(2003). The World as Representation: Schopenhauer's Arguments for Transcendental Idealism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 57-87.

The philosophy devoted to the sacred knowledge of Athena has suffered an undeniable castration in modernity, because, following Sloterdijk, it has been related to the cynic, subjugation to appearance. For this reason, German literature differentiates between Kynismus and Zynismus. The kynysmós with "k" refers to the wise dogs of the agora and the Zynismus to the toothless Papillon. Under the keys of modernity, philosophy is camouflaged in moderation, good saying and salon etiquette, thereby abandoning the stridency, sarcasm and challenge that (...) the school of Diogenes practiced; but what was that insolence? What was his speech? What were his gestures? These are some of the questions addressed in this article; therefore, the reflection on the figure of the cynic, by the hand of the author of Critique of Cynical Reason, has been central to elucidate some of these questions and, why not, obscure them, after all, the interstices of the words are deeper. For methodological reasons, the text is divided into three sections: first, Resonances of a supplanted concept, in which the link between insolence and the cynical is investigated; second, Philosophical gestures, where the grimaces of an impertinent thought are drawn and third, Conclusions. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, definition is the first step to aquire scientific knowledge. And the full knowledge of objects is possible only by knowing their essence and essential definition. Following Aristotle, Avicenna thinks that the full knowledge of things is gained through the knowledge of their essence. Admitting the difficulty of understanding the essentials of objects, he states, based on his essentialist doctrine, that real definition should imply quiddity, truth and perfection of essential existence of the limited object so that it (...) represents all its essence. But man can not identify essentials of objects and true definitions of them. Avicenna describes details of all kinds of definitions, and this article we modifies and completes the rules of Aristotle’s theory of definition. In will explain it. Keywords: Essentialism, Real Definitions, Genus and Differentia, Aristotle, Avicenna. 1. Introduction Distinguishing between essential and accidental attributes of objects, Aristotle chooses essentialism as his approach. Avicenna shows interest in Aristotelian essentialism in some of his works, but in other works he claims that kowing the essential features of objects is beyond human epistemic capacity and thus modifies the rules of the Aristotelian definitions. 2. Aristotelian Essentialism about Definition: According to Aristotle, sensitive perception represents the knowledge of particular objects and is not considered an example of scientific knowledge; but these very sensitive observations assist the intellect to discover the hidden universals within particular objects and pave the way for the reason to get access to the specific form of objects and distinguish between their essential and accidental features and succeed in revealing their true nature. Aristotle in his metaphysical discussions distinguishes between real and nominal definitions and declares both of them possible and considers the real definition to be the first step for acquiring the scientific knowledge of objects. According to Aristotle, perfect knowledge of objects can be achieved merely by the knowledge of their nature and essence. Real definition of an object is a statement that expresses its essential features, without mentioning the name of the object itself in the definition. This definition is composed of genus and differentia, and it is always universal and affirmative. 3. Avicenna’s Notion of Definition and His Critisism of Aristotelian Definition: Avicenna’s words in Shifa and Isharat, like followers of Aristotle, are focused on the possibility of the knowledge of essential features of objects; in the essay devoted to the issue of definition in his book entitled Nijat, Avicenna endorses the possibility of definition and at the same time highlights the absolute difficulty of definition, including real and nominal definitions. However, in his book entitled Ta’liqat he clearly argues that true definition of objects is out of the reach of man. In his book entitled Mantiq al-Mashriqyyin, he provides a detailed discussion of various types of definition and makes some modifications in Aristotelian rules of definition. In Ta’liqat, Avicenna declares real definition composed of genus and differentia to be impossible and criticizes Aristotle’s method as incorrect. He restricts human knowledge of objects to knowing their features, requirements and accidents and denied the possibility of knowing their essential features and real definitions. He claims that the first epistemic means of human being is sense, which touches the superficial aspects of objects; then man distinguishes between identical and different perceptions using his intellectual powers and reason and thus understands some of their attributes and requirements and remains uninformed about others. If man was able to perceive the truth of objects he could be aware of all requirements; then man is not able to know the essence and truth of objects. Moreover, difference of opinions regarding the nature of objects is a sign of human reason’s inability to understand essential attributes of objects. Knowledge of the true differentia of compound objects lies beyond the ability of man’s intellectual perception and he has access only to their requirements. So, man calls their common requirements as genus while he calls their special requirements differentia and particular accident. For example, thinking is not the true differentia of human being, but rather one of the requirements of his true differentia. Furthermore, simple objects have no genus and differentia so that man could know them by knowing these. For this reason, man does not have any access to the knowledge of the essence of objects. The completely immaterial objects are considered as externally simple and intellectually compound, as accidents. The essence of the completely immaterial entities is simple and lacks any matter or external form. We assume genus and differenia for them and bring these in their essential definition. Genus and differentia are declared to be mental matter and form when these are considered without any condition and in this case, they are parts of real definition, not components of simple entities. So, in fact, neither the essence of compound entities nor the essence of simple entities is accessible to man. 4. Conclusion: Aristotle believes that every object has an essence and definition aims at knowing this very essence. Aristotle’s followers contend that true definition is difficult to reach, but many Muslim philosophers in general and Avicenna in particular in some of his works argue that essential attributes of objects lie beyond the limits of human intellect. Reaching the true genus and differentia of objects and knowing their essential features is not possible for man. What is declared to be the differentia of the object is in fact its logical differentia, which is in turn the requirement of true differentia. However, knowledge of some of the essential features and requirements leads to the undetailed knowledge of the truths of objects and their features. The major purpose of the definition is thus achieved and man is delivered from the vortex of doubt and sophistry. References: - Aristotle, Aristotelian logic, Abdul Rahman Badawi’s research, Beirut, Dar al-Qalam, 2,418 - Aristotle, metaphysics, translated by Mohammad Hassan Lotfi, Tehran, Tarh-e-now, 63 - Ibn Sina, Hussein bin Abdullah, Mantiq Al-Mashriqiyin, Shukri al-Najjar’s introduction, Beirut, Dar Al-hedatheh, 59-67 - Ibn Sina, Al-ta’liqat, Abdul Rahman Badawi’s research, Qom, School Al-Alam al-salami, 34. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo nos referiremos a dos temas que frecuentemente han sido estudiados por la filosofía del conocimiento: sensación y percepción. Con ello queremos suministrar un panorama –desde una perspectiva filosófica, teniendo en cuenta el aporte de las neurociencias – sobre el proceso perceptivo y su relación en la construcción del conocimiento, así, procuraremos explicar el rol que desempeña, analizando sus componentes, y su vinculación en el proceso de aprendizaje. Y dado que la educación actual se enfrenta a nuevos (...) retos, esta investigación se enmarca en la propuesta de integrar los estudios cognitivos al sistema educativo. (shrink)

