This dissertation explores some objections to natural law theory- many of which are also leveled against contemporary naturalism. Despite the way the natural law tradition has fallen into disrepute in much of the American academy, this dissertation defends a classical Thomistic approach to natural law from some modern and contemporary criticisms. It begins with a brief explanation of the theory of natural law that will be defended from these contemporary objections. Chapter three examines G.E. Moore and David Hume's classical problems (...) posed to natural law, along with some contemporary defenders of Moore's position. These arguments are purported to undermine using human nature as a basis for ethics. Chapter four considers how moral relativism, especially the form given by Gilbert Harmon and David Wong, offers a unique challenge to natural law that must be answered and one that seems to undermine any ethical theory than any account relying on human nature. Chapter five explores the relation between neo-naturalism and natural law. Although neo-naturalism is a position often thought of as opposed to natural law, the two share many similarities in the positions they oppose. The last chapter examines how natural law reasoning is used in making medical decisions. The overarching thesis is that, insofar as natural law is coherent and answers many major criticisms, the proposal to reexamine this ethical theory stands as viable. (shrink)

The emergence of global bioethics is connected to a rise of interest in ethics in general (both in academia and in the public sphere), combined with an increasing awareness of the interrelatedness of peoples and their ethical dilemmas, and the recognition that global problems need global solutions. In short, global bioethics has two distinguishing features: first, its global scope, both geographically and conceptually; and second, its focus on justice (communal and individual).

The professional and institutional responsibility for handling genetic knowledge is well discussed; less attention has been paid to how lay people and particularly people who are affected by genetic diseases perceive and frame such responsibilities. In this exploratory study we qualitatively examine the attitudes of lay people, patients and relatives of patients in Germany and Israel towards genetic testing. These attitudes are further examined in the national context of Germany and Israel, which represent opposite regulatory approaches and bioethical debates concerning (...) genetic testing. Three major themes of responsibility emerged from the inter-group and cross-cultural comparison: self-responsibility, responsibility for kin, and responsibility of society towards its members. National contrast was apparent in the moral reasoning of lay respondents concerning, for example, the right not to know versus the duty to know (self-responsibility) and the moral conflict concerning informing kin versus the moral duty to inform (responsibility for kin). Attitudes of respondents affected by genetic diseases were, however, rather similar in both countries. We conclude by discussing how moral discourses of responsibility are embedded within cultural (national, religious) as well as phenomenological (being affected) narratives, and the role of public engagement in bioethical discourse. (shrink)

Genetic information about one individual often has medical and reproductive implications for that individual’s relatives. There is a debate about whether policy on transmitting genetic information within the family should change to reflect this shared aspect of genetic information. Even if laws on medical confidentiality remain unchanged, there still remains the question of professional practice and whether, to what extent and by what means professionals should encourage disclosure within a family. The debate so far has tended to focus on who (...) has a right to genetic information, or has a right to decline genetic information, frequently drawing on the notion of individual autonomy. There are significant divergences within this debate, and difficulties with the use of autonomy in this context have been noted. This paper draws on theoretical considerations as well as on qualitative empirical data to show that shifting from talk of autonomy to talk of integrity will greatly enrich and illuminate the issues. It becomes possible to gain deeper insights into the ethical significance of the timing and the manner of such communication, the character of recipients of knowledge, and the nuanced nature of communication and different levels of understanding within a family. (shrink)

Individual autonomy is a concept highly appreciated in modern Western societies. Its significance is reflected by the central importance and broad use of the model of informed consent in all fields of medicine. In predictive genetic testing, individual autonomy gains particular importance, for what is in focus here is not so much a concrete medical treatment but rather options for taking preventive measures and the influence that the test results have on long-term lifestyle and preferences. Based on an analysis of (...) autonomy-related issues in predictive genetic diagnosis and genetic screening programmes, this contribution stresses the central relevance of a broad notion of autonomy for the discussion of ethical issues raised in connection with predictive genetic testing and genetic screening programmes. Only against the background of such a broad notion of autonomy, which stresses not only free and informed decision-making but also the relevance of long-term prospects for leading a self-determined life in familial and social contexts, can the manifold autonomy-related issues linked to predictive genetic testing be given adequate consideration. (shrink)

