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The Rejection of the Extreme Demand

In The Moral Demands of Affluence. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press on Demand (2004)

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  1. Consequentialism and Its Demands: The Role of Institutions.András Miklós & Attila Tanyi - 2025 - Acta Analytica 40 (1):111-131.
    Consequentialism is often criticized as being overly demanding, and this overdemandingness is seen as sufficient to reject it as a moral theory. This paper takes the plausibility and coherence of this objection—the Demandingness Objection—as a given. Our question, therefore, is how to respond to the Objection. We put forward a response relying on the framework of institutional consequentialism we introduced in previous work. On this view, institutions take over the consequentialist burden, whereas individuals, special occasions aside, are required to set (...)
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  • Justice and Security-based Attachment.Stephanie Collins & Liam Shields - 2025 - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-35.
    Attachment is deeply important to human life. When one person becomes ‘attached’ to another, their sense of security turns on their emotional, social, and physical engagement with that person. This kind of security-based attachment has been extensively studied in psychology. Yet attachment theory (in the specific sense studied by psychologists) has not received adequate attention in analytic theories of social justice. In this paper, we conceptualize attachment’s nature and value, addressing when and why attachments place justice-based claims on individuals and (...)
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  • In Praise of Ineffectiveness.Peter Seipel - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (5):1301-1316.
    Effective altruism implies that we should donate to an asteroid deflection program at the expense of saving a nearby child’s life. I argue that anyone who finds this result counterintuitive has prima facie reason to reject, or at least doubt that their own values commit them to, effective altruism.
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  • Fairness and Fair Shares.Keith Horton - 2011 - Utilitas 23 (1):88-93.
    Some moral principles require agents to do more than their fair share of a common task, if others won’t do their fair share – each agent’s fair share being what they would be required to do if all contributed as they should. This seems to provide a strong basis for objecting to such principles. For it seems unfair to require agents who have already done their fair share to do more, just because other agents won’t do their fair share. The (...)
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