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  1. Dual process theories versus massive modularity hypotheses.Angeles Eraña - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):855-872.
    Two prevailing accounts of the structure of the mind have been provided, respectively, by the Dual System Theory and by the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. It has been claimed, however, that they cannot both be true at the same time, i.e., that they are incompatible and, thus, that one of them must be abandoned. I will offer some arguments to challenge this claim. I will show that a plausible understanding of each theory makes it possible for them both to be true (...)
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  • Advancing the rationality debate.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):701-717.
    In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily (...)
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  • Rationality disputes – psychology and epistemology.Patrick Rysiew - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1153-1176.
    This paper reviews the largely psychological literature surrounding apparent failures of human rationality (sometimes referred to as 'the Rationality Wars') and locates it with respect to concepts and issues within more traditional epistemological inquiry. The goal is to bridge the gap between these two large and typically disconnected literatures – concerning rationality and the psychology of human reasoning, on the one hand, and epistemological theories of justified or rational belief, on the other – and to do so in such as (...)
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  • (1 other version)What's epistemology for? The case for neopragmatism in normative metaepistemology.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 26--47.
    How ought we to go about forming and revising our beliefs, arguing and debating our reasons, and investigating our world? If those questions constitute normative epistemology, then I am interested here in normative metaepistemology: the investigation into how we ought to go about forming and revising our beliefs about how we ought to go about forming and revising our beliefs -- how we ought to argue about how we ought to argue. Such investigations have become urgent of late, for the (...)
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  • Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis.Richard Samuels - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):575-602.
    In recent years evolutionary psychologists have developed and defended the Massive Modularity Hypothesis, which maintains that our cognitive architecture—including the part that subserves ‘central processing’ —is largely or perhaps even entirely composed of innate, domain-specific computational mechanisms or ‘modules’. In this paper I argue for two claims. First, I show that the two main arguments that evolutionary psychologists have offered for this general architectural thesis fail to provide us with any reason to prefer it to a competing picture of the (...)
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  • Dominance hierarchies and the evolution of human reasoning.Denise Dellarosa Cummins - 1996 - Minds and Machines 6 (4):463-480.
    Research from ethology and evolutionary biology indicates the following about the evolution of reasoning capacity. First, solving problems of social competition and cooperation have direct impact on survival rates and reproductive success. Second, the social structure that evolved from this pressure is the dominance hierarchy. Third, primates that live in large groups with complex dominance hierarchies also show greater neocortical development, and concomitantly greater cognitive capacity. These facts suggest that the necessity of reasoning effectively about dominance hierarchies left an indelible (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Philosophy of psychology.Kelby Mason, Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Stephen Stich - 2008 - In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy. Routledge.
    The 20 sup > th /sup > century has been a tumultuous time in psychology -- a century in which the discipline struggled with basic questions about its intellectual identity, but nonetheless managed to achieve spectacular growth and maturation. It’s not surprising, then, that psychology has attracted sustained philosophical attention and stimulated rich philosophical debate. Some of this debate was aimed at understanding, and sometimes criticizing, the assumptions, concepts and explanatory strategies prevailing in the psychology of the time. But much (...)
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  • Illusions in quantified reasoning: How to make the impossible seem possible, and vice versa.Yingrui Yang & Philip Johnson-Laird - 2000 - Memory and Cognition 28 (3):452-465.
    The mental model theory postulates that reasoners build models of the situations described in premises, and that these models normally represent only what is true. The theory has an unexpected consequence. It predicts the existence ofillusions in inferences. Certain inferences should have compelling but erroneous conclusions. Two experiments corroborated the occurrence of such illusions in inferences about what is possible from disjunctions of quantified assertions, such as, “at least some of the plastic beads are not red.” Experiment 1 showed that (...)
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  • ``Two'' many optimalities.Oscar Vilarroya - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (2):251-270.
