그동안 많은 전문서적을 출간한 경험을 가지고 있지만, 이번 출간하는 법과 생활은 생활 현장에서 느낀 바를 진솔하게 담고 있어 독자들이 쉽게 읽을 수 있게 하였다. 항상 법이 무엇인가를 생각하면서 단조로운 일상을 살아야 하는 변호사, 법학교수로서, 우리 주변의 이야기는 빈곤한 사고의 저변을 넓혀 준다. 조선대학교 법사회대학에서 학생들을 가르치는 백면서생이지만, 서울과 광주를 오가면서 한국 사회를 객관적으로 바라볼 수 있는 시간을 가질 수 있었던 것은 본서 출간을 가능하게 한 동인이었다. 본 서는 정밀한 법이론이나 사례 분석, 또는 판례에 대한 학술적 비평을 담고 있지 않다. 다만 (...) 지난 수년간 느껴온 바를 일상의 시간에 연결한 천학비재한 한 법학도의 단상과 에세이 모음집이라 할 수 있다. 페이스북을 통하여 발표된 글들을 정리하여 학술적 외관을 씌운 부끄러운 졸작이다. 그러나 저자로서 작은 소망이 있다면, 그것은 독자들이 함께 살아 온 시간들을 반추하면서, 민주주의와 법치주의의 가치를 조금이라도 음미할 수 있었으면 하는 것이다. (shrink)

법을 공부하고 법을 가르치는 법학도나 법학 교수, 그리고 현실 사회에서 법과 정의를 구현하기 위하여 묵묵히 자신의 책무를 수행하는 일선 법률가들을 생각하며 조금이라도 도움이 될 수 있는 글을 써 보겠다는 마음으로 페북에 글을 올리기 시작한지 어언 5년 가까이 되고 있다. 우리 법률전문가들은 세상의 진실에 눈을 감고 진리를 왜곡하는 곡학아세의 길을 걷는 것을 항상 경계하여야 한다. 특히 좌우 정치가 자리를 잡아가면서 법률가들 마저 파벌을 이루어 법을 생각하기 앞서 자파의 이익을 생각하는 현실을 부인하기 어렵다. 이는 우리에게 양심의 회복을 질책한다. 무매한 민중을 호도하고 국가의 (...) 기강이자 바른 초석이어야 할 법과 법지식을 우롱하는 것이라 아니할 수 없다. 이는 민주주의와 함께 우뚝 서야 할 법치주의를 갉아 먹는 행태라 아니할 수 없다. 조심스러운 마음에서 같이 공부하여야겠다는 생각으로 ‘인간과 사회 그리고 법에 관한 성찰’이라는 제목으로 책을 출간하기로 마음 먹었다. 본서는 한 법률과목을 전문적으로 다루었다거나, 법이론이나 법해석학 관련 주제를 체계적으로 다룬 서적이 아니다. 그렇다고 법 실무에 도움이 될 수 있는 구체적이고 실무적인 문제를 다루고 있는 것도 아니다. 본서는 우리의 일상을 기반으로 법에 관한 단상, 그리고 관련되는 이론들을 생각나는대로 기술한 책이다. 변호사. 법률가. 법학교수, 법학도 등이 제 1차로 독자가 될 수 있을 것이지만, 그 밖에 인간, 사회, 법에 관심 있는 시민 모두가 즐겁게 읽을 수 있도록 엮으려고 노력하였다. 천학비재한 주제에도 화광동진(和光同塵)의 심정으로 출간에 나아가면서 감히 일독을 권하는 바이다. (shrink)

This article explores the ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ that seems to drive contemporary American jurists to interpret their opponents’ arguments to be ideologically motivated wrong answers to legal questions. The first part situates the hermeneutic in the history of the critique of legal reasoning, in public and private law, particularly the critique that claims that ‘no right answer is possible’ to many high-stakes questions of legal interpretation. The second part locates the hermeneutic in the long running processes of juridification, judicialization and (...) constitutionalization that characterize law in modern society. The last part interprets the hermeneutic as ‘projective identification’, in the sense of Freud’s analysis of jealousy, with the jurist solving the problem of role conflict by firmly externalizing the inevitable ideological element in doing justice onto his opponent while preserving the legalist element in doing justice for himself. (shrink)

