Článek se zabývá pojmem panteismus v období renesance. Ačkoli termín panteismus se objevil až na konci 17. století a později v kontextu tzv. “Pantheismusstreit”, za předchůdce moderního panteistického myšlení byl označen renesanční filosof Giordano Bruno. Následně i Mikuláš Kusánský, a to jakožto pokračovatel myšlení Mistra Eckharta, začal být považován za panteistu. Jak Kusánský, tak Bruno v určitém smyslu obhajovali imanenci božského ve světě, avšak zároveň oba zdůrazňovali rozdíl mezi Bohem a přírodou a připisovali Bohu transcendenci nebo přinejmenším transcendentální aspekty. Toto (...) není v souladu s definicí panteismu v tzv. silném slova smyslu, kdy se tvrdí striktní identita Boha a světa. Zdá se, že pojem renesanční panteismus je konstruktem, který byl vytvořen skrze násilnou aplikaci terminologie osvícenské filosofie na renesanční období. (shrink)

ArgumentThis article examines the conception of elements in the natural philosophy of Nicolaus Taurellus (1547–1606) and explores the theological motivation that stands behind this conception. By some of his early modern readers, Taurellus may have been understood as a proponent of material atoms. By contrast, I argue that considerations concerning the substantiality of the ultimate constituents of composites led Taurellus to an immaterialist ontology, according to which elements are immaterial forms that possess active and passive potencies as well as motion (...) and extension. In Taurellus's view, immaterialism about elements provides support for the theological doctrine of creationex nihilo. As he argues, the ontology of immaterial forms helps to explicate a sense in which creatures are substances, not accidents of the divine substance. In particular, he maintains that immaterial forms stand in suitable relations of ontological dependence to God: creation dependence (since forms would not exist without the divine act of creation), but neither subsistence dependence (since forms continue to exist without continued divine agency) nor activity dependence (since forms are active without requiring divine concurrence). (shrink)

The paper examines the Dialogue De pace fidei written by Nicolaus Cusanus in 1453 to settle disputes arising from events that triggered religious unrest, such as the fall of Constantinople in May 1453, the invasion and massacre of the Turks led by Sultan Mehmed II and the defeat of the Christians. Following the disintegration of medieval Christianity, Cusanus, instead of promoting a crusade, as Cardinal Bessarione did, proposed a more suitable way to make the major exponents of different religions interact (...) in a fruitful dialogue, hoping for the peace of a single universal faith. The arguments through which Cusanus claimed the concept of a concordance and pacification of the faith reveal the originality and topicality of the message communicated by the humanist, founded on the doctrine of peace in the faith, overcoming inter-confessional barriers and religious divergences.The author contrasts the divergences, massacres and wars with a doctrinal comparison among different religions through dialogue. The paper invites reflection upon the religious struggles that still spread discord in the world. (shrink)

Naturae vero rerum vis atque majestas in omnibus momentis fide caret, si quis modo partes ejus ac non totam coplectatur animo.1In the De natura deorum, Cicero recalls that followers of Pythagoras often justified justified their acceptance of a statement by appealing to the authority of their teacher. For them, inasmuch as Pythagoras “himself said it,” his words should be accepted unreservedly and there was no reason to argue further.2 Since antiquity, “ipse dixit” has been considered the most straightforward summary of (...) the argument from authority. It also seems to condense all of the negative characteristics of an attitude that we nowadays regard as the contrary to modern scientific... (shrink)

