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Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind

Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press (1984)

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  1. What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.
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  • Is searching for a soul inherently unscientific?Charles T. Tart - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):612.
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  • From data to dynamics: The use of multiple levels of analysis.Gregory O. Stone - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):54-55.
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  • Connectionism, Realism, and realism.Stephen P. Stich - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):531.
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  • The status of parapsychology.Rex G. Stanford - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):610.
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  • The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.
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  • (2 other versions)Naturalizing jurisprudence – by Brian Leiter.Torben Spaak - 2008 - Theoria 74 (4):352-362.
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  • Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism.John Spackman - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1054-1065.
    There has in recent years been a significant surge of interest in non-materialist accounts of the mind. Property dualists hold that all substances (concrete particulars that persist over time) are material, but mental properties are distinct from physical properties. Substance dualists maintain that the mind or person is a non-material substance. This article considers the prospects for substance dualism given the current state of the debate. The best known type of substance dualism, Cartesian dualism, has traditionally faced a number of (...)
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  • The sounds of silence.Charles T. Snowdon - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):167-168.
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  • The homunculus at home.J. David Smith - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):697-698.
    In Gray's conjecture, mismatches in the subicular comparator and matches have equal prominence in consciousness. In rival cognitive views novelty and difficulty especially elicit more conscious modes of cognition and higher levels of self-regulation. The mismatch between Gray's conjecture and these views is discussed.
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  • Styles of computational representation.M. P. Smith - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):530.
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  • Why philosophers should be designers.Aaron Sloman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):529.
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  • Deception and adaptation: Multidisciplinary perspectives on presenting a neutral image.Thomas R. Shultz & Peter J. LaFrenière - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):263-264.
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  • Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.
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  • The realistic stance.John R. Searle - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):527.
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  • Searles kritik am funktionalismus — eine untersuchung Des chinesischzimmers.Jürgen Schröder - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (2):321-336.
    Summary Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's „Gedankenexperiment results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are (...)
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  • Structure and controlling subsymbolic processing.Walter Schneider - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):51-52.
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  • Knowing thyself, knowing the other: They're not the same.Jonathan Schull & J. David Smith - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):166-167.
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  • A Sound Cartesian Argument from Doubt for Dualism.Ari Maunu - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):461-465.
    I put forward a version of the Cartesian Argument from Doubt for mind–body dualism. My version utilizes de re statements, which means that it is not vulnerable to the usual charge of intensional fallacy. The key de re statement is, ‘Body is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’, which is false, whereas the respective ‘Mind is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’ is true.
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  • The replacement of time.Steven F. Savitt - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):463 – 474.
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  • Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.
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  • Cognisance and cognitive science. Part one: The generality constraint.James Russell - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):235 – 258.
    I distinguish between being cognisant and being able to perform intelligent operations. The former, but not the latter, minimally involves the capacity to make adequate judgements about one's relation to objects in the environment. The referential nature of cognisance entails that the mental states of cognisant systems must be inter-related holistically, such that an individual thought becomes possible because of its relation to a system of potential thoughts. I use Gareth Evans' 'Generality Constraint' as a means of describing how the (...)
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  • Philosophical and religious implications of cognitive social learning theories of personality.William A. Rottschaefer - 1991 - Zygon 26 (1):137-148.
    This paper sketches an alternative answer to James Jones's recent attempt to explore the implications of cognitive social learning theories of personality for issues in epistemology, philosophy of science, and religious studies. Since the 1960s, two cognitive revolutions have taken place in scientific psychology: the first made cognition central to theories of perception, memory, problem solving, and so on; the second made cognition central to theories of learning and behavior, among others. Cognitive social learning theories find their place in the (...)
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  • Will the argument for abstracta please stand up?Alexander Rosenberg - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):526.