Interpreting the content of the law is not limited to what a relevant lawmaker utters. This paper examines the extent to which implied and implicit content is part of the law, and specifically whether the Gricean concept of conversational implicature is relevant in determining the content of law. Recent work has focused on how this question relates to acts of legislation. This paper extends the analysis to case law and departs from the literature on several key issues. The paper's argument (...) is based upon two points: Precedent-setting judicial opinions may consist of multiple conversations, of which some entail opposing implicata, and if a particular precedent-setting judicial opinion consists of multiple conversations, of which some entail opposing implicata, then no meaningful conversational implicatum is part of the content of that particular precedent-setting opinion. Nevertheless, the paper's conclusion leaves open the prospect of gleaning something in between conversational implicature and what is literally said, namely, conversational impliciture. (shrink)

Work on analogy has been done from a number of disciplinary perspectives throughout the history of Western thought. This work is a multidisciplinary guide to theorizing about analogy. It contains 1,406 references, primarily to journal articles and monographs, and primarily to English language material. classical through to contemporary sources are included. The work is classified into eight different sections (with a number of subsections). A brief introduction to each section is provided. Keywords and key expressions of importance to research on (...) analogy are discussed in the introductory material. Electronic resources for conducting research on analogy are listed as well. (shrink)

The article examines the feasibility and the possibility of «the language of sociology» usage in jurisprudence. It is proved that «the language of sociology» not only promotes the implementation of the methodological function of law, but actively supports «the spirit of law» in the studying of social processes. It is emphasized that the coexistence in the modern society of two systems of norms - social legal and social non-legal - requires the search for differentiation criteria. As such criteria, it is (...) proposed to use the criterion of coercion and the criterion of the consideration procedure. (shrink)

Many studies have highlighted a substantial "bureaucracy domination" in procedures relating to migrants’ access to territory. This form of domination is marked by highly discretionary and arbitrary practices, enacted by the administrative authorities of the state. Only minor attention, however, has been devoted to the arbitrariness of judicial decisions and to the judicial role in general in the numerous proceedings that increasingly affect the path of migrants. This path is the main object of this paper. The study focuses on Italian (...) case law in expulsion and detention proceedings of irregular third country national citizens and asylum seekers and presents qualitative empirical research on decisions issued by the competent national authorities. The results have been analysed using a selection of theoretical tools, all referable to the general concept of the rule of law. The judicial decisions on pre-removal detention proceedings in two case studies are examined: the jurisprudence on detention of irregular migrants, in different offices of the Justice of the Peace in Italy; and the case law on detention of asylum seekers in the Ordinary Tribunal of Rome. The assumption underlying the research is that various conceptions of the rule of law may have different explanatory power when it comes to explaining the empirical results. To verify this hypothesis, the study proposes an overview of the main rule of law doctrines in the Western tradition of political and legal thought and applies the method of historical-conceptual analysis. As a result, the explanatory power of six theoretical models of the rule of law was verified against the data with the view to highlight the virtues and vices of the respective explanatory frameworks. This article reaches a two-fold conclusion. First, as far as the explanatory frameworks are concerned: the results of the two case studies cannot be fully explained by any of the models considered in this study. This fact alone casts doubts on the explanatory power of these theories and calls for further research on judicial decision-making more generally. Secondly, a key finding of the study regarding the notions of discretion and arbitrariness is that the judicial approach which assures the highest protection of rights is also the one that is most easily influenced by arbitrariness. The author argues that this paradox can be easily dissolved by paying attention to the plural dimensions of arbitrariness. If we consider arbitrariness from a legal point of view, i.e. as an illegal decision, it is unsurprising that the authority that most uses its discretionary powers is also the one most at risk of abusing these discretionary powers and hence of exercising arbitrary power. However, if we consider arbitrariness from the point of view of philosophical-political theory, i.e. as a form of domination characterised by the absence of sufficient justification, it is unsurprising that the judicial approach which assures the highest protection of rights is also the one that takes its own role as guarantor of these rights and of the constitutional democratic legal order as such most seriously. This judicial approach thus most often risks exercising its power in criticisable ways, as compared to an authority much more in line with the requirements of law enforcement agencies. Keywords: migration, discretion, justice, arbitrariness, civil rights, Rechtsstaat, expulsion, mixed constitution. (shrink)