Bez wątpienia, Peirce nie oferuje w swoim pismach jasnego ujęcia koncepcji przekonania, a jego poglądy, ewoluujące w ciągu całego życia, nie wydają się prowadzić do wyraźnej konkluzji. Niemniej jednak pozostaje autorem inspirującym, który pozosta- wił trwałe osiągnięcia na gruncie logiki symbolicznej i semiotyki. Metoda hermeneutyczna, którą zastosowaliśmy w tej pracy, miała na celu, w zgodzie z jego własną wskazówką metodyczną, ukazanie koncepcji przekonania, którą można by uzgodnić z dostępnymi stwierdzeniami samego Peirce’a, jak również jego komentatorów.

This article examines the philosophical position of Plutarch on death through the way that he faces the deaths of prominent and non-prominent Lacedaemonians. Then, an analysis of Plutarch's positions by Georgius Trapezuntius in the Renaissance period is attempted, so as to illustrate the degree and the method of using the classical philosophical thought in the Renaissance.

Scholars of International Politics have recently come to grip with the global resurgence of religion. Since the inception of the field of International Politics, the secularisation thesis had been taken for granted and religion dismissed as unimportant. But in line with the current transformation affecting societies worldwide as well as with the re-consideration of the secularisation thesis by Sociologists, new resources must be developed within IR to better understand current events. While theories and concepts have been developed within Sociology and (...) the Political Sciences, no such tools are available in International Politics. Thus, this article provides a tentative theory of secularisation drawing on resources endogenous to the field. Drawing on recent advances in the broadly Constructivist tradition, this article re-interprets secularisation as a protracted international crisis of legitimacy. (shrink)

