The dilemma objection charges that ‘weak’ versions of the precautionary principle (PP) are vacuous while ‘strong’ ones are incoherent. I respond that the ‘weak’ versus ‘strong’ distinction is misleading and should be replaced with a contrast between PP as a meta-rule and PP proper. Meta versions of PP require that the decision-making procedures used for environmental policy not be susceptible to paralysis by scientific uncertainty. Such claims are substantive because they often recommend against basing environmental policy decisions on cost–benefit analysis. (...) I argue that the second horn of the dilemma fails as a result of disregarding the role of proportionality in applications of PP. (shrink)

The precautionary principle has been widely discussed in the academic, legal, and policy arenas. This paper argues, however, that there is no single precautionary principle and we should stop referring to ?the? precautionary principle. Instead, we should talk about ?precaution? and ?precautionary approaches? more generally and identify and defend distinct precautionary principles of limited scope. Drawing on the vast literature on ?the? precautionary principle, this paper further argues that the challenges of decision making under conditions of uncertainty necessitate taking a (...) precautionary approach to decision making that will enable us to understand what particular precautionary principles require of us on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

The precautionary principle states, roughly, that it is better to take precautionary measures now than to deal with serious harms to the environment or human health later on. This paper builds on the work of Neil A. Manson in order to show that the precautionary principle, in all of its forms, is fraught with vagueness and ambiguity. We examine the version of the precautionary principle that was formulated at the Wingspread Conference sponsored by the Science and Environmental Health Network in (...) 1998. That version fails to indicate who must bear the cost of precaution; what constitutes a threat of harm; how much precaution is too much; and what should be done when environmental concerns and concern for human health pull in different directions. Whether this vagueness is a strength or weakness of the principle depends on what purpose(s) the precautionary principle is supposed to serve. (shrink)

The precautionary principle holds that we should not allow scientific uncertainty to prevent us from taking precautionary measures in response to potential threats that are irreversible and potentially disastrous. Critics of the principle claim that it deters progress and development, is excessively risk-aversive and is unscientific. This paper argues that the principle can be scientific provided that the threats addressed by the principle are plausible threats, and the precautionary measures adopted are reasonable. The paper also argues that one may use (...) epistemic criteria, such as consistency, coherence and explanatory power, to determine whether a threat is plausible, and that one may use practical considerations, such as effectiveness, proportionality, cost-effectiveness, realism and consistency, to determine whether a response to a threat is reasonable. (shrink)

The precautionary principle has its origins in debates about environmental policy, but is increasingly invoked in bioethical contexts. John Harris and Søren Holm argue that the principle should be rejected as incoherent, irrational, and representing a fundamental threat to scientific advance and technological progress. This article argues that while there are problems with standard formulations of the principle, Harris and Holm's rejection of all its forms is mistaken. In particular, they focus on strong versions of the principle and fail to (...) recognize that weaker forms, which may escape their criticisms, are both possible and advocated in the literature. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between the precautionary principle and uncertainty factors used by toxicologists to estimate acceptable exposure levels for toxic chemicals from animal experiments. It shows that the adoption of uncertainty factors in the United States in the 1950s can be understood by reference to the precautionary principle, but not by cost-benefit analysis because of a lack of relevant quantitative data at that time. In addition, it argues that uncertainty factors continue to be relevant to efforts to implement (...) the precautionary principle and that the precautionary principle should not be restricted to cases involving unquantifiable hazards. (shrink)

Surgical innovation involves practices, such as new devices, technologies, procedures, or applications, which are novel and untested. Although innovative practices are believed to offer an improvement on the standard surgical approach, they may prove to be inefficacious or even dangerous. This article considers how surgeons considering innovation should reason in the conditions of uncertainty that characterize innovative surgery. What attitude to the unknown risks of innovative surgery should they take? The answer to this question involves value judgments about the acceptability (...) of risk taking when satisfactory scientific information is not available. This question has been confronted in legal contexts, where risk aversion in the form of the precautionary principle has become increasingly influential as a regulatory response to innovative technologies that pose uncertain future hazards. This article considers whether it is appropriate to apply a precautionary approach when making decisions about innovative surgery. (shrink)