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  1. Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one's evidence. In this book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it--roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition (...)
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  • Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
    The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have.
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  • Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty.L. Cosmides - 1996 - Cognition 58 (1):1-73.
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  • Rational belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231-245.
    There is a tension between normative and descriptive elements in the theory of rational belief. This tension has been reflected in work in psychology and decision theory as well as in philosophy. Canons of rationality should be tailored to what is humanly feasible. But rationality has normative content as well as descriptive content.A number of issues related to both deductive and inductive logic can be raised. Are there full beliefs – statements that are categorically accepted? Should statements be accepted when (...)
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  • The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and methodological challenges.Jonathan J. Koehler - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):1-17.
    We have been oversold on the base rate fallacy in probabilistic judgment from an empirical, normative, and methodological standpoint. At the empirical level, a thorough examination of the base rate literature (including the famous lawyer–engineer problem) does not support the conventional wisdom that people routinely ignore base rates. Quite the contrary, the literature shows that base rates are almost always used and that their degree of use depends on task structure and representation. Specifically, base rates play a relatively larger role (...)
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  • On the study of statistical intuitions.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):123-141.
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  • Rationality and charity.Paul Thagard & Richard E. Nisbett - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (2):250-267.
    Quine and others have recommended principles of charity which discourage judgments of irrationality. Such principles have been proposed to govern translation, psychology, and economics. After comparing principles of charity of different degrees of severity, we argue that the stronger principles are likely to block understanding of human behavior and impede progress toward improving it. We support a moderate principle of charity which leaves room for empirically justified judgments of irrationality.
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  • Are there any a priori constraints on the study of rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.
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  • L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.
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  • Improvements in human reasoning and an error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340-340.
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  • Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342-343.
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  • Inductive reasoning: Competence or skill?Christopher Jepson, David H. Krantz & Richard E. Nisbett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):494.
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  • Are people programmed to commit fallacies? Further thoughts about the interpretation of experimental data on probability judgment.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1982 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 12 (3):251–274.
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  • Is irrationality systematic?Robyn M. Dawes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):491.
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  • Normative theories of rationality: Occam's razor, Procrustes' bed?Lola L. Lopes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):255-256.
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  • Advancing the rationality debate.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):701-717.
    In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily (...)
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  • Performing competently.Lola L. Lopes - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):343-344.
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  • Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism.Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (1):1-38.
    This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that (...)
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  • Who shall be the arbiter of our intuitions?Daniel Kahneman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-340.
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  • Rational animal?Simon Blackburn - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331-332.
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  • “Is” and “ought” in cognitive science.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344-345.
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  • The persistence of cognitive illusions.Persi Diaconis & David Freedman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):333-334.
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  • Inferential competence: right you are, if you think you are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353-354.
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  • On defining rationality unreasonably.J. St B. T. Evans & P. Pollard - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):335-336.
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  • Propensity, evidence, and diagnosis.J. L. Mackie - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):345-346.
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  • Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.
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  • L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.
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  • Intuition, competence, and performance.Henry E. Kyburg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):341-342.
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  • Unphilosophical probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.
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  • Status of the rationality assumption in psychology.Marvin S. Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):332-333.
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  • The irrational, the unreasonable, and the wrong.Avishai Margalit & Maya Bar-Hillel - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):346-349.
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  • Rationality and the Structure of the Self Volume II: A Kantian Conception.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2013 - APRA Foundation.
    Adrian Piper argues that the Humean conception can be made to work only if it is placed in the context of a wider and genuinely universal conception of the self, whose origins are to be found in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. This conception comprises the basic canons of classical logic, which provide both a model of motivation and a model of rationality. These supply necessary conditions both for the coherence and integrity of the self and also for unified agency. (...)
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  • Who commits the base rate fallacy?Isaac Levi - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):502.
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  • Stronger attentional biases can be linked to higher reward rate in preferential choice.Veronika Zilker - 2022 - Cognition 225 (C):105095.
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  • False memories of the future: A critique of the applications of probabilistic reasoning to the study of cognitive processes.Mihnea Moldoveanu & Ellen Langer - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (2):358-375.
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  • Decisions with indeterminate probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-261.
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  • Physicians neglect base rates, and it matters.Robert M. Hamm - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):25-26.
    A recent study showed physicians' reasoning about a realistic case to be ignorant of base rate. It also showed physicians interpreting information pertinent to base rate differently, depending on whether it was presented early or late in the case. Although these adult reasoners might do better if given hints through talk of relative frequencies, this would not prove that they had no problem of base rate neglect.
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  • Can irrationality be intelligently discussed?Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):509.
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  • Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2013 - APRA Foundation Berlin.
    The Humean conception of the self consists in the belief-desire model of motivation and the utility-maximizing model of rationality. This conception has dominated Western thought in philosophy and the social sciences ever since Hobbes’ initial formulation in Leviathan and Hume’s elaboration in the Treatise of Human Nature. Bentham, Freud, Ramsey, Skinner, Allais, von Neumann and Morgenstern and others have added further refinements that have brought it to a high degree of formal sophistication. Late twentieth century moral philosophers such as Rawls, (...)
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  • Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.
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  • Resiliency, robustness and rationality of probability judgements.James Logue - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (1):21 – 34.
    This paper addresses and rejects claims that one can demonstrate experimentally that most untutored subjects are systematically and incurably irrational in their probability judgements and in some deductive reasoning tasks. From within a strongly subjectivist theory of probability, it develops the notions of resiliency —a measure of stability of judgements—and robustness —a measure of expected stability. It then becomes possible to understand subjects' behaviour in the Wason selection task, in examples which have been claimed to involve a 'base-rate fallacy', in (...)
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  • The importance of cognitive illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.
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  • On the Reality of the Base-Rate Fallacy: A Logical Reconstruction of the Debate.Martina Calderisi - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Does the most common response given by participants presented with Tversky and Kahneman’s famous taxi cab problem amount to a violation of Bayes’ theorem? In other words, do they fall victim to so-called base-rate fallacy? In the present paper, following an earlier suggestion by Crupi and Girotto, we will identify the logical arguments underlying both the original diagnosis of irrationality in this reasoning task under uncertainty and a number of objections that have been raised against such a diagnosis. This will (...)
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  • The controversy about irrationality.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):510.
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  • In philosophical defence of Bayesian rationality.Jon Dorling - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):249-250.
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  • First things first: What is a base rate?Clark McCauley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):33-34.
    The fallacy beneath the base rate fallacy is that we know what a base rate is. We talk as if base rates and individuating information were two different kinds of information. From a Bayesian perspective, however, the only difference between base rate and individuating information is – which comes first.
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  • Logic and probability theory versus canons of rationality.Gilbert Harman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):251-251.
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  • The base rate controversy: Is the glass half-full or half-empty?Gideon Keren & Lambert J. Thijs - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):26-26.
    Setting the two hypotheses of complete neglect and full use of base rates against each other is inappropriate. The proper question concerns the degree to which base rates are used (or neglected), and under what conditions. We outline alternative approaches and recommend regression analysis. Koehler's conclusion that we have been oversold on the base rate fallacy seems to be premature.
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  • Base rates do not constrain nonprobability judgments.Paul D. Windschitl & Gary L. Wells - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):40-41.
    Base rates have no necessary relation to judgments that are not themselves probabilities. There is no logical imperative, for instance, that behavioral base rates must affect causal attributions or that base rate information should affect judgments of legal liability. Decision theorists should be cautious in arguing that base rates place normative constraints on judgments of anything other than posterior probabilities.
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  • Human rationality: Essential conflicts, multiple ideals.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):245-246.
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