Prompted by developments in human genetics, a recurrent bioethical question concerns a person’s ‘right to know’ and ‘right not to know’ about genetic information held that is intrinsically related to or linked to them. In this paper, we will revisit the claimed rights in relation to two particular test cases. One concerns the rights of the 500,000 participants in UK Biobank whose biosamples, already having been genotyped, will now be exome sequenced, and the other concerns the rights of pregnant women (...) who undergo non-invasive prenatal testing —a simple blood test that can reveal genetic information about both a foetus and its mother. This two-part paper is in four principal sections. First, we sketch the relevant features of our two test cases. Secondly, we consider the significance of recent legal jurisprudence in the UK and Singapore. Thirdly, we consider how, the jurisprudence apart, the claimed rights might be grounded. Fourthly, we consider the limits on the rights. We conclude with some short remarks about the kind of genetically aware society that we might want to be and how far there is still an opportunity meaningfully to debate the claimed rights. (shrink)

The European Union faced high risks from personal data proliferation to individuals’ privacy. Legislation has emerged that seeks to articulate all interests at stake, balancing the need for data flow from EU countries with protecting personal data: the General Data Protection Regulation. One of the mechanisms established by this new law to strengthen the individual’s control over their data is the so-called “right to be forgotten”, the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of records. In gender transition, this (...) right represents a powerful form of control over personal data, especially health data that may reveal a gender with which they do not identify and reject. Therefore, it is pertinent to discern whether the right to have personal data deleted—in particular, health data—is ethically acceptable in gender transition. Towards addressing the ethical dimensions of the right to be forgotten in this case, this study presents relevant concepts, briefly outlines history, ethics and law of records considering the evolution from paper to electronic format, the main aspects of identity construction and gender identity, and explores the relationship between privacy, data protection/information control and identity projection. Also, it discusses in gender transition the relation between “the right to self-determination”, “the right to delete”, and “the right to identity and individuality”. Conclusions on the ethical admissibility of the ‘right to be forgotten’ to control gender-affirming information are presented. (shrink)

Recent advances in genomic research have led to the development of new diagnostic tools, including tests which make it possible to predict the future occurrence of monogenetic diseases (e.g. Chorea Huntington) or to determine increased susceptibilities to the future development of more complex diseases (e.g. breast cancer). The use of such tests raises a number of ethical, legal and social issues which are usually discussed in terms of rights. However, in the context of predictive genetic tests a key question arises (...) which lies beyond the concept of rights, namely, What should we want to know about our future? In the following I shall discuss this question against the background of Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue. It will be demonstrated that the system of duties of virtue that Kant elaborates in the second part of his Metaphysics of Morals offers a theoretical framework for addressing the question of a proper scope of future knowledge as provided by genetic tests. This approach can serve as a source of moral guidance complementary to a justice perspective. It does, however, not rest on the – rather problematic – claim to be able to define what the “good life” is. (shrink)

This text is about obtaining and sharing genetic information when there is a potential conflict of interests between patients and their families and relatives. The patient or, in this text, the “index-person,” is someone who is considering obtaining or already has obtained genetic information about herself through genetic testing.The index-person can have several reasons to take an interest in obtaining her genetic information. She may want to know if she has a genetic predisposition for a disorder in order to take (...) measures for preventing its development. Even if there are no preventive measures, as is the case with Huntington's disease, for instance, she may still want to know whether she has the mutation, in order to adjust her future plans. These interests that an individual may have in obtaining genetic information have been used to argue in favour of a right to know. (shrink)

Beneficence and respect for autonomy are two of the most fundamental moral duties in general and in bioethics in particular. Beyond the usual questions of how to resolve conflicts between these duties in particular cases, there are more general questions about the possible forms of the interactions between them. Only recognition of the full spectrum of possible interactions will ensure optimal moral deliberation when duties potentially conflict. This paper has two simultaneous objectives. The first is to suggest a typological scheme (...) of all possible modes of interaction; these will be classified under the “discrete,” “semi-discrete,” and “non-discrete” categories, according to whether the meaning and/or forms of expression of each duty are treated as independent from or rather as constrained by the other. The second objective is to show that all logical possibilities of interaction indeed have real expressions in medical ethics, to provide clear illustrations of each, and in particular to stress those that have usually escaped recognition. (shrink)