Law and emotion has evolved into a vibrant and diverse field, drawing in legal scholars and interdisciplinary partners from across the social sciences, hard sciences, and humanities. This introduction to the special section on law and emotion traces the history and theoretical underpinnings of this movement and situates the special section within it. The insights of emotion research can help legal scholars and practitioners to better calibrate law to human realities and to foster a desired set of emotional experiences among (...) law’s subjects. Law, in turn, offers to researchers a forum within which to explore emotion in a dynamic and influential real-world setting. The introduction ends with a call to disciplined interdisciplinarity. (shrink)

This article questions some assumptions in legal, moral and political theory regarding the law’s ways of functioning. As the constant revival of the topos ‘living law’ shows, underlying common models of law, and of the legitimacy of law, is, though often implicitly, the view that law is or should be particular, near to the facts, flexible, susceptible to realities, and as a consequence accessible to modernisations. However, this article proposes an immanent critique of similar hopes or fears, and it argues (...) that modern positive law can not be responsive to any other ‘order’ or context because it constitutes an order of its own. The article seeks to give an explanation of the specific character and forms of the juridical operating and to explain more specifically how decisions are produced. The article in this regard also investigates the importance and role of imagination, fiction and performativity. Underlining the fact that the juridical exceeds legal propositions by asserting itself as a distinct form of social communication, it calls for a shift from the representational to the performative analysis in the study of law. (shrink)

This paper construes various positions in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of law as responses to the problem of underdetermination in science and in law. We begin by drawing a close analogy between the successive approaches to this problem in the two fields. In particular, we stress the analogy between conventionalism as a philosophy of science and legal realism as a philosophy of law, and between Putnam's and Dworkin's critiques of these positions. We then challenge the Putnam-Dworkin strategy, (...) arguing that their attempts to combat underdetermination are unsuccessful. We are thus led to scepticism regarding the outlook underlying the celebrated maxim, “ruled by law, not by men”. (shrink)

The principle of bivalence is the assertion that every statement is either true or else false. Its legal analog, however, must be formulated relative to particular legal systems and in terms of validity rather than truth. It asserts that every statement of law that can be formulated in the vocabulary of a given legal system is valid or else invalid in that system. A line of New York cases is traced, beginning with Thomas v. Winchester . This case, which involved (...) a poison mislabeled as a medicine, established an exception to the rule that a manufacturer or supplier is never liable for negligence to a remote purchaser. The court made an exception because a poison is an “imminently dangerous” thing. How far may this exception be applied to other fact‐situations? Some subsequent cases are examined, and it is considered whether there is no correct answer in these instances and, more dramatically, whether more than one correct answer is tenable. In either event the legal analog of bivalence would seem to fail. (shrink)

This paper is intended to be a summary of the author's views on the relationship between law and morality worked out over the past three decades in jurisprudence. The paper preliminarily clarifies the matter by isolating some lines of cleavage separating different questions askable about this relationship. With this done, the author argues for two theses. One, that judges are obligated to use morality in their decisions in particular cases; and two, that the morality judges are obligated to use in (...) their judicial reasonings, is best seen as the natural lawyer sees it, namely, as being part of the law that obligates judges in their role as judges. The author not only believes these theses to be true; he also thinks that these theses are practically important, in that their acceptance by judges makes for better judging. (shrink)

This paper proposes a model ofratio decidendi as a justification structure consisting of a series of reasoning steps, some of which relate abstract predicates to other abstract predicates and some of which relate abstract predicates to specific facts. This model satisfies an important set of characteristics ofratio decidendi identified from the jurisprudential literature. In particular, the model shows how the theory under which a case is decided controls its precedential effect. By contrast, a purely exemplar-based model ofratio decidendi fails to (...) account for the dependency of precedential effect on the theory of decision. (shrink)

This article describes Chester Barnard, the author of The Functions of the Executive, one of the twentieth century’s most influential books on management and leadership. The book emphasizes competence, moral integrity, rational stewardship, professionalism, and a systems approach, and was written for posterity. Barnard emphasized the role of the manager as both a professional and as a steward of the corporation. His teachings drew on personal insights as a senior executive of AT&T, which saw good governance as the primary means (...) of winning public acceptance of its telecommunications monopoly. Barnard provided a conceptual scheme of the theory of organization based on the following structural concepts: the individual and bounded rationality, cooperation, formal organization, and informal organization. The principal dynamic concepts include communication, consent theory of authority, free will, the decision process, dynamic equilibrium and the inducement–contributions balance, and leadership, executive responsibility, and moral codes. (shrink)