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Nicholas Colgrove
Wake Forest University
  1. The Subjects of Ectogenesis: Are “Gestatelings” Fetuses, Newborns, or Neither?Nick Colgrove - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (11):723-726.
    Subjects of ectogenesis—human beings that are developing in artificial wombs (AWs)—share the same moral status as newborns. To demonstrate this, I defend two claims. First, subjects of partial ectogenesis—those that develop in utero for a time before being transferred to AWs—are newborns (in the full sense of the word). Second, subjects of complete ectogenesis—those who develop in AWs entirely—share the same moral status as newborns. To defend the first claim, I rely on Elizabeth Chloe Romanis’s distinctions between fetuses, newborns and (...)
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    Meeting the Epicurean Challenge: A Reply to ’Abortion and Deprivation'.Nick Colgrove - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (6):380-383.
    Anna Christensen argues that it is implausible to claim that abortion and murder are morally impermissible given that they deprive individuals of a future like ours. In this essay, I provide two responses to Christensen’s argument. First, I show that the premises upon which Christensen’s argument relies have implausible implications. Second, I provide a direct response to Christensen’s challenge, showing that abortion and murder are morally impermissible given that they do deprive individuals of an FLO. Doing so involves drawing a (...)
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  3. Hawthorne’s Might-y Failure: A Reply to “Knowledge and Epistemic Necessity”.Nick Colgrove & Trent Dougherty - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1165-1177.
    In “Knowledge and epistemic necessity,” John Hawthorne gives a defense of what he rightly calls the “standard approach” to epistemic possibility against what he calls a new “competing idea” presented by Dougherty and Rysiew which he notes has been “endorsed and elaborated upon” by Fantl and McGrath. According to the standard approach, roughly, p is epistemically possible for S if S doesn’t know that not-p. The new approach has it that p is epistemically possible if p has a non-zero epistemic (...)
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