In this essay, I indicate how social-science approaches can throw light on predictive genetic testing (PGT) in various societal contexts. In the first section, I discuss definitions of various forms of PGT, and point out their inherent ambiguity and inappropriateness when taken out of an ideal–typical context. In section two, I argue further that an ethics approach proceeding from the point of view of the abstract individual in a given society should be supplemented by an approach that regards bioethics as (...) inherently ambiguous, contested, changeable and context-dependent. In the last section, I place these bioethical discussions of PGT in the context of Asian communities. Here, a critical view of what constitutes a community and culture proves necessary to understand the role of bioethical debates and the empirical manifestations of PGT in Asian societies. A discussion of the concepts of family and kinship in relation to PGT indicates that any bioethical analysis has to take into account that bioethical values are not just reflections of a cultural community, but embody both bioethical ideals and prevalent political rhetoric which is exhibited, propagated and manipulated by individuals and collectives for a variety of purposes. I end by summarising the contributions that social science could make to the understanding of the bioethics of PGT. (shrink)

The right not to know is often defended on the basis of the principle of respect for personal autonomy. If I choose not to acquire personal information that impacts on my future prospects, such a choice should be respected, because I should be able to decide whether to access information about myself and how to use it. But, according to the incoherence objection to the right not to know in the context of genetic testing, the choice not to acquire genetic (...) information undermines the capacity for autonomous decision making. The claim is that it is incoherent to defend a choice that is inimical to autonomy by appealing to autonomy. In this paper, I suggest that the choice not to know in the context of genetic testing does not undermine self-authorship, which is a key aspect of autonomous decision making. In the light of this, the incoherence objection to the right not to know seems less compelling. (shrink)

Due to the potential ethical and psychological implications of screening, and especially inregard of screening on children without available and acceptable therapeutic measures, there is a common view that such procedures are not advisable. As part of an independent research- and bioethical case study, our aim was therefore to explore and describe bioethical issues among a representative sample of participant families (n = 17,055 children) in the ABIS (All Babies In South-east Sweden) research screening for Type 1 diabetes (IDDM).The primary (...) aim is the identification of risk factors important for the development of diabetes and other multifactorial immune-mediated diseases. Four hundred, randomly chosen, participant mothers were asked to complete a questionnaire exploring issues of information, informed consent, bio-material, confidentiality and autonomy, and of prevention/intervention. 293 completed the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 73.3%. The majority of questions had the form of 6-point Likert-type response scales (1–6).We found that the majority of respondents felt calm in regard of samples and written material, and also concerning the possibility of their child in the future being identified as having high risk of developing Type 1 diabetes. An important finding concerning access and control of mainly biological data was indicated, with the respondents expressing concern for potential future use. We believe our findings indicate that this kind of empirical studies can substantially contribute to our understanding of bioethical issues of medical research involving genetics. Issues, such as safeguards ensuring theethical criteria of autonomy and respect, were emphasised by our respondents. We believe theissues brought up may promote further discussion, and do suggest issues for consideration by, among others, researchers, bioethicists and Institutional Review Boards. (shrink)

The right not to know is often defended on the basis of the principle of respect for personal autonomy. If I choose not to acquire personal information that impacts on my future prospects, such a choice should be respected, because I should be able to decide whether to access information about myself and how to use it. But, according to the incoherence objection to the right not to know in the context of genetic testing, the choice not to acquire genetic (...) information undermines the capacity for autonomous decision making. The claim is that it is incoherent to defend a choice that is inimical to autonomy by appealing to autonomy. In this paper, I suggest that the choice not to know in the context of genetic testing does not undermine self-authorship, which is a key aspect of autonomous decision making. In the light of this, the incoherence objection to the right not to know seems less compelling. (shrink)

The debate on the ‘right to know’ has simmered on for over 30 years. New examples where a right to be informed is contrasted to a right to be kept in ignorance occasionally surface and spark disagreement on the extent to which patients and research subjects have a right to be self-determining concerning the health related information they receive. Up until now, however, this debate has been unsatisfactory with regard to the question what type of rights—if any—are in play here (...) and to what extent they can provide a normative basis for informed consent. This paper provides an analysis of informed consent in the context of ‘epistemic interventions’: interventions which involve the communication of information. First, I offer an analysis of the concept of a ‘right not to know’ in the context of consent to epistemic interventions. I argue that the scope of the consent is determined by the extent to which this intervention can be seen as an infringement of the private sphere. After that I show how this analysis affects the scope and standards of informed consent. (shrink)