Meeting the Epicurean challenge: a reply to ’Abortion and Deprivation'

Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (6):380-383 (2019)
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Abstract
Anna Christensen argues that it is implausible to claim that abortion and murder are morally impermissible given that they deprive individuals of a future like ours. In this essay, I provide two responses to Christensen’s argument. First, I show that the premises upon which Christensen’s argument relies have implausible implications. Second, I provide a direct response to Christensen’s challenge, showing that abortion and murder are morally impermissible given that they do deprive individuals of an FLO. Doing so involves drawing a distinction between Acts of killing and Death. Christensen focuses on the latter, but it is the former that is the proper subject in the abortion debate. I conclude that Christensen has failed to provide a response to arguments—like the one presented by Marquis —that murder and abortion are impermissible given that they deprive individuals of an FLO.
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Archival date: 2020-05-24
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