    In evolutionary biology, a trait is said to be optimal if it maximizes the fitness of the organism, that is, if the trait allows the organism to survive and reproduce better than any other competing trait would. In engineering, a design is said to be optimal if it complies with its functional requirements as well as possible. Cognitive science is both a biological and engineering discipline and hence it uses both notions of optimality. Unfortunately, the lack of a clear methodological (...)
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  • A little logic goes a long way: basing experiment on semantic theory in the cognitive science of conditional reasoning.Keith Stenning & Michiel van Lambalgen - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28 (4):481-529.
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  • A little logic goes a long way: basing experiment on semantic theory in the cognitive science of conditional reasoning.Keith Stenning & Michiel Lambalgen - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28 (4):481-529.
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  • A willingness to be vulnerable: norm psychology and human–robot relationships.Stephen A. Setman - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (4):815-824.
    Should we welcome social robots into interpersonal relationships? In this paper I show that an adequate answer to this question must take three factors into consideration: (1) the psychological vulnerability that characterizes ordinary interpersonal relationships, (2) the normative significance that humans attach to other people’s attitudes in such relationships, and (3) the tendency of humans to anthropomorphize and “mentalize” artificial agents, often beyond their actual capacities. I argue that we should welcome social robots into interpersonal relationships only if they are (...)
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  • (1 other version)What brains won't tell us about the mind: A critique of the neurobiological argument against representational nativism.Richard Samuels - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (4):548-570.
    In their recent and influential book Rethinking Innateness, Jeffrey Elman and his co‐authors argue that evidence from neurobiology provides us with grounds to reject representational nativism (RN). I argue that Elman et al.’s argument fails because it makes a series of unwarranted assumptions about RN and about the extent to which neurobiological data constrain claims about the innateness of mental rep‐resentations. Moreover, I briefly discuss how we ought to understand RN and argue that on two prima facie plausible approaches, far (...)
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  • Rationality and psychology.Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich - 2004 - In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford handbook of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 279-300.
    Samuels and Stich explore the debate over the extent to which ordinary human reasoning and decision making is rational. One prominent cluster of views, often associated with the heuristics and biases tradition in psychology, maintains that human reasoning is, in important respects, normatively problematic or irrational. Samuels and Stich start by sketching some key experimental findings from this tradition and describe a range of pessimistic claims about the rationality of ordinary people that these and related findings are sometimes taken to (...)
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  • (1 other version)Acquired moral truths. [REVIEW]Jesse Prinz - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):219-227.
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  • The case for moral empiricism.Shaun Nichols - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):549-567.
    It is an old and venerable idea in philosophy that morality is built into us, and this nativist view has seen a resurgence of late. Indeed, the prevailing systematic account of how we acquire complex moral representations is a nativist view inspired by arguments in Chomskyan linguistics. In this article, I review the leading argument for moral nativism – the poverty of the moral stimulus. I defend a systematic empiricist alternative that draws on the resources of statistical learning. Such an (...)
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  • Deontic Reasoning, Modules and Innateness: A Second Look.Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):191-202.
    Cummins (this issue) puts the case for an innate module for deontic reasoning. We argue that this case is not persuasive. First, we claim that Cummins’evolutionary arguments are neutral regarding whether deontic reasoning is learned or innate. Second, we argue that task differences between deontic and indicative reasoning explain many of the phenomena that Cummins takes as evidence for a deontic module. Third, we argue against the suggestion that deontic reasoning is superior to indicative reasoning, either in adults or children. (...)
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  • ¿Existen Reglas Adaptativas en la Mente Humana? Una revisión crítica de las teorías cognitivas evolutivas por medio del enfoque de la perfección del condicional.Miguel López - 2011 - Cinta de Moebio 41:123-143.
    La teoría de los contratos sociales es un enfoque cognitivo que apareció décadas atrás y que defiende que la mente humana se encuentra dotada con sistemas neurocognitivos evolutivos. Estos sistemas regulan diferentes situaciones sociales, por ejemplo, los intercambios y las negociaciones, y nos permiten detectar infractores de reglas o individuos que no cumplen acuerdos. En este trabajo, revisamos críticamente las tesis de este enfoque a partir de los argumentos lingüísticos de Moldovan sobre la perfección del condicional. Nuestra conclusión apunta a (...)
