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  1. What is Good Thinking? Comments on Mona Simion's Shifty Speech and Independent Thought. [REVIEW]Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Mona Simion’s Shifty Speech and Independent Thought argues for epistemic independence—the independence of good thinking from practical considerations. Along the way she argues against “shifty” views of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, as well as against those who have tried to preserve the independence of knowledge from practical considerations by accepting shifty views of the epistemic normativity of assertion. In my discussion I start by highlighting some of Simion’s main claims and reconstructing her main lines of argument. I then raise some (...)
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  • What's Wrong with Partisan Deference?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - In Worsnip Alex (ed.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Vol. 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Deference in politics is often necessary. To answer questions like, “Should the government increase the federal minimum wage?” and “Should the state introduce a vaccine mandate?”, we need to know relevant scientific and economic facts, make complex value judgments, and answer questions about incentives and implementation. Lay citizens typically lack the time, resources, and competence to answer these questions on their own. Hence, they must defer to others. But to whom should they defer? A common answer is that they should—or (...)
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  • The skeptical import of motivated reasoning: A closer look at the evidence.Maarten van Doorn - forthcoming - Thinking and Reasoning.
    Central to many discussions of motivated reasoning is the idea that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity. Reasoning differently about information supporting our prior beliefs versus information contradicting those beliefs, is frequently equated with motivated irrationality. By analyzing the normative status of belief polarization, selective scrutiny, biased assimilation and the myside bias, I show this inference is often not adequately supported. Contrary to what’s often assumed, these phenomena need not indicate motivated irrationality, even though they are instances of belief-consistent information (...)
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  • Knowledge in real-world contexts: not glamorous, but indispensable.Patricia Rich - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-32.
    During the past several decades, many epistemologists have argued for and contributed to a paradigm shift according to which knowledge is central to assertion, action, and interaction. This general position stands in sharp contrast to several recently developed accounts regarding specific epistemic contexts. These specific accounts resist applying traditional epistemic norms, including strong knowledge norms, to real-world situations of interest. In particular, I consider recent arguments about the epistemic standards for scientific pronouncements, expert testimony in a political context, and interactive (...)
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  • Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):257-273.
    This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three key issues. First, it starts by exploring how philosophers have recently challenged our understanding of radical skeptical arguments. It then unpacks and critically evaluates some influential reactions to radical skepticism: structuralism, knowledge-first epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, and hinge epistemology. Third, it explores some novel developments of pragmatism, like pragmatic skepticism, gauges its anti-skeptical import, and reflects on the ways in which radical skeptical epistemology and ethics (...)
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  • An argument for egalitarian confirmation bias and against political diversity in academia.Uwe Peters - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11999-12019.
    It has recently been suggested that politically motivated cognition leads progressive individuals to form beliefs that underestimate real differences between social groups and to process information selectively to support these beliefs and an egalitarian outlook. I contend that this tendency, which I shall call ‘egalitarian confirmation bias’, is often ‘Mandevillian’ in nature. That is, while it is epistemically problematic in one’s own cognition, it often has effects that significantly improve other people’s truth tracking, especially that of stigmatized individuals in academia. (...)
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  • Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & II.Christos Kyriacou - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):e12739.
    I review proposed skepticisms in recent literature (or skeptical invariantisms, if we understand skepticism semantically), contrast their basic commitments and highlight some of their comparative theoretical attractions and problems. To help set the scene for the discussion, I start with Unger’s (1975) modern classic of global skepticism about knowledge (and justification). I then distinguish three extant categories of skepticism in the recent literature: two non‐traditional and one more traditional. On the non‐traditional side are fallibilist science‐based skepticism (which relaxes thestringencyof the (...)
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  • Varieties of skeptical invariantism II.Christos Kyriacou - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):e12758.
    AbstarctIn the first installment of Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism, we set the scene for subsequent discussion with Unger's (1975) modern classic of global skepticism and distinguished three varieties of skeptical invariantism in recent literature: traditional skeptical invariantism, fallibilist science-based skepticism and practical skepticism. We then presented fallibilist science-based skepticism, that is, the position that relaxes the stringency of the standard of knowledge but still questions parts of our everyday knowledge on the basis of scientific reasons. In particular, we presented Frances’ (...)
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  • Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & II.Christos Kyriacou - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):e12739.
    I review proposed skepticisms in recent literature (or skeptical invariantisms, if we understand skepticism semantically), contrast their basic commitments and highlight some of their comparative theoretical attractions and problems. To help set the scene for the discussion, I start with Unger’s (1975) modern classic of global skepticism about knowledge (and justification). I then distinguish three extant categories of skepticism in the recent literature: two non‐traditional and one more traditional. On the non‐traditional side are fallibilist science‐based skepticism (which relaxes the stringency (...)
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  • Probability fixed points, (in)adequate concept possession and COVID-19 irrationalities.Christos Kyriacou & Nicos Stylianou - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (6):1037-1061.
    We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinfo...
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  • Motivated reasoning and the ethics of belief.Jon Ellis - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (6):e12828.
    In recent years, motivated reasoning has received significant attention across numerous areas of philosophy, including political philosophy, social philosophy, epistemology, moral psychology, philosophy of science, even metaphysics. At the heart of much of this interest is the idea that motivated reasoning (e.g., rationalization, wishful thinking, and self‐deception) is problematic, that it runs afoul of epistemic normativity, or is otherwise irrational. Is motivated reasoning epistemically problematic? Is it always? When it is, what is the nature of the violation? Philosophical projects on (...)
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  • Moderate realist ideology critique.Rebecca L. Clark - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    Realist ideology critique (RIC) is a strand of political realism recently developed in response to concerns that realism is biased toward the status quo. RIC aims to debunk an individual's belief that a social institution is legitimate by revealing that the belief is caused by that very same institution. Despite its growing prominence, RIC has received little critical attention. In this article, I buck this trend. First, I improve on contemporary accounts of RIC by clarifying its status and the role (...)
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  • Moderate realist ideology critique.Rebecca L. Clark - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy.
    Realist ideology critique (RIC) is a strand of political realism recently developed in response to concerns that realism is biased toward the status quo. RIC aims to debunk an individual's belief that a social institution is legitimate by revealing that the belief is caused by that very same institution. Despite its growing prominence, RIC has received little critical attention. In this article, I buck this trend. First, I improve on contemporary accounts of RIC by clarifying its status and the role (...)
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  • Vices of distrust.J. Adam Carter & Daniella Meehan - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (10):25-32.
    One of the first things that comes to mind when we think of the special issue’s theme, “Trust in a Social and Digital World” is the epidemic of ‘fake news’ and a cluster of trust- relevant vices we commonly associate with those who share it, click on it, and believe it. Fake news consumers are, among other things, gullible and naïve. Many are also dogmatic: intellectually and/or emotionally tied to a view point, and as a result, too quick to uncritically (...)
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