Hoy en día es una revolución hablar de totalidad, —nos referiremos con este concepto a la cualidad de total, de cosa íntegra—, en un mundo tan fragmentado. ¿Dónde quedaron las enseñanzas de Vitrubio de considerar tantas cosas: el firmamento, el paisaje, las estrellas… y hoy: nuestras ciudades, sus habitantes, el contexto…? En este artículo se revisarán distintos autores procedentes de diferentes ámbitos del conocimiento que dialogan a través del tiempo, es decir, se sigue un orden en función de sus ideas, (...) más que cronológico, que permitan una dialéctica sobre la importancia de la reflexión en los proyectos arquitectónicos más allá del objeto en sí mismo, para abrir la discusión sobre la consideración de otros aspectos relevantes que conduzcan a seguir pensando, proyectando la arquitectura con la finalidad de aspirar a generar un lugar y una experiencia de totalidad para sus habitantes. (shrink)

-/- Este artículo analiza la posible superación teórica de la escisión moderna entre sujeto y objeto, por un lado, y delimita teóricamente la relación entre estas nociones, por el otro. Para tales propósitos, los autores se -/- fundamentan teóricamente en las propuestas de la hermenéutica de Wilhelm Dilthey y del estructuralismo de -/- Michel Foucault, tanto en su semejanzas (en el ámbito -/- de lo vivencial y el análisis de lo vivido, así como en su -/- preocupación por establecer un (...) ámbito de estudio en las -/- ciencias del espíritu) como en sus diferencias (pues el -/- primero propone la síntesis en la vivencia, mientras el -/- otro el análisis de lo vivido). (shrink)

The topic of the article is the way in which a human being can grasp its own body. The confrontation between Husserl's and Sartre's philosophy about meeting Another is my way of showing the radical change in our understanding of the problem of how we know our own body. According to Husserl both our psyche and body are given to us immediately. The body of Another is given to us by means of our own body. The psyche of Another is (...) made present through his body. This conception is inverted by Sartre. Both the psyche and the body are no longer able to grasp themselves. Yet this does not mean that Another is ungraspable. Knowledge of him does not require self-knowledge. The psyche of Another is given through his body, which is given immediately. Our own body needs the body of Another - it is contained in everything that is not itself. (shrink)

Russell alleged that the version of the cosmological argument he debated with Copleston involved type confusions, but the definitions of plural descriptive functions and the ancestral in Principia Mathematica can be used to reformulate the argument in a type-safe way via a notion of causally self-sufficient classes. Although the argument depends on the assumption that the class of contingent things is not causally self-sufficient, if that assumption is weakened to say only that it may not be so, then a new (...) modalized version emerges which has similarities with recent ontological arguments but weaker and more intuitive assumptions. (Familiarity with Principia notation and conventions is presupposed throughout.). (shrink)

Nuestra investigación presenta la propuesta kantiana del idealismo trascendental como una filosofía crítica mediadora entre el dogmatismo propio del racionalismo y el escepticismo generado por el empirismo sensualista. Nuestro trabajo realiza una breve presentación de las formas del juicio que conforman las distintas formas del conocimiento humano. Resulta de gran importancia el reconocer y tener en cuenta, al estudiar el pensamiento filosófico actual, la relevancia profundísima que Kant ha tenido en la historia y en el desarrollo del pensamiento contemporáneo. Kant (...) establece una diferencia fundamental que es decisiva para la justa compresión de su pensamiento. Es la diferencia entre conocer y pensar. Dicho breve y sencillamente: no todo lo real es susceptible de ser conocido, pues conocer significa, en vigor, conocimiento científico. Ahora nos interesa analizar la naturaleza y la posibilidad del conocer: ¿cómo es posible el conocimiento?; ¿cuál es su alcance y su límite? A ello está dedicada la primera parte de la Crítica de la razón pura: la «Doctrina trascendental de los elementos». Además, vamos a presentar la compleja relación que establece Kant entre la razón en sus usos teóricos y la razón en sus usos prácticos. Se introduce un análisis comparativo entre idealismo y realismo, utilizando una metodología hermenéutica y un análisis del discurso filosófico dialéctico en términos de antítesis conceptuales. Por último, planteamos la diferencia entre teoría y praxis en el campo de la ciencia y la ética, y la necesidad de comprender a la objetividad científica y la subjetividad ética como formas diversas de conocimiento humano rigurosos. (shrink)

El presente estudio trata de ser una aproximación histórica al posmodernismo en una de sus vertientes: el constructivismo, la teoría que defiende que el mundo es construcción social sin correlato objetivo alguno. A través del examen de la genealogía de este perfil, el artículo se propone mostrar que el constructivismo es deudor de diversas tradiciones de pensamiento irracionalista, subjetivista e idealista, y que por ello constituye una doctrina anti y pseudocientífica.

