This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed ‘identificationism.’.

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke rejects some of the most popular accounts of what meaning facts consist in on the grounds that they fail to accommodate the normative character of meaning. I argue that a widespread interpretation of Kripke's argument is incorrect. I contend that the argument does not rest on the contrast between descriptive and normative facts, but on the thought that speakers' uses of linguistic expressions have to be justified. I suggest that the line (...) of reasoning that I attribute to Kripke can be seen as putting pressure on the idea that predicate satisfaction is to be explained in terms of a relation between predicates and properties. (shrink)

Although the fallible/infallible distinction in the theory of knowledge has traditionally been upheld by most epistemologists, almost all contemporary theories of knowledge claim to be fallibilist. Fallibilists have, however, been forced to accommodate knowledge of necessary truths. This has proved to be a daunting task, not least because there is as yet no consensus on how the fallible/infallible divide is to be understood. In this article, after examining and rejecting a number of representative accounts of the notion of fallible knowledge, (...) I argue that the main problems with these accounts actually stem from the very coherence of that notion. I then claim that the distinction is best understood in terms of the externalist/internalist conceptions of knowledge. Finally, I seek to garner some independent support for the proposal by highlighting some of its consequences, including its surprising bearing on certain recent and seemingly distant controversies involving issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Although the fallible/infallible distinction in the theory of knowledge has traditionally been upheld by most epistemologists, almost all contemporary theories of knowledge claim to be fallibilist. Fallibilists have, however, been forced to accommodate knowledge of necessary truths. This has proved to be a daunting task, not least because there is as yet no consensus on how the fallible/infallible divide is to be understood. In this article, after examining and rejecting a number of representative accounts of the notion of fallible knowledge, (...) I argue that the main problems with these accounts actually stem from the very coherence of that notion. I then claim that the distinction is best understood in terms of the externalist/internalist conceptions of knowledge. Finally, I seek to garner some independent support for the proposal by highlighting some of its consequences, including its surprising bearing on certain recent and seemingly distant controversies involving issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony--whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or 'reduced to,' other familiar sort of justification, e.g. without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. (...) Fricker (1994) argues, first, that some monitoring for trustworthiness is required if the hearer is to avoid being gullible, and second, that reductionism but not anti-reductionism is compatible with ascribing an important role to the process of monitoring in the course of justifiably accepting observed testimony. In this paper we argue that such an argument fails. (shrink)

Most epistemologists hold that knowledge entails belief. However, proponents of this claim rarely offer a positive argument in support of it. Rather, they tend to treat the view as obvious and assert that there are no convincing counterexamples. We find this strategy to be problematic. We do not find the standard view obvious, and moreover, we think there are cases in which it is intuitively plausible that a subject knows some proposition P without—or at least without determinately—believing that P. Accordingly, (...) we present five plausible examples of knowledge without (determinate) belief, and we present empirical evidence suggesting that our intuitions about these scenarios are not atypical. (shrink)

Although David Hume is no match for Immanuel Kant in terms of opaque writing, his overall philosophy is not without interpretive difficulties. Earlier this century, many philosophers read Hume as the precursor to logical positivism. Of course, the concluding words of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding added fuel to these flames; but with the downfall of positivism, this reading of Hume has virtually disappeared. Today, interpretations of Hume fall into two main camps: the naturalistic camp and the sceptical camp. Roughly (...) speaking, naturalistic interpreters of Hume see him as attempting to employ the methods of the natural sciences in studying human subjects while sceptical interpreters read Hume as denying that we have any knowledge. In this article I want to shed some light on this controversy in an indirect way: namely, by trying to classify Hume’s epistemology as internalist or externalist. Although this internalism/externalism debate has erupted only recently in epistemology, it should be constructive in carving up the logical space of certain epistemological positions. With this background in place, we can not only see how to categorize Hume, but also discern some of the ramifications for Hume’s epistemology when he affirms theses that place him in these categories. To anticipate a bit, I will argue that the internalist aspects of Hume’s epistemology lend great credence to the sceptical interpretation. (shrink)

Several recent contextualist theorists have proposed contextualizing the skeptic. Their claim is that oneshould view satisfactory answers to global doubts regarding such subjects as theexternal world, other minds, and induction as requirements for justification incertain philosophical contexts, but not in everyday and scientific contexts. Incontrast, the skeptic claims that a satisfactory answer to a global doubt in eachof these areas is a context-invariant requirement for justified belief. In this paper,I consider and reject the arguments Michael Williams develops in his bookUnnatural (...) Doubts that are intended to show that the skeptic's interpretationof the significance of global doubts is mistaken. In addition, I argue that Williams'general strategy in opposing the skeptic is extremely interesting and worth furtherinvestigation, even if his particular execution of it is unsuccessful. To this end, Iclarify the general strategy, distinguish it from a variety of others, and discuss itsprospects as an answer to the skeptic. (shrink)

SummaryCarnap tried to overcome metaphysics through a distinction between empirical and conceptual truths. The distinction has since been challenged, but not on the basis of a systematic logical analysis of language. It is suggested here that the logical theory of identifiability based on the author's interrogative model will provide the tools for such a systematic analysis. As an example of what the model can do, a criticism is offered of Quine's and Chomsky's implicit assumption that language learning is based on (...) atomistic “answers” .RésuméCarnap a essayé de dépasser la métaphysique par une distinction entre des vérités empiriques et des vérités conceptuelles. Cette distinction a ensuite été contestée, mais non sur la base ?une analyse systematique du langage. On suggére ici que la théorie logique de ľidentifiabilité basée sur le modéle interrogatif de ľauteur fournira les outils ?une telle analyse systématique. Comme exemple de ce que peut faire ce modéle, on présente une critique de la supposition implicite de Quine et de Chomsky selon laquelle ľapprentissage du langage repose sur des ≫réponses≪ atomiques .ZusammenfassungCarnap versuchte Metaphysik durch eine Unterscheidung zwischen empirischen und konzep‐tuellen Wahrheiten zu iiberwinden. Seither wurde die Unterscheidung immer wieder angegriffen, jedoch nicht auf der Basis einer systematischen logischen Analyse der Sprache. In vorliegendem Artikel wird vorgeschlagen, dass eine logische Theorie der Identifizierbarkeit, welche auf dem Frage‐Antwort‐Modell des Autors grilndet, die Instrumente fur eine solche logische Analyse bereitstellt. Als Beispiel dafiir, was das Modell leisten kann, dient eine Kritik an Quines und Chomskys impliziter Voraussetzung, dass das Erlernen von Sprache auf atomaren ≫Antworten≪ aufbaut. (shrink)

More than one philosopher has expressed puzzlement at the very idea of feminist epistemology. Metaphysics and epistemology, sometimes called the 'core' areas of philosophy, are supposed to be immune to questions of value and justice. Nevertheless, many philosophers have raised epistemological questions starting from feminist-motivated moral and political concerns. The field is burgeoning; a search of the Philosopher's Index reveals that although nothing was published before 1981 that was categorized as both feminist and epistemology, soon after, the rate of publication (...) in feminist epistemology rose to between 15 and 25 articles per year.1 At the same time, social epistemology was also beginning to grow as a separate identifiable field of inquiry. (shrink)