- Conflicting reasons in the small-improvement argument.Johan E. Gustafsson & Nicolas Espinoza - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):754-763.details
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An Extended Framework for Preference Relations.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (3):360-367.details
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The Numbers Count.Peter A. Graham - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):129-134.details
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Whom Should We Enhance? The Problem of Altering Potential.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):731-753.details
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Whom Should We Enhance? The Problem of Altering Potential.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (6):731-753.details
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How (and How Not) to Defend Lesser-Evil Options.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (3-4):211-232.details
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Teaching Ethics to Engineers: A Socratic Experience.Gonzalo Génova & M. Rosario González - 2016 - Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (2):567-580.details
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Parity, Preference and Puzzlement.Joshua Gert - 2015 - Theoria 81 (3):249-271.details
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Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):611-618.details
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Breaking the law of desire.Joshua Gert - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (3):295-319.details
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Fallibility without Facts.Will Gamester - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.details
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A Dissolution of the Repugnant Conclusion.Roberto Fumagalli - 2024 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 41 (1):85-105.details
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Epistemicism and Commensurability.Paul Forrester - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The small improvement argument, epistemicism and incomparability.Edmund Tweedy Flanigan & John Halstead - 2018 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (2):199-219.details
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Counting People and Making People Count.Jessica J. T. Fischer - 2021 - Philosophy 96 (2):229-252.details
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Imprecise lexical superiority and the (slightly less) Repugnant Conclusion.James Fanciullo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2103-2117.details
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The small improvement argument.Nicolas Espinoza - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):127 - 139.details
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Incommensurability as vagueness: a burden-shifting argument.Luke Elson - 2017 - Theoria 83 (4):341-363.details
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Introduction.Luke Elson - 2016 - Ratio 29 (4):353-356.details
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Heaps and Chains: Is the Chaining Argument for Parity a Sorites?Luke Elson - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):557-571.details
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Borderline Cases and the Collapsing Principle.Luke Elson - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (1):51-60.details
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An extended framework for preference relations.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):101-108.details
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Vague Value.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):352-372.details
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The Case for Comparability.Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel & Jake Zuehl - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):414-453.details
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Parity, prospects, and predominance.Ryan Doody - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):1077-1095.details
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Hard choices in artificial intelligence.Roel Dobbe, Thomas Krendl Gilbert & Yonatan Mintz - 2021 - Artificial Intelligence 300 (C):103555.details
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Reconsidering Meaning in Life: A Philosophical Dialogue with Thaddeus Metz.Masahiro Morioka (ed.) - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy of Life, Waseda University.details
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Perfect Freedom and God's Hard Choices.Luke Wilson - 2022 - Faith and Philosophy 39 (2):291-312.details
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Meaning and More Meaningful. A Modest Measure.Peter Baumann - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy of Life 5 (3):33-49.details
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The Mere Addition Paradox, Parity and Critical Level Utilitarianism.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2002 - School of Economic and Social Studies, University of East Anglia.details
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Incomparable numbers.Kenneth Walden - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 10.details
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The Case for Incomparability.Benjamin Eva - manuscriptdetails
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On Evaluative Imprecision.Teruji Thomas - 2022 - In Jeff McMahan, Timothy Campbell, Ketan Ramakrishnan & Jimmy Goodrich (eds.), Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 478-497.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Value theory.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Dynamic choice.Chrisoula Andreou - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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How It All Relates : Exploring the Space of Value Comparisons.Henrik Andersson - 2017 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Papers in Population Ethics.Elliott Thornley - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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Topics in Population Ethics.Teruji Thomas - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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On Epistemic Agency.Kristoffer Hans Ahlstrom - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherstdetails
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Annihilation Isn't Bad For You.Travis Timmerman - manuscriptdetails
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What's Fair about Individual Fairness?Will Fleisher - 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society.details
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Incomparable risks, values and preferences.Nicolas Espinoza - 2006 - Dissertation, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholmdetails
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Pick the Sugar.Seamus Bradley - manuscriptdetails
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Incommensurability in Population Ethics.Jacob Nebel - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Oxforddetails
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The aggregation problem for Scanlonian Contractualism: an exploration of the relevance view, mixed solutions, and why Scanlonian Contractualists could be, and perhaps should be, Restricted Prioritarians.Aart Van Gils - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Readingdetails
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Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Epistemic Decision Theory's Reckoning.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - manuscriptdetails
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Lopsided Lives.Theron Pummer - 2017 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296.details
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