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Bin Zhao
University of California, Irvine
  1.  97
    Knowledge From Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-13.
    According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one’s belief could not easily have been false. An important issue for the account is whether we should only examine the target belief when evaluating whether a belief is safe or not. In this paper, it is argued that, if we should only examine the target belief, then the account fails to account for ignorance of necessary truths. But, if we should also examine beliefs in other relevant (...)
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  2.  75
    A Dilemma for Globalized Safety.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-13.
    The safety condition is supposed to be a necessary condition on knowledge which helps to eliminate epistemic luck. It has been argued that the condition should be globalized to a set of propositions rather than the target proposition believed to account for why not all beliefs in necessary truths are safe. A remaining issue is which propositions are relevant when evaluating whether the target belief is safe or not. In the literature, solutions have been proposed to determine the relevance of (...)
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  3.  70
    Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    It has been argued that an advantage of the safety account over the sensitivity account is that the safety account preserves epistemic closure; while the sensitivity account implies epistemic closure failure. However, the argument fails to take the method-relativity of the modal conditions on knowledge, viz, sensitivity and safety, into account. In this paper, I argue that the sensitivity account and the safety account are on a par with respect to epistemic closure once the method-relativity of the modal conditions is (...)
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