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  • Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty.Robert Lockie - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (2):133-149.
    The epistemic poverty objection is commonly levelled by externalists against deontological conceptions of epistemic justification. This is that an “oughts” based account of epistemic justification together with “ought” implies “can” must lead us to hold to be justified, epistemic agents who are objectively not truth-conducive cognizers. The epistemic poverty objection has led to a common response from deontologists, namely to embrace accounts of bounded rationality—subjective, practical or regulative accounts rather than objective, absolute or theoretical accounts. But the bounds deontological epistemologists (...)
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  • Nativism and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality.Brendan Cline - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):231-253.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to undercut the justification of our moral judgments by showing why a tendency to make moral judgments would evolve regardless of the truth of those judgments. Machery and Mallon (2010. Evolution of morality. In J.M. Doris and The Moral Psychology Research Group (Eds.), The Moral Psychology Handbook (pp. 3-46). Oxford: Oxford University Press) have recently tried to disarm these arguments by showing that moral cognition – in the sense that is relevant to debunking – is not (...)
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  • Illocutionary forces and what is said.M. Kissine - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):122-138.
    A psychologically plausible analysis of the way we assign illocutionary forces to utterances is formulated using a 'contextualist' analysis of what is said. The account offered makes use of J. L. Austin's distinction between phatic acts (sentence meaning), locutionary acts (contextually determined what is said), illocutionary acts, and perolocutionary acts. In order to avoid the conflation between illocutionary and perlocutionary levels, assertive, directive and commissive illocutionary forces are defined in terms of inferential potential with respect to the common ground. Illocutionary (...)
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  • How young children use manifest emotions and dominance cues to understand social rules: a registered report.Gökhan Gönül & Fabrice Clément - forthcoming - Cognition and Emotion.
    Given the complexity of human social life, it is astonishing to observe how quickly children adapt to their social environment. To be accepted by the other members, it is crucial to understand and follow the rules and norms shared by the group. How and from whom do young children learn these social rules? In the experiments, based on the crucial role of affective social learning and dominance hierarchies in simple rule understanding, we showed 15-to-23-month-olds and 3-to-5-year-old children videos where the (...)
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  • The Property Equilibrium in a Liberal Social Order (or How to Correct Our Moral Vision).Gerald Gaus - 2011 - Social Philosophy and Policy 28 (2):74-101.
    The “welcome return” to “substantive political philosophy” that Rawls'sA Theory of Justicewas said to herald has resulted in forty years of proposals seeking to show that philosophical reflection leads to the demonstrable truth of almost every and any conceivable view of the justice of property rights. Select any view—from the justice of unregulated capitalist markets to the most extreme forms of egalitarianism—and one will find that some philosophers have proclaimed that rational reflection uniquely leads to its justice. This is, I (...)
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  • The egalitarian species.Gerald Gaus - 2015 - Social Philosophy and Policy 31 (2):1-27.
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  • Moral learning in the open society: The theory and practice of natural liberty.Gerald Gaus & Shaun Nichols - 2017 - Social Philosophy and Policy 34 (1):79-101.
    Abstract:When people reason on the basis of moral rules, do they suppose that in the absence of a prohibitory rule they are free to act, or do they suppose that morality always requires a justification establishing a permission to act? In this essay we present a series of learning experiments that indicate when learners tend to close their system on the basis of natural liberty and when on the principle of residual prohibition. Those who are taught prohibitory rules tend to (...)
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  • Is the public incompetent? Compared to whom? About what?Gerald Gaus - 2008 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 20 (3):291-311.
    From Mill to, most recently, Bryan Caplan, political and economic elites have been seen as the solution to the public’s ignorance and incompetence. In order to show that elites are actually more competent than the public, however, we would have to find out what type of knowledge is necessary to enact good public policy. The empirical evidence shows that economic experts have a slight advantage over the general public in knowledge of how to achieve policy goals. But, contrary to Caplan, (...)