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  • Aristotle’s Naïve Somatism.Alain E. Ducharme - unknown
    Aristotle’s Naïve Somatism is a re-interpretation of Aristotle’s cognitive psychology in light of certain presuppositions he holds about the living animal body. The living animal body is presumed to be sensitive, and Aristotle grounds his account of cognition in a rudimentary proprioceptive awareness one has of her body. With that presupposed metaphysics under our belts, we are in a position to see that Aristotle in de Anima (cognition chapters at least) has a di erent explanatory aim in view than that (...)
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  • How do monkeys remember the world?R. M. Ridley - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):166-166.
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  • Psychology and the Churches in Britain 1919-39: symptoms of conversion.Graham Richards - 2000 - History of the Human Sciences 13 (2):57-84.
    The encounter between the Christian Churches and Psychology has, for all its evident cultural importance, received little attention from disciplinary historians. During the period between the two world wars in Britain this encounter was particularly visible and, as it turned out, for the most part relatively amicable. Given their ostensive rivalry this is, on the face of it, somewhat surprising. Closer examination, however, reveals a substantial convergence and congruence of interests between them within the prevailing cultural climate, and considerable overlapping (...)
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  • Sanity surrounded by madness.Georges Rey - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):48-50.
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  • Unitary consciousness requires distributed comparators and global mappings.George N. Reeke - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):693-694.
    Gray, like other recent authors, seeks a scientific approach to consciousness, but fails to provide a biologically convincing description, partly because he implicitly bases his model on a computationalist foundation that embeds the contents of thought in irreducible symbolic representations. When patterns of neural activity instantiating conscious thought are shorn of homuncular observers, it appears most likely that these patterns and the circuitry that compares them with memories and plans should be found distributed over large regions of neocortex.
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  • Parallelism and Functionalism.William M. Ramsey - 1989 - Cognitive Science 13 (1):139-144.
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  • Outflanking the mind-body problem: Scientific progress in the history of psychology.Sam S. Rakover - 1992 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 22 (2):145–173.
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  • The elusive quale.Howard Rachlin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):692-693.
    If sensations were behaviorally conceived, as they should be, as complex functional patterns of interaction between overt behavior and the environment, there would be no point in searching for them as instantaneous psychic elements within the brain or as internal products of the brain.
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  • Only external representations are needed.Howard Rachlin - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):261-262.
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  • Which are more easily deceived, friends or strangers?Duane Quiatt - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):260-261.
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  • Folk psychology as theory or practice? The case for eliminative materialism.John M. Preston - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (September):277-303.
    One foundation of Eliminative Materialism is the claim that the totality of our ordinary resources for explaining and predicting behaviour, ?Folk Psychology?, constitutes a theoretical scheme, potentially in conflict with other theories of behaviour. Recent attacks upon this claim, as well as the defence by Paul Churchland, are examined and found to be lacking in a suitably realistic conception of theory. By finding such a conception, and by correctly identifying the level of conceptual structures within which Folk Psychology is located, (...)
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  • Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.
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  • On attributing mental states to monkeys: First, know thyself.Daniel J. Povinelli & Sandra deBlois - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):164-166.
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  • Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.
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  • Some suggestions from sociology of science to advance the psi debate.Trevor Pinch - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):603.
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  • First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.
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  • Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places. [REVIEW]Andrew Pessin - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 78 (1):33-53.
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  • Exploring the “boundary” between the minds of monkeys and humans.Sidney I. Perloe - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):163-164.
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  • The Continuity of Philosophy and the Sciences.Paul M. Churchland - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (1):5-14.
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  • Are the conventional explanations of psi anomalies adequate?John Palmer - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):601.
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  • Calls as labels: An intriguing theme, but one with limitations.Donald H. Owings - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):162-163.
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  • Two "representative" approaches to the learning problem.Robert E. Orton - 1989 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 21 (1):66–71.
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  • What Ekman really said.Mats Olsson, Kathleen Harder & John C. Baird - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):157-158.
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  • Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.
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  • When immovable objections meet irresistible evidence: A case of selective reporting.Roger O. Nelson & Dean I. Radin - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (4):600.
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