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  1. Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):391-401.
    According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one's belief could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should only examine the belief in the target proposition when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it is argued that if we only examine the belief in the target proposition, then the account fails to account for why beliefs in necessary truths could fall short of (...)
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  • A Statistical Analysis of Luck.Isaac Wilhelm - 2018 - Synthese (2):1-19.
    A modal analysis of luck, due to Duncan Pritchard, has become quite popular in recent years. There are many reasons to like Pritchard’s analysis, but at least two compelling problems have been identified. So I propose an alternative analysis of luck based on the laws of statistical mechanics. The statistical analysis avoids the two problems facing Pritchard’s analysis, and it has many other attractive features.
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  • Accident and Agency: A Mixed Methods Study Contrasting Luck and Interactivity in Problem Solving.Wendy Ross & Frédéric Vallée-Tourangeau - 2022 - Thinking and Reasoning 28 (4):487-528.
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  • Fortune.Tyler Porter - 2022 - Erkenntnis 10.
    Abstract: In this paper I argue that luck and fortune are distinct concepts that apply to different sets of events. I do so by suggesting that lucky events are best understood as significant events that are either modally fragile or improbable (depending on whether you accept a modal account or a probability account of luck), whereas fortunate events are best understood as significant events that are outside of our control. I call this the Pure Control Account of Fortune. I show (...)
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  • What's Luck Got to Do with the Luck Pincer?Jesse Hill - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Luck skepticism is the view that no one is ever morally responsible for anything because of the nature and ubiquity of luck. One acclaimed argument in favor of this view is Neil Levy’s luck pincer. The luck pincer holds that all morally significant acts or events involve either present luck, constitutive luck, or both and that present and constitutive luck each negate moral responsibility. Therefore, no one is ever morally responsible for any action or event. I argue that this argument (...)
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  • On Luck and Modality.Jesse Hill - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1873-1887.
    The modal account of luck is the predominant account of luck in epistemology and ethics. In the first half of this paper, I discuss three possible interpretations of the modal account and raise objections to each. I then raise an objection to all plausible versions of the modal account, that is, that whether an event is lucky or the extent to which it is a matter of luck will depend on what initial conditions or features of the event one holds (...)
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  • On luck and significance.Jesse Hill - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.
    It is often assumed that all lucky events are significant. The thought is that a chancy event such as winning the lottery is lucky for you in part because it affects your interests or well-being. But whether you win an Absurdist Raffle in which there are no prizes, is, intuitively, not a matter of luck. This is because this event—even if chancy—is not significant for any subject. However, a few philosophers have recently claimed not only that luck does not necessarily (...)
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  • Does Folk Disagreement About Ambiguous Lucky Cases Warrant an Error Theory? A Response to Hales and Johnson.Jesse Hill - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (6):876-891.
    Steven Hales and Jennifer Johnson—building off their (2014) work as well as Hales (2015, 2016)—have recently conducted two studies in Philosophical Psychology (2018) that show that there is a relationship between optimism and folk assessments of luck. Hales and Johnson use these results to argue that there is no such thing as luck. Instead, they claim that the concept is highly subjective and a cognitive illusion and that what we are in need of is an error theory. After reviewing Hales (...)
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  • Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck.Job Grefte - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):240-255.
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  • What’s Wrong with Modal Conceptions of Luck and Risk.Di Yang - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):773-787.
    The modal account of luck has become very popular and influential in the past decade. More recently, some of its proponents have also put forth a modal account of risk and argued that we ought to apply it to problems both in and out of philosophy. This paper tries to show that modal conceptions of luck and risk are mistaken.
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  • Three Sosaian Responses and a Wittgensteinian Response to the Dream Argument in the Zhuangzi.Leo K. C. Cheung - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):721-743.
    Ernest Sosa has proposed at least three responses to the dream argument for skepticism in his writings in the past decade. The first and the main purpose of this paper is to critically examine the three Sosaian responses, as well as a Wittgensteinian response Sosa would endorse, by investigating whether they can refute the six different versions of the dream argument found in a passage in the Zhuangzi. The second purpose of this paper is exactly to offer an exposition of (...)
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  • Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind.J. Adam Carter - 2017 - In Ian M. Church (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Theories of Luck. London: Routledge.
    Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000) reveal this commitment by taking for granted a traditional internalist construal of what I call the cognitive fixedness thesis—viz., the thesis that the cognitive process that is being employed in the actual world is (...)
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