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  • Constructivist and ecological modeling of group rationality.Gerald Gaus - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):245-254.
    These brief remarks highlight three aspects of Christian List and Philip Pettit's Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents that illustrate its constructivist nature: its stress on the discursive dilemma as a primary challenge to group rationality and reasoning; its general though qualified support for premise-based decision-making as the preferred way to cope with the problems of judgment aggregation; and its account of rational agency and moral responsibility. The essay contrasts List and Pettit's constructivist analysis of group (...)
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  • (1 other version)Contemporary debates in philosophy of science.Christopher Hitchcock (ed.) - 2004 - Malden, MA: Blackwell.
    Showcasing original arguments for well-defined positions, as well as clear and concise statements of sophisticated philosophical views, this volume is an ...
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  • Adaptive domains of deontic reasoning.Laurence Fiddick - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):105 – 116.
    Deontic reasoning is reasoning about permission and obligation: what one may do and what one must do, respectively. Conceivably, people could reason about deontic matters using a purely formal deontic calculus. I review evidence from a range of psychological experiments suggesting that this is not the case. Instead, I argue that deontic reasoning is supported by a collection of dissociable cognitive adaptations for solving adaptive problems that likely would have confronted ancestral humans.
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  • Cognitive ability and variation in selection task performance.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (3):193-230.
    Individual differences in performance on a variety of selection tasks were examined in three studies employing over 800 participants. Nondeontic tasks were solved disproportionately by individuals of higher cognitive ability. In contrast, responses on two deontic tasks that have shown robust performance facilitationthe Drinking-age Problem and the Sears Problem-were unrelated to cognitive ability. Performance on deontic and nondeontic tasks was consistently associated. Individuals in the correct/correct cell of the bivariate performance matrix were over-represented. That is, individuals giving the modal response (...)
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  • Politics in a State of Nature.William A. Edmundson - 2013 - Ratio Juris 26 (2):149-186.
    Aristotle thought we are by nature political animals, but the state-of-nature tradition sees political society not as natural but as an artifice. For this tradition, political society can usefully be conceived as emerging from a pre-political state of nature by the exercise of innate normative powers. Those powers, together with the rest of our native normative endowment, both make possible the construction of the state, and place sharp limits on the state's just powers and prerogatives. A state-of-nature theory has three (...)
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  • Biological preparedness and evolutionary explanation.Denise Dellarosa Cummins & Robert Cummins - 1999 - Cognition 73 (3):B37-B53.
    It is commonly supposed that evolutionary explanations of cognitive phenomena involve the assumption that the capacities to be explained are both innate and modular. This is understandable: independent selection of a trait requires that it be both heritable and largely decoupled from other ”nearby’ traits. Cognitive capacities realized as innate modules would certainly satisfy these contraints. A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology, however, requires neither extreme nativism nor modularity, though it is consistent with both. In this paper, we seek to show (...)
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  • How to Think about the Modularity of Mind Reading.Gregory Currie & Kim Sterelny - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):145-160.
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  • (1 other version)How the Social Environment Shaped the Evolution of Mind.Denise Dellarosa Cummins - 2000 - Synthese 122 (1-2):3-28.
    Dominance hierarchies are ubiquitous in the societies of human and non-human animals. Evidence from comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychological investigations is presented that show how social dominance hierarchies shaped the evolution of the human mind, and hence, human social institutions. It is argued that the pressures that arise from living in hierarchical social groups laid a foundation of fundamental concepts and cognitive strategies that are crucial to surviving in social dominance hierarchies. These include recognizing and reasoning transitively about dominance relations, (...)
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  • Biological preparedness and evolutionary explanation.Denise D. Cummins & Robert C. Cummins - 1999 - Cognition 73 (3):B37-B53.
