ideas and postulates in the context of (...) quality assurance, etc. are paramount. The article defines the structure of artistic and pedagogical competence of a fine arts teacher. Its structural elements ) and pedagogical component and ways of their formation are determined. Ways to improve professional training of future fine arts teachers taking into account the postmodern features of higher education development (ensuring continuity of creative education; updating the scope of professional training; the use of information technology in the process of professional training of future fine arts teachers; emphasis of the educational programme on personal and creative development, self-fulfilment of students of artistic specialties. Development of pedagogical conditions for formation of artistic and pedagogical competence in future fine arts teachers and organization of a pedagogical experiment in order to determine their effectiveness seems promising. (shrink)

One thing an examination of the literature on youth work makes clear is a lack of clarity on youth work's purpose. This study investigated the value of using the concept of telos as an analytical tool to orient youth work towards the right ends. Relevant literature was systematically reviewed. The value of telos in understanding youth work was examined. Common aims of youth work were described. The merits of different goals were assessed to figure out which, if any, is youth (...) work's proper purpose. A telos would provide youth work a clear and cohesive definition, act as a useful guide for good practice, and distinguish youth work from other interventions into young people's lives. The case was made for the telos of youth work to be 'enabling young people to live the good life'. (shrink)

I consider if and how far it is possible to live an educational philosophical life, in the fast-changing, globalised world of Higher Education. I begin with Socrates’ account of a philosophical life in the Apology. I examine some tensions within different conceptions of what it is to do philosophy. I then go on to focus more closely on what it might be to live a philosophical, educational life in which educational processes and outcomes are influenced by philosophy, using examples taken (...) from published sources and from conversational interviews with philosophers carried out by myself with Kenneth Wain, Bas Levering and Richard Pring. I then outline the directions of current European policy for Higher Education. Finally I discuss how far current policies and trends leave room for doing philosophy of education, concluding that it is possible, but only for individuals who are very much in sympathy with current policy trends or who are creative in constructing smoke screens. (shrink)

This article examines the benefits and burdens of the debate between Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr over a set of issues to do with philosophy and education specifically and theory and practice more generally. Hirst and Carr, in different ways, emphasise the importance of Aristotelian practical philosophy as an antidote to the theory-oriented confined method of ‘conceptual analysis’ that has haunted the philosophy of education. Despite their proper recognition of the irreducible character of practice to theory, they fail to provide (...) a satisfying account of their interpenetrating relation. Hirst falls into error by fencing off ‘forms of theoretical knowledge’ from ‘forms of practice’; Carr’s dismissive attitude to theory is saturated with internal tensions in his own discourse. This article contends that what is left unaddressed both in Hirst’s and Carr’s arguments is the most fundamental sense of ‘social’, which is prior to relative differences in the standards of knowledge among societies and which reminds us that theory is not a socially disembodied enterprise. A lively appreciation of this point encourages us to see the prevailing outlook towards the relation between philosophy and education quite differently. (shrink)

This paper argues that the modern curriculum of academic subject disciplines embodies a rationalist conception of pure, universal knowledge that does little to cultivate, humanise or form the self. A liberal education in the classical humanist tradition, by contrast, develops a personal culture or paideia, an understanding of the self as a social, political and cultural being, and the practical wisdom needed to make judgements in practical, political and human affairs. The paper concludes by asking whether the old liberal curriculum, (...) traditionally centred on the humanities and the disciplines of grammar and rhetoric, can be recovered in the modern age. (shrink)

Educational Research is commonly regarded as a rational pursuit aimed at the production of objective knowledge. Researchers are expected to avoid value bias by detaching themselves from the normative conceptions of education that shape practice in schools and classrooms, and by casting themselves in the role of the impartial spectator. It is assumed that, as a rational pursuit, educational research is not directly concerned with changing practice but simply with discovering facts about it.This paper claims that it is possible to (...) construct a view of educational research as a form of rational and disciplined inquiry that does not depend on any underpinning spectator theory of knowledge. Nor, the paper claims, does it imply any underpinning foundational principles of rational action and choice. Rather it implies a form of disciplined conversation in which reasons for action are scrutinised, critiqued and modified without resort to foundational principles of rationality. Drawing particularly on the work of John Dewey, Richard Rorty and Amartya Sen, the paper casts educational research as a practical science—a form of action research—that is underpinned by a democratic conception of rationality. In doing so, it contrasts educational research, shaped by a pragmatic theory of knowledge, with research on education that is shaped by a spectator theory. (shrink)

