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  1. Advantages of artificial intelligences, uploads, and digital minds.Kaj Sotala - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):275-291.
    I survey four categories of factors that might give a digital mind, such as an upload or an artificial general intelligence, an advantage over humans. Hardware advantages include greater serial speeds and greater parallel speeds. Self-improvement advantages include improvement of algorithms, design of new mental modules, and modification of motivational system. Co-operative advantages include copyability, perfect co-operation, improved communication, and transfer of skills. Human handicaps include computational limitations and faulty heuristics, human-centric biases, and socially motivated cognition. The shape of hardware (...)
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  • Why Machines Will Never Rule the World: Artificial Intelligence without Fear.Jobst Landgrebe & Barry Smith - 2022 - Abingdon, England: Routledge.
    The book’s core argument is that an artificial intelligence that could equal or exceed human intelligence—sometimes called artificial general intelligence (AGI)—is for mathematical reasons impossible. It offers two specific reasons for this claim: Human intelligence is a capability of a complex dynamic system—the human brain and central nervous system. Systems of this sort cannot be modelled mathematically in a way that allows them to operate inside a computer. In supporting their claim, the authors, Jobst Landgrebe and Barry Smith, marshal evidence (...)
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  • Uploads, Faxes, and You: Can Personal Identity Be Transmitted?Jonah Goldwater - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):233–250.
    Abstract. Could a person or mind be uploaded—transmitted to a computer or network—and thereby survive bodily death? I argue ‘mind uploading’ is possible only if a mind is an abstract object rather than a concrete particular. Two implications are notable. One, if someone can be uploaded someone can be multiply-instantiated, such that there could be as many instances of a person as copies of a book. Second, mind uploading’s possibility is incompatible with the leading theories of personal identity, insofar as (...)
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  • Responses to Catastrophic AGI Risk: A Survey.Kaj Sotala & Roman V. Yampolskiy - 2015 - Physica Scripta 90.
    Many researchers have argued that humanity will create artificial general intelligence (AGI) within the next twenty to one hundred years. It has been suggested that AGI may inflict serious damage to human well-being on a global scale ('catastrophic risk'). After summarizing the arguments for why AGI may pose such a risk, we review the fieldʼs proposed responses to AGI risk. We consider societal proposals, proposals for external constraints on AGI behaviors and proposals for creating AGIs that are safe due to (...)
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  • Why we need friendly ai.Luke Muehlhauser & Nick Bostrom - 2014 - Think 13 (36):41-47.
    Humans will not always be the most intelligent agents on Earth, the ones steering the future. What will happen to us when we no longer play that role, and how can we prepare for this transition?
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  • The problem of superintelligence: political, not technological.Wolfhart Totschnig - 2019 - AI and Society 34 (4):907-920.
    The thinkers who have reflected on the problem of a coming superintelligence have generally seen the issue as a technological problem, a problem of how to control what the superintelligence will do. I argue that this approach is probably mistaken because it is based on questionable assumptions about the behavior of intelligent agents and, moreover, potentially counterproductive because it might, in the end, bring about the existential catastrophe that it is meant to prevent. I contend that the problem posed by (...)
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  • Mind-upload. The ultimate challenge to the embodied mind theory.Massimiliano Lorenzo Cappuccio - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):425-448.
    The ‘Mind-Upload’ hypothesis, a radical version of the Brain-in-a-Vat thought experiment, asserts that a whole mind can safely be transferred from a brain to a digital device, after being exactly encoded into substrate independent informational patterns. Prima facie, MU seems the philosophical archenemy of the Embodied Mind theory, which understands embodiment as a necessary and constitutive condition for the existence of a mind and its functions. In truth, whether and why MU and EM are ultimately incompatible is unobvious. This paper, (...)
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  • Superintelligence AI and Skepticism.Joseph Corabi - 2017 - Journal of Evolution and Technology 27 (1):4-23.
    It has become fashionable to worry about the development of superintelligent AI that results in the destruction of humanity. This worry is not without merit; but it may be overstated. This paper explores some previously undiscussed reasons to be optimistic that; even if superintelligent AI does arise; it will not destroy us. These have to do with the possibility that a superintelligent AI will become mired in skeptical worries that its superintelligence cannot help it to solve. I argue that superintelligent (...)
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