This paper focuses on the Enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires that if an agent sincerely and with conviction believes she ought to X, then X-ing is a goal in her plan. We analyze the logical structure of Enkrasia and its implications for deontic logic. To do so, we elaborate on the distinction between basic and derived oughts, and provide a multi-modal neighborhood logic with three characteristic operators: a non-normal operator for basic oughts, a non-normal operator for (...) goals in plans, and a normal operator for derived oughts. We prove two completeness theorems for the resulting logic, and provide a dynamic extension of the logic by means of product updates. We illustrate how this setting informs deontic logic by considering issues related to the filtering of inconsistent oughts, the restricted validity of deontic closure, and the stability of oughts and goals under dynamics. (shrink)

Multi-agent systems where the agents are developed by parties with competing interests, and where there is no access to an agent’s internal state, are often classified as ‘open’. The members of such systems may inadvertently fail to, or even deliberately choose not to, conform to the system specification. Consequently, it is necessary to specify the normative relations that may exist between the members, such as permission, obligation, and institutional power. We present a framework being developed for executable specification of open (...) multi-agent systems. We adopt a bird’s eye view of these systems, as opposed to an agent’s perspective whereby it reasons about how it should act. This paper is devoted to the presentation of various examples from the NetBill protocol formalised in terms of institutional power, permission and obligation. We express the system specification in the Event Calculus and execute the specification by means of a logic programming implementation. We also give several example formalisations of sanctions for dealing with violations of permissions and obligations. We distinguish between an open multi-agent system and the procedure by which an agent enters and leaves the system. We present examples from the specification of a role-management protocol for NetBill, and demonstrate the interplay between such a protocol and the corresponding multi-agent system. (shrink)

Belief revision from the point of view of doxastic logic. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 3(4), 535–553. Segerberg, K. (1995). Conditional action. In G. Crocco, L. Fariñas, & A. Herzig (Eds.), Conditionals: From philosophy to computer science, Studies ...

This paper tackles the problem of inference in normative systems where norms concerning actions and states of affairs appear together. A deontic logic of actions and states is proposed as a solution. It is made up of two independent deontic logics, namely a deontic logic of action and a deontic logic of states, interlinked by bridging definitions. It is shown at a language and a model level how an agent should look for norms to follow in a concrete situation. It (...) is pointed out that such specific norms are obtained by finding the most specific obligation and the most general prohibition. They are to be derived from all norms applicable to the situation by using the principles of the logic presented in this paper. (shrink)

The paper tackles the problem of the relation between rights and obligations. Two examples of situations in which such a relation occurs are discussed. One concerns the abortion regulations in Polish law, the other one—a clash between freedom of expression and freedom of enterprise occurring in the context of discrimination. The examples are analysed and formalised using labelled transition systems in the \ framework. Rights are introduced to the system as procedures allowing for their fulfilment. Obligations are based on the (...) requirement of cooperation in the realisation of the goals of the agent that has a right. If the right of an agent cannot be fulfilled without an action of another agent, then that action is obligatory for that agent. If there are many potential contributors who are individually allowed to refuse, then the last of them is obliged to help when all the others have already refused. By means of formalisation this account of the relation under consideration is precisely expressed and shown consistent. (shrink)