This article explains how teachers might navigate inquiry learning despite the experience of a constant tension between abandoning their students and controlling them. They do this by conceiving of themselves as guides who decide the path with students, not for them. I build on a conception of teaching as guiding from Burbules, and argue that inquiry teachers should take the particular stance of an expedition-educator (rather than the stance of either a tour-leader or an expedition-leader). They should guide students to (...) make progress during co-inquiry, rather than leading them to follow the teacher’s agenda. This stance gives a heuristic they can use to balance control and abandonment in their pedagogical practice—they judge which pedagogical actions to take, and when, according to which actions are likely to help their students to engage in autonomous inquiry and hence learn to guide themselves. Students thus can learn to inquire by participating in an inquiry which is guided, but not controlled, by their teacher. (shrink)

A kind of ‘neo‐Aristotelianism’ that connects educational reasoning and reflection to phronesis, and education itself to praxis, has gained considerable following in recent educational discourse. The author identifies four cardinal claims of this phronesis‐praxis perspective: that a) Aristotle's epistemology and methodology imply a stance that is essentially, with regard to practical philosophy, anti‐method and anti‐theory; b) ‘producing’, under the rubric of techné, as opposed to ‘acting’ under the rubric of phronesis, is an unproblematically codifiable process; c) phronesis must be given (...) a particularist interpretation; and d) teaching is best understood as praxis in the Aristotelian sense, guided by phronesis. The author argues that these claims have insufficient grounding in Aristotle's own writings, and that none of them stands up to scrutiny. (shrink)

When Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr squared up to each other a few years ago on the issue of the role of philosophical theory in educational practice, it became clear that theory itself had become a troubled term. The very fact that Wilfred Carr could argue for the end of educational theory recalls Paul Feyerabend's fiery argument for the end of theory in natural science and simply deepened the attack that had already appeared in Carr and Kemmis's book, Becoming Critical (...) (1986). In response, Hirst insisted that theory, and particularly the philosophical theory of education, should be defined as a discrete area of study in itself, governed and structured by the axioms of logic. In this way, he argued, the philosophy of education would be no different from philosophy in general (at least in its analytic formulation). Carr, on the other hand, preferred to consider educational theory as a flexible event that took its shape from the landscape explored, and hence precisely not the kind of study that Hirst supported, but one based in action research and reflective practitioner experience. This debate is as yet unresolved. In this piece I begin by making several remarks about the current context for raising the question Hirst and Carr address, and I go on to consider other possible understandings of theoria in a Greek sense before developing this idea through a reading of Aristotle. I eventually conclude that each of the protagonists in the debate has taken a step too far. (shrink)

Much current educational research shows the influence of two powerful but potentially pernicious lines of thought. The first, which can be traced at least as far back as Francis Bacon, is the ambition to formulate precise techniques of research, or ‘research methods’, which can be applied reliably irrespective of the talent of the researcher. The second is the recognition that in the social sciences we—humankind—are ourselves the objects of our study. The first line of thought threatens to cut educational research (...) free of the wider range of ideas and theories that should govern or at least inform it. The second tends to turn it into an absorption with self, particularly when allied to what its practitioners like to think of as the postmodern turn. (shrink)

Paul Hirst’s philosophical ‘conversion’ from forms of knowledge to forms of social practices was largely prompted by his radical reappraisal of the philosophical underpinnings that had validated his classic conception of liberal education. The primary motivation for Hirst’s later works was to remedy his own neglect of practical reason, whose sharp distinction from theoretical reason he acknowledged he had failed to appreciate. There is much to commend in his ‘practical’ turn. The main challenge that remains, however, is that the social (...) practices view is something of a ‘foundationalist’ two-part picture, where overwhelming priority is given to practical reason. I appreciate the importance of the two issues Hirst puts on the table, in his debate with Wilfred Carr particularly and in his later works more generally: the issues of cultivating phronesis and of making sense of the practical character of critical-reflective activities. But I argue that addressing these issues fully requires us to recognize that neither theoretical nor practical rationality can be intelligible apart from the other. To press the point home, I review the analogous debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell over whether to accept, and how to understand, the view that rational conceptuality in a relevant sense pervades not only deliberation and propositional thinking but also perception and embodied coping skills. I conclude by briefly considering the prospect that the legacy of Hirst and recent discussions around human nature, practical rationality, and the formation of reason will interactively enrich our philosophical-educational scholarship. (shrink)