The meaning of “talk about God” remains the first and most fundamental issue facing philosophers and theologians in the modern age. This study concerns the analogies needed to make sense of that talk: images, ripe with poetic intensity, borrowed from the language and practice of faith; from the splicing together of lives, human and divine. It concerns, moreover, the reinvestment of those images in the structures of human personality, their role in the development of a renewed metaphysic of the human (...) spirit, aspirationally divine or ‘upwardly’ oriented. Such concerns have, in recent years, gained still greater urgency as a popular and aggressive ‘evangelical atheism’ has come to dominate religious discourse, threatening to obscure the human truth of religious language. The challenge is a familiar one; its polemic deeply indebted to British Empiricism and, perhaps, especially the Logical Positivism of the last century. It seems that those who put their faith in post-modern theories of language to silence the likes of Ayer and Russell spoke too soon. In response, theism has retreated from empiricist attack into a new-found realism. Championed by the likes of Peter Byrne, William Alston, and of course, Richard Swinburne, neo-realist metaphysics has, ostensibly, steeped itself in classical philosophy. Amid the search for reason and necessity, the God of grace and providence, of ordinary belief, has been forced to yield to ‘Perfect Being’ thinking, Absolute Being ontology, and other forms of untenable metaphysics, with few alternatives on the margins of relevance. The God of the philosophers may have the virtue of necessity, but this Being’s temperament remains essentially anti-social. With God successfully held in logical quarantine, we may well wonder whether “God-talk” means anything at all. To close the breach and realign finite with Infinite, philosophical faith with practical piety, has become the most pressing problem in contemporary philosophical theology. Undoubtedly, Whitehead and his neo-classical followers have been quick to learn the lessons of British Empiricism. If anything, however, they learned them too well, placing the religious emphasis almost exclusively on natural, physical forces. So seamless an alignment of God with Creation can be of little comfort to the ordinary believer. Caught between inflationary transcendence and reductive empiricism, the ‘gap’ between theological speculation and religious belief has widened until neither side seems very concerned with the other. Cleaving to ‘first principles’ and other metaphysical abstractions, both classical and neo-classical theologians have disenfranchised the faithful, putting faith on a trajectory for atheism. To steer a course between such extremes, I want to return to an earlier tradition; to a metaphysic of persons exemplified in the practice of faith. Doing so draws upon the logic of personal identity: what it means to be, or rather, to become, a person. This is the practical application of a cutting-edge theology, progeny of one of the twentieth century’s last great metaphysical minds. Almost fifty years after his death, Austin Farrer remains in the vanguard of modern theology, his vital grasp of faith and philosophy unequalled and unrivalled. Farrer first defended theology against the excesses of positivist and then process reduction but he used them to drive his own retreat from the scholastic tradition. This was analysed at great length by Charles Conti in Metaphysical Personalism. Locating the means and motive for revision in the experience and expressions of lived faith, Farrer supplied the vital corrective; there is nothing more one can say about such an overweening impersonalism which describes God as Ens per se, so cuts its own throat by depersonalising the cosmological connection. It is my supposition, on Farrer’s behalf, that person-concepts meet the pragmatic demands of both metaphysical theism and realistic belief. So doing, they open up a more fertile route between orthodox and ‘process’ mythologies. Following that route, I begin with the incoherence of philosophical realism and its ruinous application to theism. From there, we journey backwards into neo-classical and neo-Thomist thinkers who themselves attempted to overcome realist abstractions. Our destination lies in a Feuerbachian anthropology of theology or ‘anthropotheism’. Like Farrer, Ludwig Feuerbach used the language of the believer to relocate theology and philosophy within a framework which makes fertile use of anthropomorphic personifications to ‘think’ God. Ultimately, revisiting the personalist presuppositions of metaphysics in this way throws light on questions of personal identity, which is to describe the nature of an ‘overview’ existence directly related to or experienced in ourselves. This is to ‘draw’ reality on a grand-scale and, most importantly, locate our place within that image. Doing theology dynamically, or psychologically informed – as both Farrer and Feuerbach insisted we must – means recognising the constitutive role projections play in self-construction. Without conscious, active, or intentional participation in our projects, we cannot become persons at all. This returns us to the practice of faith wherein Feuerbach’s anthropology is reconstructed as applied theology, thus completing the personalist metaphysics perpetuated by Farrer as initially developed by the Biblical faith in a Godly person. And what greater challenge can religious philosophy respond to today? (shrink)

