- On the many as one: A reply to Kornhauser and Sager.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2005 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 33 (4):377–390.details
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(1 other version)A defence of 'self-defeating' arguments.John F. Fox - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):213 – 216.details
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How original a work is the tractatus logico-philosophicus?Laurence Goldstein - 2002 - Philosophy 77 (3):421-446.details
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Replies.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):449-464.details
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Gruesome diagonals.Laura Schroeter - 2003 - Philosophers' Imprint 3:1-23.details
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Pragmaticism.Charles S. Peirce - 2024 - De Gruyter.details
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Dankbarkeit, Freiheit und Verweigerung.Jonathan Lear - 2024 - Psyche 78 (3):230-256.details
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Reason, reasoning, and the taking condition.Hamid Vahid - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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The Normativity of Meaning and Content.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini, Kathrin Glüer-Pagin & Asa Wikforss - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Thinking through talking to yourself: Inner speech as a vehicle of conscious reasoning.Wade Munroe - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (2):292-318.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Absolutely general knowledge.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser & Beau Madison Mount - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):547-566.details
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Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy, Vintage Enthusiasms: Essays in Honour of John L. Bell.David DeVidi, Michael Hallett & Peter Clark (eds.) - 2011 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Czy posiadanie sprzecznych przekonań jest możliwe? Omówienie i krytyka argumentów za psychologiczną zasadą niesprzeczności.Maciej Tarnowski - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (2):323-353.details
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(1 other version)¿Intuición o confianza racional?María D. García Arnaldos - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (2):49.details
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El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico.María Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2019 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 36 (1):243-259.details
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Reasoning and Deducing.Markos Valaris - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):861-885.details
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I—Lucifer’s Logic Lesson: How to Lie with Arguments.Roy Sorensen - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):105-126.details
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Naturalism and Inference: On the Need for a Theory of Material Inference.Dabay Thomas - 2016 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt Universitydetails
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Infinte Regress Arguments.Claude Gratton - 2009 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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(1 other version)Argumentation Theory and the conception of epistemic justification.Lilian Bermejo-Luque - 2009 - In Marcin Koszowy (ed.), Informal logic and argumentation theory. Białystok: University of Białystok. pp. 285--303.details
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Reductionism and cognitive flexibility.Frank Keil - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):141-142.details
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From computational metaphor to consensual algorithms.Kenneth Mark Colby - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):134-135.details
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Unjustified presuppositions of competence.Leah Savion - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):364-365.details
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Scientific thinking and mental models.Ryan D. Tweney - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):366-367.details
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Situation theory and mental models.Alice G. B. ter Meulen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):358-359.details
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Getting down to cases.Kent Bach - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):334-336.details
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Three-store theories of memory.William S. Maki - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (3):505-506.details
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Is the hippocampus a store, intermediate or otherwise?Neil McNaughton - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (3):508-509.details
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Oneindige regressieargumenten.Jan Willem Wieland - 2013 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 105 (1):1-14.details
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The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability.Samuel Alexander Taylor - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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Blind rule-following.Paul A. Boghossian - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 27-48.details
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What Carroll’s Tortoise Actually Proves.Jan Willem Wieland - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):983-997.details
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The Value of Understanding.Stephen Grimm - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (2):103-117.details
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Bootstrapping, defeasible reasoning, and a priori justification.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.details
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Wittgenstein and the Logic of Inference.Jan Zwicky - 1982 - Dialogue 21 (4):671-692.details
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The Explanation of Cognition.John R. Searle - 1997 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42:103-.details
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(1 other version)Does the Traditional Treatment of Enthymemes Rest on a Mistake?David Hitchcock - 1998 - Argumentation 12 (1):15-37.details
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Two kinds of deviance.William H. Hanson - 1989 - History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1):15-28.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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An argument against the social fact thesis (and some additional preliminary steps towards a new conception of legal positivism).Kevin Toh - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (5):445 - 504.details
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The "strong programme", normativity, and social causes.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2008 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (1):1–22.details
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(1 other version)The Humean problem of induction and Carroll’s Paradox.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357 - 376.details
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A naturalized approach to the a priori.Louise Antony - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):1–17.details
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What’s So Special About Reasoning? Rationality, Belief Updating, and Internalism.Wade Munroe - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe.Wade Munroe - forthcoming - Episteme:1-27.details
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Modular vs. diagrammatic reasoning.Angelina Bobrova & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2022 - Pragmatics and Cognition 29 (1):111-134.details
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Ratiocination.Winnie Sung - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-28.details
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Alonzo Church.Oliver Marshall & Harry Deutsch - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Reasoning and grasping objects.Rea Golan - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):699-711.details
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