The overall question addressed in this article is,‘What kind of philosophy of education is relevant to educational policy makers?’ The article focuses on the following four themes: The meanings attached to the term philosophy by philosophers themselves; the meanings attached to the term philosophy by policy makers; the difference place and time makes to these meanings; how these different meanings affect the possibility of philosophy influencing policy.The question is addressed using philosophical methods and empirical evidence from conversations and conversational interviews (...) with some philosophers of education and other educational researchers.The argument begins with an investigation of different ways of understanding philosophy and philosophy of education in relation to education and educational policy. It then examines first the current policy context and secondly some evidence about the practices of policy makers in relation to ideas and to research. It goes on to present some of the findings from the conversational evidence.The article is drawn together in the penultimate section where I make some suggestions about possible fruitful relationships between doing philosophy and policy making. Finally, in the concluding section, some further—thorny—questions are raised by the analysis, especially in relationship to ethics and social justice. (shrink)

The starting point of our research is the recent discussion within history of education about the aim and scope of historical educational research. More specifically, it deals with the relationship between the past and the future and is characterized by two clashing paradigms. The recent discussion within history of education is from the perspective of philosophy of education extremely interesting. Particularly intriguing is the way in which history of education defines its role of giving shape to a future. Given the (...) criticism of the means‐end reasoning and the fact that ‘utopia’ in some sense always implies this, and that it plays itself nearly always a role when a stance is taken concerning history of education, what is defended here is the need of a different way to think about the relationship between the past, the present and the future thus to give ‘utopia’ a different place. Therefore we make use of Emile Cioran's History and Utopia. Cioran's criticism of the utopian position can be indicated by the following three sets. Not the past, neither the future, but the present is what one should be concerned with; not unity but diversity; not finding the solution, the final truth, but making room for the freedom of the human being. (shrink)

Filosofi og pædagogik er gamle fæller, og der er et overlap mellem filosofiens historie og pædagogikkens historiske litteratur. Store tænkere som Platon, Aristoteles, Augustin, Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart og Dewey hører hjemme begge steder. I den pædagogiske filosofi kan almene teoretiske og praktisk filosofiske spørgsmål udforskes systematisk og historisk. Gennem diskussioner af sådanne spørgsmål kan man forholde sig mere nysgerrigt, bevidst, begrundet og kritisk til pædagogisk praksis såvel som til pædagogisk teori, empiri og undervisningsteknologi. -/- Fællesskabet er (...) ikke uproblematisk. Pædagogik er ikke filosofi, og pædagogisk filosofi ikke kun pædagogik. Både didaktik og almen pædagogik kan komme i konflikt med pædagogisk filosofi. Hvordan kan almene pædagogiske spørgsmål overhovedet belyses filosofisk, og hvad betyder de for filosofien selv? En pædagogisk filosofisk tilgang forandrer kanon i både pædagogik og filosofi. Udvalget af nøgletekster ændres. Emner, der er værd at diskutere, forskydes. Nye forskningsspørgsmål og prioriteringer viser sig. Et pædagogisk perspektiv på filosofiens udvikling vil fremhæve dens bidrag til at forstå ’den pædagogiske problem- og fænomenverden’, ligesom et filosofisk perspektiv på pædagogikken vil flytte – eller rettere udvide – fokus med hensyn til dens idéhistorie såvel som dens aktuelle teoretiske praksis. Som i al anden filosofi kan man i den pædagogiske filosofi diskutere teoretiske og praktiske, såvel som poetiske og æstetiske spørgsmål; men det er typisk med en særlig vinkel, nemlig den pædagogiske. Man kan således diskutere erkendelse, viden og sandhed, ligeså vel som man kan undersøge ret, retfærdighed og skønhed. Ofte vil det være med en særlig tvist. Den pædagogiske filosofi kan vise sig som særegen både ved sin særlige position og ved at relatere sig til det pædagogiske som genstandsfelt. Hvad denne position og dette genstandsfelt egentlig er, er der dog ingen enighed om. Det kan ikke engang siges at være udelukkende pædagogisk defineret, og derfor må den pædagogiske filosofi forholde sig åbent til begge dele. Studier i pædagogisk filosofi indbyder til denne drøftelse. (shrink)