Much theorizing about altruism has been undertaken within a naturalistic and deterministic sociobiological framework that has sought to explain altruistic action in terms of underlying genetic selfishness. Recently, however, social constructionist thinkers have developed an alternative to such theorizing which suggests that human action arises out of fundamentally open-ended and malleable social relationships. This paper intends to show, however, that a reductive egoism is nonetheless still at work in such accounts, typically taking the form of an underlying concern for matters (...) of personal status and social recognition. As a response, this paper will briefly outline the work of the French phenomenologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas as an example of non-reductive and fundamentally Other-oriented alternatives to both sociobiological and social constructionist accounts of altruistic action. (shrink)

I SHOW THAT THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT OF AQUINAS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD COMMITS A RATHER TRIVIAL LINGUISTIC FALLACY, BY SHOWING THAT (1) SOME OF ZENO'S PARADOXES COMMIT A TRIVIAL LINGUISTIC FALLACY, AND THAT (2) THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IS SUFFICIENTLY SIMILAR TO THESE PARADOXES THAT IT COMMITS THE SAME FALLACY. COPLESTON'S VIEW THAT "MENTION OF THE MATHEMATICAL INFINITE SERIES IS IRRELEVANT" TO "ANY" OF AQUINAS'S ARGUMENTS FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE IS THUS SHOWN FALSE.

While much has been written on phronesis, there is a dearth of empirical work on the how the concept can be developed and implemented in practice, particularly in an educational setting. To address this problem, characteristics of phronesis were identified through a review of current literature and an examination of related themes from a special issue of the Philosophy of Management Journal on the philosophy of innovation. The implementation of the concept was investigated using an illustrative study of ongoing work (...) aimed at embedding phronesis in an innovation educational module. The study will contribute to the nascent debate by providing evidence of embedding Aristotle’s phronesis in the curriculum of future managers, in this case Engineering and Business students, working in cross-functional teams. A schema is proposed, based on concepts distilled from the literature and the illustrative study, to examine whether an educational project cultivates phronesis among the students. (shrink)

This article will examine McCormick's moral epistemology both at the level of how human persons know values and disvalues, which hereinafter will be referred to as synderesis, and at the level of how human persons know the rightness and wrongness of an action, which hereinafter will be referred to as normative moral judgment. On the one hand, from this investigation it appears that McCormick operates with a dual moral epistemology, at least at the level of synderesis. This means that at (...) one point in time it appears that a significant shift may have occurred in his moral epistemology at the level of synderesis. This may also be true at the level of normative moral judgment. On the other hand, McCormick's moral epistemology may in fact be a synthesis, which is the product of development and maturity in his thought process. This article will articulate, examine, and analyse both moral epistemologies. The first moral epistemology is operative in McCormick's writing up until 1983. The second moral epistemology corresponds to McCormick's decision in 1983 to write primarily in the area of bioethics from a theological perspective. Since the year 1983 seems to be the pivotal time when these two moral epistemologies converge, I will refer to the first moral epistemology as “prior to 1983” and I will refer to the second moral epistemology as “after 1983.” Because of the numerous criticisms that surround McCormick's moral epistemology, and the ambiguity that it entails, McCormick needed to articulate his theoretical foundations clearly and develop them systematically and coherently. Numerous moral theologians called for him to do this, yet he never responded. A systematic understanding of McCormick's moral epistemology is not only necessary but crucial in examining various issues in bioethics. It is necessary because it is the basis of moral decision making. It is crucial because the life and death of individuals may hang in the balance. (shrink)

A number of recent discussions of atheism allude to cosmological arguments in support of theism. The five ways of Aquinas are classic instances, offered as rational justification for theistic belief. However, the five ways receive short shrift. They are curtly dismissed as vacuous, arbitrary, and even insulting to reason. I contend that the atheistic critique of the Thomistic five ways, and similarly formulated cosmological arguments, argues at cross purposes because it misrepresents them. I first lay out the context, intent and (...) structure of Aquinas’ arguments, then show in what way recent discussions misrepresent them, and finally conclude with a comment on metaphysical orientation, which I take to be central, not only to a proper understanding of the Thomistic five ways but generally to the debate between atheism and theism on the existence of God. (shrink)