    It is commonly supposed that evolutionary explanations of cognitive phenomena involve the assumption that the capacities to be explained are both innate and modular. This is understandable: independent selection of a trait requires that it be both heritable and largely decoupled from other `nearby' traits. Cognitive capacities realized as innate modules would certainly satisfy these contraints. A viable evolutionary cognitive psychology, however, requires neither extreme nativism nor modularity, though it is consistent with both. In this paper, we seek to show (...)
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  • Practical reasoning in a modular mind.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (3):259-278.
    This paper starts from an assumption defended in the author's previous work. This is that distinctivelyhuman flexible and creative theoretical thinking can be explained in terms of the interactions of a variety of modular systems, with the addition of just a few amodular components and dispositions. On the basis of that assumption it is argued that distinctively human practical reasoning, too, can be understood in modular terms. The upshot is that there is nothing in the human psyche that requires any (...)
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  • The grain of domains: The evolutionary-psychological case against domain-general cognition.Anthony P. Atkinson & Michael Wheeler - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):147-76.
    Prominent evolutionary psychologists have argued that our innate psychological endowment consists of numerous domainspecific cognitive resources, rather than a few domaingeneral ones. In the light of some conceptual clarification, we examine the central inprinciple arguments that evolutionary psychologists mount against domaingeneral cognition. We conclude (a) that the fundamental logic of Darwinism, as advanced within evolutionary psychology, does not entail that the innate mind consists exclusively, or even massively, of domainspecific features, and (b) that a mixed innate cognitive economy of domainspecific (...)
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  • Review of The Social Psychology of Morality. [REVIEW]Michael Klenk - 2016 - Metapsychology Online 20 (48):1-8.
    If you put chimpanzees from different communities together you can expect mayhem - they are not keen on treating each other nicely. There is closely related species of apes, however, whose members have countless encounters with unrelated specimen on a daily basis and yet almost all get through the day in one piece - that species is us, homo sapiens. But what makes us get along, most of the time? Morality as such is, perhaps surprisingly, not a mainstream research topic (...)
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  • The Rational Significance of Desire.Avery Archer - 2013 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    My dissertation addresses the question "do desires provide reasons?" I present two independent lines of argument in support of the conclusion that they do not. The first line of argument emerges from the way I circumscribe the concept of a desire. Complications aside, I conceive of a desire as a member of a family of attitudes that have imperative content, understood as content that displays doability-conditions rather than truth-conditions. Moreover, I hold that an attitude may provide reasons only if it (...)
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  • Reason and rationality.Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich & Luc Faucher - 2004 - In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Matti Sintonen & Jan Woleński (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic. pp. 1-50.
    Over the past few decades, reasoning and rationality have been the focus of enormous interdisciplinary attention, attracting interest from philosophers, psychologists, economists, statisticians and anthropologists, among others. The widespread interest in the topic reflects the central status of reasoning in human affairs. But it also suggests that there are many different though related projects and tasks which need to be addressed if we are to attain a comprehensive understanding of reasoning.
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  • (1 other version)Virtue epistemology and the sources of epistemic value.Robert Lockie - 2018 - In Heather D. Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.
    A basic question for virtue epistemology is whether it represents a ‘third force’ – a different source of normativity to that offered by internalism and externalism. It is argued that virtue epistemology does not offer us a distinct source of normativity. It is also argued that virtue theories offer us nothing that can unify the internalist and externalist sub-components of their preferred state of ‘virtue’. Claims that phronesis can unify a virtues-based axiology are specifically opposed.
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  • Context Dependence in Gaus's Evolutionary Account of Public Reason.Luca Costa - 2017 - Public Reason 9 (1-2).
    One of the distinctive features of Gerald Gaus’s public justification theory is his extensive use of the empirical data from the social sciences to support his normative claims. One such claim which stands out for its importance, within the context of Gaus’s theory, is the evolution of strong reciprocity: over time, members of large societies develop a tendency to follow social rules and punish defectors. This claim, in turn, is supported by several studies in experimental economics involving mixed motive games, (...)
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