Children as learners need adults who love them, even when the children are unable to give anything in return. Furthermore, adults should be able to make wise judgements concerning what is good for the children. The clarification of these principles and of their educational import has to start within our own cultural tradition. Agape (unconditional love, neighbour-love or charity) is a basic concept in the Christian tradition. Phronesis (moral wisdom, practical judgement or prudence) has a key position in the Aristotelian (...) tradition. In his Summa TheologiaeThomas Aquinas has combined these traditions and ethical concepts, with agape (in Latin caritas) as the commanding concept. The article will explore some key challenges and productive resources revealed by this combination for today's education and upbringing. (shrink)

Professor Whitty has endorsed the consensus that research into education is empirical social science, distinguishing ‘educational research’ which seeks directly to influence practice, and ‘education research’ that has substantive value but no necessary practical application.The status of the science here is problematic. The positivist approach is incoherent and so supports neither option. Critical educational science is virtually policy-inert. The interpretive approach is empirically sound but, because of the value component in education, does not support education research either, or account for (...) this component.A solution to the latter problem is sought in the debate between Carr and Hirst on the relationship between philosophy and education. This shows Carr making claims that rely on a conception of philosophy that he rejects, while Hirst insists on this conception, uses it to justify practical claims, but denies that this is possible.To achieve a practically relevant analysis of educational research, both need to include second-order, normative, conceptual enquiry into the philosophies that drive educational policy-making and partly regulate teaching methodology. Deweyan, first-order, ‘reflective practice’ needs, then, to be supplemented with second-order reflection.Educational research is philosophy- not science-driven, and is value-led. Consequently, it has the status not of scientific discovery but of practical recommendation. (shrink)

This symposium begins with a critique by Paul Hirst of Wilfred Carr's ‘Philosophy and Education’(Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2004, 38.1), where Carr argues that philosophy of education should be concerned with ‘practical philosophy’ rather than ‘theoretical philosophy’. Hirst argues that the philosophy of education is best understood as a distinctive area of academic philosophy, in which the exercise of theoretical reason contributes critically to the development of rational educational practices and their discourse. While he acknowledges that these practices and (...) their discourse must of their nature be directly developed in the exercise of practical reason, or phronesis, the notion of ‘practical philosophy’ is rejected as ultimately incoherent and illusory. In his reply to Hirst's critique, Carr identifies three central claims in Hirst's argument and takes issue with each of these. He reaffirms the need to draw upon the resources afforded by the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy in order to identify inadequacies in our present understanding of how philosophy is related to education. He suggests that it is only through bringing their own ‘prejudices’ into critical confrontation with this tradition that philosophers of education will be able to assess whether practical philosophy is incoherent and illusory, as Hirst claims, or whether it is indispensable to the future development of their discipline. In a rejoinder to Carr, Hirst, defends the claim that philosophy of education is a social practice concerned with developing justifiable propositional accounts of the conceptual relations, justificatory procedures and presuppositions of educational practices. He rejects the argument that this ‘theoretical philosophy’ approach must be replaced by that of a new ‘practical philosophy’. (shrink)

This article considers the state of philosophy of education in our current age and assesses prospects for the future of the field. I argue that as philosophers of education, we live in both the best of times and the worst of times. Developments in one key organisation, the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia, are examined in relation to broader international trends. Informed by the work of Pierre Hadot, I also reflect on what it might mean to talk of philosophy (...) of education as a way of life in the contemporary world. (shrink)

Philosophical research tends to be done separately from empirical research, but this makes it difficult to tackle questions which require both. To make it easier to address these hybrid research questions, I argue that we should sometimes combine philosophical and empirical investigations. I start by describing a continuum of research methods from data collecting and analysing to philosophical arguing and conceptualising. Then, I outline one possible middle-ground position where research is equally philosophical and empirical: the Community of Inquiry reconceived as (...) a research method. In this method, a group of participants engage in philosophical discussion and dialogue to answer the research question . I argue that this collaborative philosophical inquiry, moderated by a philosopher, provides a new method for collecting and testing data. The results are philosophical positions and arguments blended with empirical findings. Next, I illustrate how I used this philosophical–empirical method in a recent study to evaluate the strength of educational metaphors. I conclude that the Community of Inquiry is a viable means of combining philosophical and empirical research, and a new and worthwhile method for research in education. (shrink)