Resumen En el presente artículo estudio la asociación entre los conceptos de “materialismo” y “ateísmo” en The True Intellectual System of the Universe de Ralph Cudworth y las consecuencias metafísicas que el inglés encuentra en esas corrientes. El inglés ofrece una clasificación exhaustiva de los posibles ateísmos para mostrar sus errores y participar en la gestación de categorías que a la larga se considerarán historiográficas. En un segundo momento, presento el concepto de “naturaleza plástica” y el orden ontológico que Cudworth (...) ofrece como el correcto, en el cual se aprecia la influencia platónica y la subordinación de lo material a lo inmaterial. Así, en su metafísica, Cudworth sostiene un dualismo porque no rechaza la existencia de la materia, sino la utilización errónea que hacen de ella los ateos.In this paper I examine the association between the concepts of “materialism” and “atheism” in Ralph Cudworth’s The True Intellectual System of the Universe, and the metaphysical consequences that the Englishman establishes for those trends. Cudworth offers an exhaustive classification of possible atheisms in order to show their mistakes, and in this way he participates in the origination of categories which eventually will be considered as historiographical. I present then the concept of “Plastic Nature” and the ontological order that Cudworth thinks to be the correct one, and which exhibits the Platonic influence and the subordination of the material to the immaterial. Thus, in his metaphysics Cudworth maintains a dualism insofar as he does not reject the existence of matter but the wrong use that atheists make of it. (shrink)

This paper deals with Ágnes Heller’s suggestion, in A Theory of Modernity (1999), to ascribe to science a central role in the ongoing development of modernity. As we shall argue, this is not merely a historical issue but, rather, a historical-philosophical one that entails the problem of defining modernity, science and technology and their mutual interconnections. As for modernity, according to Heller, it is a free developmental project without any foundations other than freedom itself. In particular, the evolution of science (...) and technology is one of its main developmental tendencies. Science, she argues, has become the dominant world explanation while technological thought is the corresponding dominant (but not unique) imaginary institution. Her attempt to isolate the essential cultural features of science-technology owes much to Habermas’s analyses of the 1960s on the technocratic developments of contemporary societies legitimized through an ideological employment of science. Like Habermas, Heller embraces an instrumental and problem-solving conception of technology and ‘normal’ science which appears questionable, however, in the light of conclusions on the intrinsic creativity of the science-technology interface deriving from historical epistemology and an externalist history of science. Considerations and examples derived from the recent agenda of historical epistemology could integrate Heller’s philosophical and cultural analysis of the role of science in modernity while challenging some of her assumptions. (shrink)

Aunque Nicolás de Cusa, no es un anti-aristotélico estricto, el propósito de este artículo es mostrar en qué sentido la reflexión acerca del principio capital de la filosofía de Nicolás de Cusa el principio de la coincidencia de los opuestos, supone una lectura crítica de Aristóteles. En diálogo con la literatura secundaria propongo que el contacto con el llamado Aristoteles latinus ofrece al Cusano la oportunidad para plantear una superación de las condiciones de la contradicción y encontrar un marco especulativo (...) adecuado para una nueva concepción del Primer Principio. While Nicholas of Cusa is not a strict anti-aristotelian, the purpose of this article is to show the sense in which in the first principle of cusanian philosophy, the principle of the coincidence of opposites, contains a critical reading of Aristotle. Discussing some contemporary positions, it is proposed here that the contact with the so-called Aristoteles latinus gives Nicholas of Cusa the opportunity to attempt a critical examination of the conditions of contradiction and to open a speculative framework for a new conception of the First Principle. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to an overview of Cassirer’s work both as historian of philosophy and historian of science. Indeed, the “intelletcual cooperation” between history of philosophy and history of science represents an essential feature of Cassirer’s style of philosophizing: while the roots of a wide exploration stretching from Renaissance thought to modern physics go back to the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School, the results of a similar cross-fertilization of research fields have deeply contributed to shaping new standards of inquiry. (...) Cassirer’s relationship with the Warburg milieu in Hamburg and late in his life with the American intellectual scenario are surely worthy of closer investigation. Distinguished scholars such as Meyerson, Brunschvicg, Burtt, Koyré, Metzger, Lovejoy, Kristeller, have disussed, appreciated, critizised Cassirer’s still today fascinating studies devoted to Pico della Mirandola, Galileo, Newton, Leibniz, to mention but a few. To explore some of these aspects focusing both on affinities and differences within a cosmpolitian intellectual community can provide a better understanding of philosophy and history of science in the first half of 20th century. Cassirer’s legacy requires, therefore, a new assessment. (shrink)