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  1. On the margins: personhood and moral status in marginal cases of human rights.Helen Ryland - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birmingham
    Most philosophical accounts of human rights accept that all persons have human rights. Typically, ‘personhood’ is understood as unitary and binary. It is unitary because there is generally supposed to be a single threshold property required for personhood. It is binary because it is all-or-nothing: you are either a person or you are not. A difficulty with binary views is that there will typically be subjects, like children and those with dementia, who do not meet the threshold, and so who (...)
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  • Meeting the Epicurean challenge: a reply to ’Abortion and Deprivation'.Nick Colgrove - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (6):380-383.
    Anna Christensen argues that it is implausible to claim that abortion and murder are morally impermissible given that they deprive individuals of a future like ours. In this essay, I provide two responses to Christensen’s argument. First, I show that the premises upon which Christensen’s argument relies have implausible implications. Second, I provide a direct response to Christensen’s challenge, showing that abortion and murder are morally impermissible given that they do deprive individuals of an FLO. Doing so involves drawing a (...)
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  • Thomson 50 Years Later.Elliott R. Crozat - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):177-197.
    Approximately 50 years have passed since Judith Jarvis Thomson wrote A Defense of Abortion (1971). Her article has significantly shaped the philosophical literature on abortion. In this paper, I will summarize some of the interesting and important work done on the topic since Thomson's article. I will highlight Thomson as a defender of the claim that abortion is morally permissible and Don Marquis as an influential opponent of that claim. I will start by articulating Thomson's case, focusing on the violinist (...)
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  • Scourges: Why Abortion Is Even More Morally Serious than Miscarriage.Calum Miller - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (3):225-242.
    Several recent papers have suggested that the pro-life view entails a radical, implausible thesis: that miscarriage is the biggest public health crisis in the history of our species and requires radical diversion of funds to combat. In this paper, I clarify the extent of the problem, showing that the number of miscarriages about which we can do anything morally significant is plausibly much lower than previously thought, then describing some of the work already being done on this topic. I then (...)
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  • Murder, abortion, contraception, greenhouse gas emissions and the deprivation of non-discernible and non-existent people: a reply to Marquis and Christensen.Hugh V. McLachlan - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (6):415-416.
    Marquis’s account of the ethics of abortion is unsatisfactory but not as Christensen implies baseless. It requires to be amended rather than abandoned. It is true, as Marquis asserts that murder and abortion both might deprive people of something of value to them, in particular, the life of a sort that might have been to them worth living. However, it is mistaken to conclude, as Marquis does, that murder and abortion are thereby morally equivalent. Not all deprivation is wrongful. Not (...)
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  • Abortion and the Epicurean challenge.Karl Ekendahl - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (4):273-274.
    In a recent article in this journal, Anna Christensen raises an ‘Epicurean challenge’ to Don Marquis’ much-discussed argument for the immorality of abortion. According to Marquis’ argument, abortion is pro tanto morally wrong because it deprives the fetus of ‘a future like ours’. Drawing on the Epicurean idea that death cannot harm its victim because there is no subject to be harmed, Christensen argues that neither fetuses nor anyone else can be deprived of a future like ours by dying. Thus, (...)
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  • Continuing conversations about abortion and deprivation.Anna Christensen - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (4):275-276.
    In ‘Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, I argued that Marquis’ argument about abortion encounters the Epicurean Challenge. In this essay, I continue the conversation begun there. I aim to motivate the Challenge further by examining Marquis’ argument on his own terms and responding to objections about whom death deprives, whether we should focus on the action of killing or the result of death, and how harms suffered before existence compare to harms suffered after death. Finally, I suggest that (...)
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  • Meeting the Epicurean challenge: a reply to Christensen.Bruce P. Blackshaw & Daniel Rodger - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (7):478-479.
    In ’Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, Anna Christensen contends that Don Marquis’ influential ’future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion faces a significant challenge from the Epicurean claim that human beings cannot be harmed by their death. If deprivation requires a subject, then abortion cannot deprive a fetus of a future of value, as no individual exists to be deprived once death has occurred. However, the Epicurean account also implies that the wrongness of murder is also (...)
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