Educational philosopher Wilfred Carr claims that the formation of philosophy of education in accordance with the theory-centered paradigm of modernist philosophy is responsible for the miserable fact that educational practitioners take no interest in philosophy of education. A real contemporary philosophy of education, Carr suggests, would give up theory and the “foundationalist” idea of seeking a firm ground for practice outside of practice. The paper, firstly, takes up Carr’s debate with Paul Hirst on Carr’s notion of philosophy of education, and, (...) secondly, moves on to inquire the interpretation of Aristotle’s practical philosophy by Hans-Georg Gadamer, whom Carr refers to. Finally, the paper outlines some merits of Gadamer’s hermeneutics that philosophy of education should adapt. (shrink)

This article initially provides a brief overview of virtue epistemology; it thereafter considers some possible ramifications of this branch of the theory of knowledge for the philosophy of education. The main features of three different manifestations of virtue epistemology are first explained. Importantly, it is then maintained that developments in virtue epistemology may offer the resources to critique aspects of the debate between Hirst and Carr about how the philosophy of education ought to be carried out and by whom. Wilfred (...) Carr's position—that educational practitioners have privileged access to philosophical knowledge about teaching practice—will in particular be questioned. It will be argued that Carr's view rests on a form of epistemology, internalism, which places unreasonably narrow restrictions upon the range of actors and ways, in which philosophical knowledge of and/or for education might be achieved. In declaring that practical wisdom regarding teaching is ‘entirely dependent’ on practitioner reflection, Carr not only radically deviates from Aristotle's notion of practical wisdom, he also, in effect, renders redundant all philosophical research about education that is not initiated by teachers in this manner. It is concluded that Aristotle's general approach to acquiring information and knowledge about the world might yet still offer a foundation for a more comprehensive philosophy of education; one that makes clear that the professional testimony and reflection of teachers, observation of teaching practice, and already existing educational philosophy, theory and policy can all be perceived as potentially valuable sources of philosophical knowledge of and for education. (shrink)

In recent years, the ‘Western tradition’ has increasingly come under attack in anti-colonialist and postmodernist discourses. It is not difficult to sympathise with the concerns that underlie advocacy of historically marginalised traditions, and the West undoubtedly has a lot to answer for. Nonetheless, while arguing a qualified yes to the central question posed for this special issue, we question the assumption that the West can be neatly distinguished from alternative traditions of thought. We argue that there is fundamental implicit and (...) explicit agreement across traditions about the most difficult of issues and on standards about how to reason about them and that the ‘West’ has demonstrably learned from within and without itself. But, we question the very viability under conditions of heightened globalisation and neo-colonialism of distinguishing between thought of the ‘West’ and thought outside the West. It is time to move beyond the reified assumptions that underlie the idea of ‘Western thought’, cast as an agent with a collective purpose. (shrink)

What is philosophy of education? This question has been answered in as many ways as there are those who self-identify as philosophers of education. However, the questions our field asks and the research conducted to answer them often produce papers, essays, and manuscripts that we can read, evaluate, and ponder. This paper turns to those tangible products of our scholarly activities. The titles, abstracts, and keywords from every article published from 2000 to 2010 in four journals of educational philosophy were (...) analyzed to find out what kind of research is being published in the field of philosophy of education. Over 143 different concepts were identified and analyzed from 1,572 articles. The data suggests that philosophy and education, while primarily concerned with theory, teaching, and learning, tackles a diversity of subjects in a slightly narrowing band of thematic topics. (shrink)

This article aims to present the past and present state and future possibilities of philosophy of education as an academic discipline in Turkey as related to teacher training programs and academic studies in higher education institutions. It takes philosophy of education as consisting of the approaches that have emerged in its history. It has come to Turkey as a part of the modernization of education. It seems that during the Republican era in Turkey before World War II, mainly due to (...) the dominance of the German conception of educational studies, the pedagogy and the history of pedagogy courses and the textbooks for them, which were central to the curricula of teacher training schools, contained the subjects of philosophy of education in its continental form; and after World War II philosophy of education is mostly understood, primarily due to Turkey’s changing international relations and the spread of American influence, as the isms and the doctrines approaches as found in the USA between the 1940s and 1960s, while other approaches in the field have been less influential. The article identifies how the restructuring of the teacher training system and the curricula of Faculties of Education in 1998 was a serious blow to the discipline, since it excluded philosophy of education from the curricula of teacher preparation schools, and the flourishing discipline thus lost its hold and importance in the undergraduate programs, and then in graduate programs. But the 2006 revision of the curricula has given a kiss of life to the discipline. There are reasons to think that it can recover in the coming period. (shrink)

