Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief

Oxford University Press UK (2016)
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Abstract
This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one's evidence. In this book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it--roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation. This conception of justification bears upon a range of topics in epistemology and beyond. Ultimately, this way of looking at justification guides us to a new, unfamiliar picture of how we should respond to our evidence and manage our own fallibility. This picture is developed here.
ISBN(s)
9780198755333  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SMIBPA-3
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First archival date: 2015-12-07
Latest version: 2 (2015-12-19)
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References found in this work BETA
Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule1.Martin Smith - 2012 - Noûs 46 (4):791-802.

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Citations of this work BETA
Beliefs Do Not Come in Degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2017 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Varieties of Risk.Ebert, Philip A.; Smith, Martin & Durbach, Ian

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