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  1. What About the Victim? Neglected Dimensions of the Standing to Blame.Alexander Edlich - forthcoming - The Journal of Ethics:1-20.
    This paper points out neglected considerations about the standing to blame. It starts from the observation that the standing to blame debate largely focusses on factors concerning the blamer or the relation of blamer and wrongdoer, mainly hypocrisy and meddling, while neglecting the victim of wrongdoing. This paper wants to set this right by pointing out how considerations about the victim can impact a third party’s standing. The first such consideration is the blamer’s personal relation to the victim. It is (...)
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  • A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame.Patrick Todd - 2017 - Noûs:347-374.
    Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: -/- 1. One’s blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent’s wrongdoing. 3. One must be warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the (...)
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  • Blame and Fault: Toward a New Conative Theory of Blame.László Bernáth - 2020 - Disputatio 12 (59):371-394.
    This paper outlines a new conative theory of blame. I argue that the best-known conative approaches to blame misrepresent the cognitive and dispositional components of blame. Section 1 argues, against Scanlon and Sher, that blaming involves the judgment that an act or state is the fault of the blamed. I also propose an alternative dispositional condition on which blaming only occurs if it matters to the blamer whether the blamed gets the punishment that she deserves. In Section 2, I discuss (...)
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  • The Comparative Nonarbitrariness Norm of Blame.Daniel Telech & Hannah Tierney - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (1).
    Much has been written about the fittingness, epistemic, and standing norms that govern blame. In this paper, we argue that there exists a norm of blame that has yet to receive philosophical discussion and without which an account of the ethics of blame will be incomplete: a norm proscribing comparatively arbitrary blame. By reflecting on the objectionableness of comparatively arbitrary blame, we stand to elucidate a substantive, and thus far overlooked, norm governing our attributions of responsibility. Accordingly, our aim in (...)
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  • The Standing To Blame, or Why Moral Disapproval Is What It Is.Stefan Riedener - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):183-210.
    Intuitively, we lack the standing to blame others in light of moral norms that we ourselves don't take seriously: if Adam is unrepentantly aggressive, say, he lacks the standing to blame Celia for her aggressiveness. But why does blame have this feature? Existing proposals try to explain this by reference to specific principles of normative ethics – e.g. to rule‐consequentialist considerations, to the wrongness of hypocritical blame, or principles of rights‐forfeiture based on this wrongness. In this paper, I suggest a (...)
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  • The Knowledge Norm of Blaming.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):256-261.
    This paper argues that the standard evidence for the knowledge norm of assertion can be extended to provide evidence for a corresponding knowledge norm of blame.
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  • Epistemic Subjectivism in the Theory of Character.T. Ryan Byerly - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):278-285.
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 8, Issue 4, Page 278-285, December 2019.
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