The term Responsible Research and Innovation has recently gained currency, as it has been designated to be a key-term in the European research framework Horizon 2020. At the level of European research policy, Responsible Research and Innovation can be viewed as an attempt to reach a broader vision of research and innovation as a public good. The current academic debate may be fairly enriched by considering the role that phronesis may have for RRI. Specifically, in this paper we argue that (...) the current debate might be fruitfully enriched by making a categorial shift. Such a categorial shift involves moving away from the temptation to interpret responsible research and innovation in a technocratic way towards a more pluralistic vision that is rooted in the idea of phronesis. In the present context phronesis points the attention to the cultivation and nurturement of the researcher’s formation as a type of engagement with the actual practice of researching, a practice in which researchers are called to apply judgment and exercise discretion in specific and often unique situations without the re-assuring viewpoint of the technician. (shrink)

This paper focuses, not on the existing conditions of institutional association, but on hoped-for conditions that would have to be met for professional relationships within higher education to aspire to what Aristotle referred to as ?virtuous friendship?. Such relationships, it is argued, constitute the social content of hope in that they look to new perspectives on institutional renewal and professional regeneration. They provide a context of mutuality and reciprocity within which individuals can begin to realise, through the acquisition of ?functional (...) capabilities?, their particular capacities. The question then arises as to the conditions necessary for generating and sustaining such relationships within the increasingly differentiated and stratified institutional settings of the higher education sector and across an academic workforce that has become fractionalised and atomised around increasingly complex divisions of academic labour. It is that question which this paper seeks to address. ?Civil society is fragile, and it needs to be extended? (Hall, 1995, p. 27). (shrink)

The position of the philosophy of education in theoretical or practical philosophy was the main subject of debate between Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr. In his support for practical philosophy, Carr argues that in order to bridge the theory/practice gap and deconstruct the illusory intactness of philosophy of education from developments in the practical realm, philosophy of education should be assumed as a branch of practical philosophy. Opposed to this argument, Hirst holds that philosophy of education is a second-order activity (...) and a theoretical matter. Even though both viewpoints seem to be reductive, it is argued here that the controversy of Hirst and Carr on theoretical/practical philosophy of education is more a pseudo-problem than a real one. This is because Hirst does not dismiss the reflection on action as a source of philosophical knowledge, nor does Carr in fact avoid a second-order activity in his endeavour in philosophy of education. Nonetheless, it is argued that we should celebrate a moderate dualism in the case of theoretical and practical reason. (shrink)

In this thesis a new concept called ‘Lexism’ is proposed, outlined and defended. The dyslexia debate is currently in a state of deadlock. The origin of this stalemate is not an empirical problem but a conceptual one. The conceptual problems with dyslexia, and the existence of dyslexics, are both recognised, but the contradictions between them remain unresolved. For this reason a philosophical approach has been adopted. First, the conceptual foundations are set out to enable the recognition of Lexism as a (...) concept, and to reject the concept of dyslexia whilst recognising the existence of dyslexics. Second, Lexism as a concept, is evaluated, compared and contrasted with what some might consider to be the strongest existing account of dyslexics’ social experiences, that of Riddick’s social model of dyslexia. Third, the key aspects and features of Lexism as a new concept are set out. The original contribution to knowledge is that Lexism enables us to see that dyslexics are defined by Lexism not dyslexia. Lexism, it is argued, in a certain sense, is comparable to, though not the same as, racism, sexism and homophobia. This enables us break the current deadlock and move away from sterile debates over dyslexia’s existence, to how dyslexics are Othered by a literate society. Lexism raises new and significant implications for the dyslexia debate, but also government policy, educational practice, assessments and reasonable adjustments for dyslexics. (shrink)

Technology is fundamental to and embedded in the way practice is conceptualized and institutionalized in social service work. Many scholars assume and expect that good practices of care are achieved with the correct application of theory produced by rigorous scientific research. However, there are significant critiques of this viewpoint. We examine the work of Donald Schön and Martin Heidegger and agree with these authors' suggestions that technical rationality and modern technology are not the way to achieve good practice in the (...) human services. At the same time, we are not convinced that the alternatives offered by Schön and Heidegger provide what good practice requires. We draw on Aristotle's account of the intellectual virtues and make the case for phronesis and praxis as other possibilities for inspiring new kinds of social welfare practice in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