Kant's demystification is meant to put away any metaphysical and revealed elements from ethics and religion. Kant, fulfilling this, first argues that metaphysical questions of reason, from theoretical aspect, have no certain answers. In practical reason, he establishes his moral foundations, based on own human being without any referring to metaphysical bases. In fact, Kant places human being as the base, legislator and finally the end of ethics, so that the totality of morality is depended on itself him/her and there (...) is no moral reality out of our humanly understanding. Kant, then, by confirming the necessity of rational religion, believes that the age of revealed religions have been expired, since they were belonged to the childhood age of human being’s reason, while in Kant’s rational religion, this is human being’s subjective intellect that defines the nature and function of God. Therefore, for Kant’s moral and rational religion, there is no credibility for affairs like miracles, blessings and prayers, since they indicate religious misguidance. In Kant’s rational pure religion, the religion is relied on human being’s pure reason in which his/her reason is the only criterion of religious beliefs. Therefore, for Kant, religion means recognizing our duties as divine judgments, and that such religion pertains to our mundane life not for worshiping God in order to get his satisfaction or benefitting his grace. In short, Kant’s religion and morality are totally depended on our humanly and earthy rationality and understanding, and that there is no mystery out of our humanly willing. So the mysteries that are claimed by revealed religions are meaningless, since our reason, itself, determines the nature, function and virtues of God, moral axioms and religious beliefs. (shrink)

Cet article compare l’entendement philosophique traditionnel de l’espace avec l’entendement physique contemporain de l’espace qui est influencé par la théorie de la relativité d’Einstein. La première variante de l’entendement philosophique traditionnel de l’espace est l’entendement de l’espace considéré comme une propriété des êtres existants soit en tant que coordonnées associées aux corps matériels, soit en tant que supériorité universelle qui comporte tous les corps matériels. La tradition mène de la philosophie de la Grèce ancienne à l’entendement de l’espace absolu de (...) Descartes et Newton. Une deuxième variante de l’entendement traditionnel de l’espace est l’entendement de l’espace considéré comme une intuition a priori de la raison ce qui permet de percevoir les êtres existant dans l’espace universel absolu. La tradition mène de la philosophie de Kant aux théories contemporaines sur l’inhérence a priori des facultés de la raison. La fragilité de ces variantes qui impliquent le concept de l’espace absolu est démontrée grâce aux preuves qui ont confirmé la théorie de la relativité d’Einstein et grâce aux géométries non-euclidiennes. Les exemples tirés de la discussion de Stephen Hawking avec Roger Penrose sur la nature de l’espace et du temps ont servi pour démontré que l’entendement physique contemporain reste dans les cadres de l’entendement philosophique de l’espace à trois dimensions. L’exemple des fondements ontologiques des règles de la logique déductive est utilisé pour présenter quelle est la mesure de l’actualité de la variante a priori de la conception philosophique de l’espace. (shrink)

One of the major issues in the names and attributes of God, is the semantic interpretation of how to interpret and apply the concepts and predicates that talk about God. A historical survey proves that Imami theologians’ theological views are derived from the Qur'an and hadith. The Quran ascribed some attributes to God that prompted scholars to discuss and analyze the applicability of these concepts to God; accordingly, different views emerged Including Allameh Hilli’s apophaticism which is similar to the apophatic–cataphatic (...) way of Thomas Aquinas. We'll explain how three meanings of the apophatic-cataphatic. Erigena stated one of the meanings and Thomas Aquinas and Allameh Hilli stated another one which seems similar to each other. While Hilli’s negates the anti-attributes, Thomas negates the attributes which are specified to creatures. Then we explain the meaning of the attributes regarding creatures and God, and then, will discuss the “gradation theory” of Allame Hilli and “Analogy theory” of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

The article begins with the statement that there is one aspect of St Thomas’s work that has not received due scrutiny as a literary form, one with solid dramatic qualities and structure: the Article. The Article is as Thomistic as the syllogism is Aristotelian. This particular mode of argument was evidently original with St. Thomas: he did not derive it from the work of any other writer, yet its inner movement is of the essence of dialectic, from the opening proposition (...) to opposing objections, then “to the contrary” position as found in orthodoxy, and then the writer’s resolution, and so on. It is a variation on the classic sic-et-non, a reasonable, balanced to and fro of the sort beloved by disputants. No parallel or even parody of this Article is to be found in any known literature before or since the thirteenth century. The author aims to show that part of the sheer power of the Article resides in the fact that it has two levels of operation. The surface is composed of the dialectical to-and-fro adumbrated above. But under that surface lies a rhetorical structure constructed along the lines of the five divisions of the rhetorical logos as laid out by Cicero and Horace. (shrink)