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  1. Abolishing Platonism in Multiverse Theories.Stathis Livadas - forthcoming - Axiomathes:1-23.
    A debated issue in the mathematical foundations in at least the last two decades is whether one can plausibly argue for the merits of treating undecidable questions of mathematics, e.g., the Continuum Hypothesis, by relying on the existence of a plurality of set-theoretical universes except for a single one, i.e., the well-known set-theoretical universe V associated with the cumulative hierarchy of sets. The multiverse approach has some varying versions of the general concept of multiverse yet my intention is to primarily (...)
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  • Modal Objectivity.Clarke-Doane Justin - forthcoming - Noûs.
    It is widely agreed that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated. Quine's arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non-rigid designators.2 But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived. It could be that metaphysical necessity is not absolute necessity – the strictest real notion of necessity – and that no proposition of traditional metaphysical interest is necessary in every real sense. If there were nothing otherwise “uniquely metaphysically significant” about (...)
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  • Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
    Debunking arguments—also known as etiological arguments, genealogical arguments, access problems, isolation objec- tions, and reliability challenges—arise in philosophical debates about a diverse range of topics, including causation, chance, color, consciousness, epistemic reasons, free will, grounding, laws of nature, logic, mathematics, modality, morality, natural kinds, ordinary objects, religion, and time. What unifies the arguments is the transition from a premise about what does or doesn't explain why we have certain mental states to a negative assessment of their epistemic status. I examine (...)
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