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On an Unorthodox Account of Hume's Moral Psychology

Rachel Cohon

Hume Studies 20 (2):179-194 (1994)

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The simple duality: Humean passions.Hsueh Qu - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):98-116.details Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume’s claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 24 citations
Hume's conception of character.Robert Heath Mahoney - unknowndetails The thesis reconstructs Hume’s conception of character. Character is not just an ethical concern in Hume’s philosophy: Hume emphasises the importance of character in his ethics, aesthetics and history. The reconstruction therefore pays attention to Hume’s usage of the concept of character in his clearly philosophical works, the Treatise of Human Nature and the two Enquiries, as well as his less obviously philosophical works, the Essays, Moral, Political and Literary and the History of England. The first main thesis is that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Agency without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt’s Counterexample Strategy1.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.details In this paper, I examine a new line of response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the traditional association of moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise. According to this response, Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy fails, not in light of the conditions for moral responsibility per se, but in view of the conditions for action. Specifically, it is claimed, a piece of behavior counts as an action only if it is within the agent’s power to avoid performing it. In so far as (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Hume, Humans and Animals.Michael-John Turp - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):119-136.details Hume’s Treatise, Enquiries and Essays contain plentiful material for an investigation into the moral nature of other animals and our moral relations to them. In particular, Hume pays considerable attention to animal minds. He also argues that moral judgment is grounded in sympathy. As sympathy is shared by humans and some other animals, this already hints at the possibility that some animals are morally considerable, even if they are not moral agents. Most contributions to the literature on animal ethics assume (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Hume on mental representation and intentionality.Jonathan David Cottrell - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (7):e12505.details The past two decades have seen an explosion of literature on Hume's views about mental representation and intentionality. This essay gives a roadmap of this literature, while arguing for two main interpretive claims. First, Hume aims to naturalize all forms of mental representation and intentionality, that is, to explain them in terms of properties and relations that are found throughout the natural world (not just in minds) and that are not, individually, peculiar to representational or intentional things. Second, Hume holds (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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