This article clarifies the fundamental difference between empirical and conceptual questions in education. In the ongoing debate about the role of philosophy of education, many authors either unreflectively assume or actively demand that philosophy of education should try to adapt to science. Through a discussion of the possibilities of a child to open up to educational processes the article illustrates how philosophical reflection on education fundamentally differs in character from empirical approaches. It suggests that one important task for philosophy of (...) education is to clarify what questions can be answered empirically from those that are constitutive of our understanding of education. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is used as a central starting point in this article. (shrink)

The position of the philosophy of education in theoretical or practical philosophy was the main subject of debate between Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr. In his support for practical philosophy, Carr argues that in order to bridge the theory/practice gap and deconstruct the illusory intactness of philosophy of education from developments in the practical realm, philosophy of education should be assumed as a branch of practical philosophy. Opposed to this argument, Hirst holds that philosophy of education is a second-order activity (...) and a theoretical matter. Even though both viewpoints seem to be reductive, it is argued here that the controversy of Hirst and Carr on theoretical/practical philosophy of education is more a pseudo-problem than a real one. This is because Hirst does not dismiss the reflection on action as a source of philosophical knowledge, nor does Carr in fact avoid a second-order activity in his endeavour in philosophy of education. Nonetheless, it is argued that we should celebrate a moderate dualism in the case of theoretical and practical reason. (shrink)

Despite much recent concern with the possibilities of moral character education in elementary schooling and professional training, the university and higher educational prospects of such education have only lately received much attention. This paper begins by considering – and largely endorsing – the general case for character education in contexts of pre-adult schooling and adult professional and vocational training. However, it proceeds to argue that the case for intervention in character formation in some educational contexts is not generally applicable to (...) university and higher education. Key points are that there can be no clear normative warrant for such intervention in the case of learners who are: (i) beyond the age of majority and (ii) voluntarily engaged in study wherein significant professional or public implications of personal character development are not a pressing concern. In short, while good moral character is clearly of general human importance, its deliberate or explicit promotion may not be equally warranted in all educational contexts. (shrink)

This paper draws upon and critiques the Australian federal government's website My School as an archetypal example of the current tendency to abstract and quantify educational practice. Arguing in favour of a moral philosophical account of educational practice, the paper reveals how the My School website reduces complex educational practices to simple, supposedly objective, measures of student attainment, reflecting the broader 'audit' society/culture within which it is located. By revealing just how extensively the My School website reduces educational practices to (...) numbers, the paper argues that we are in danger of losing sight of the 'internal' goods of Education which cannot be readily and simply codified, and that the teacher learning encouraged by the site marginalises more active and collective approaches. While having the potential to serve some beneficial diagnostic purposes, the My School website reinforces a view of teachers as passive consumers of information generated beyond their everyday practice. (shrink)

The thesis contends that education and literary studies can make a valuable contribution to ethics and ethical development of persons, their relations with others and with the world. It promotes an approach to ethics education through dialogic enquiry based on theories and practices associated with comparative literature and philosophical enquiry. These involve students sharing experiences and meanings as they participate in interpretive communities and communities of philosophical enquiry. There are two main components to the research: ethically focused studies of literary (...) texts and the design, implementation and evaluation of a module in Ethics Education using literature and film as stimuli for Dialogic Enquiry. The literary analyses are influenced by reader-response theory. While recognizing the importance of the author or the contexts of production and receptions of texts, reader-response theory focuses on the experience of the reader as she/he responds to literary texts, and on her/his role in actively co-authoring the meaning of texts. Readers may form or join interpretive communities that share an ethos of practice. The literary narrative fictions studied include fairy tale, contemporary European cinema and neo-Western crime drama, each of which offers a valuable way of thinking about education. The module in ethics education, designed for Transition Year students, is based on movements in Philosophy with Children. Students formulate and explore ethical questions raised in response to themes or issues of literary texts. Dialogic communities of ethical inquiry may emerge from this. Students, participating in these dialogic communities of ethical inquiry, get to test out and develop their moral sense, understood in terms of reason, feeling, memory and imagination. The literary analyses demonstrate the ethically educative promise of literary texts, and the responses of students to this course and the growth of their ethical engagement suggest that this is a promising approach to ethics education. Such an educational experience may be ethical in matter, theory and practice and continue to find expression as praxis beyond the covers of books and walls of classrooms. (shrink)