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In touch with the look of solidity

Thomas Crowther

In Thomas Crowther & Clare Mac Cumhaill (eds.), Perceptual Ephemera. New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2018)

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Naïve Realism and the Colors of Afterimages.Vivian Mizrahi - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):207-227.details Along with hallucinations and illusions, afterimages have shaped the philosophical debate about the nature of perception. Often referred to as optical or visual illusions, experiences of afterimages have been abundantly exploited by philosophers to argue against naïve realism. This paper offers an alternative account to this traditional view by providing a tentative account of the colors of the afterimages from an objectivist perspective. Contrary to the widespread approach to afterimages, this paper explores the possibility that the colors of afterimages are (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Sensing mind-independence.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14931-14949.details I propose that the fundamental challenge Berkeley left realists is to account for experiences’ ability to present items as mind-independent, consistent with the claim that experiences always present themselves among the items of awareness. By exploring two ways of responding to this challenge, and ruling out the second, I hope to show that realists aiming to secure a role for experiences in grounding our grasp of mind-independence need to adopt a specific view of perceptual experience. They must take experiences to (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Objects, seeing, and object-seeing.Mohan Matthen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4).details Two questions are addressed in this paper. First, what is it to see? I argue that it is veridical experience of things outside the perceiver brought about by looking. Second, what is it to see a material object? I argue that it is experience of an occupant of a spatial region that is a logical subject for other visual features, able to move to another spatial region, to change intrinsically, and to interact with other material objects. I show how this (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations
The Way Things Look: a Defence of Content.Andrea Giananti - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):541-562.details How does perceptual experience disclose the world to our view? In the first introductory section, I set up a contrast between the representational and the purely relational conception of perceptual experience. In the second section, I discuss an argument given by Charles Travis against perceptual content. The third section is devoted to the phenomenon of perceptual constancy: in 3.1 I describe the phenomenon. In 3.2 I argue that the description given suggests a phenomenological distinction that can be deployed for a (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations

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