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  1. Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi.Jan Westerhoff - 2006 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 34 (4):367-395.
    The catuṣkoṭi or tetralemma is an argumentative figure familiar to any reader of Buddhist philosophical literature. Roughly speaking it consists of the enumeration of four alternatives: that some propositions holds, that it fails to hold, that it both holds and fails to hold, that it neither holds nor fails to hold. The tetralemma also constitutes one of the more puzzling features of Buddhist philosophy as the use to which it is put in arguments is not immediately obvious and certainly not (...)
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  • Nāgārjuna’s Negation.Chris Rahlwes - 2022 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 50 (2):307-344.
    The logical analysis of Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi has remained a heated topic for logicians in Western academia for nearly a century. At the heart of the catuṣkoṭi, the four corners’ formalization typically appears as: A, Not A, Both, and Neither. The pulse of the controversy is the repetition of negations in the catuṣkoṭi. Westerhoff argues that Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā uses two different negations: paryudāsa and prasajya-pratiṣedha. This paper builds off Westerhoff’s account and presents some subtleties of Nāgārjuna’s use of these (...)
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  • On the Coherence of Dignāga’s Epistemology: Evaluating the Critiques of Candrakīrti and Jayarāśi.Ethan Mills - 2015 - Asian Philosophy 25 (4):339-357.
    I discuss two critiques of Dignāga’s epistemology, one from Candrakīrti and another from Jayarāśi. I argue that they are two versions of what I call the core problem: if the content of Dignāga’s epistemology were correct, two fundamental beliefs within this epistemological theory could not be established or known to be true, as Dignāga claims they are. In response to objections found within the classical Indian tradition as well as several plausible contemporary objections, I then argue that the core problem (...)
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  • A Grammarian’s View of Negation: Nāgeśa’s Paramalaghumañjūs.ā on Nañartha.John J. Lowe & James W. Benson - 2023 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 51 (1):49-75.
    The theory of negation developed in the grammatical-philosophical system of later Vyākaraṇa remains almost entirely unstudied, despite its close links with the (widely studied) approaches to negation found in other philosophical schools such as Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, and despite its consequent importance for a comprehensive understanding of the theory of negation in ancient India. In this paper we present an edition, translation and commentary of the relevant sections of Nāgeśa’s _Paramalaghumañjūṣā_, a concise presentation by the final authority of the Pāṇinian (...)
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  • Nägarjuna's Appeal.Richard P. Hayes - 1994 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 22 (4):311.
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  • Nāgārjuna’s Scepticism about Philosophy.Ethan A. Mills - 2020 - In Oren Hanner (ed.), Buddhism and Scepticism: Historical, Philosophical, and Comparative Perspectives. Freiburg/Bochum: ProjektVerlag. pp. 55-81.
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