Summary In the attempt to understand science, definition is not much of a help. Due to the ever growing complexity of science, no unique and universally valid set of defining criteria is available. Hence, certain distinctions are resorted to: science is both a body of tested knowledge and a method of inquiry. The latter, in turn, consists of two phases: discovery and confirmation. The writer argues that it is mainly in respect of its method that science can best be characterized (...) and distinguished from other types of inquiry. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge develops in an increasingly fragmentary way.A multitude of scientific disciplines branch out. Curiosity for thisdevelopment leads into quests for a unifying understanding. To a certain extent, foundational studies provide such unification. There is a tendency, however, also of a fragmentary growth of foundational studies, like in a multitude of disciplinaryfoundations. We suggest to look at the foundational problem, not primarily as a search for foundations for one discipline in another, as in some reductionist approach, but as a steady (...) revelation ofpresuppositions for individual scientific theories – which are boundto meet, sooner or later, in a common language. A decisive point hereis our holistic conception of language, as a whole of description-interpretation processes which are entangled(complementary) in the language itself. For every language there is alinguistic complementarity. We suggest this unique form ofentanglement as a unifying presupposition, ultimately foundational forall communicable knowledge. Involved is a linguistic realism, in terms ofwhich we critically examine ``language-world'' problems, as exposed byWittgenstein, and Russell, about a foundational interdependence of language andreality (world). Throughout, we attach to the developmentof foundational studies of mathematics, logics, and the naturalsciences. In particular, we study the interpretation problem foraxioms of infinity in some detail. We emphasize that the holistic concept of language contradicts Carnap's semiotic fragmentation thesis (thus, no clean cutbetween syntax, semantics, pragmatics). (shrink)

Human rights discourses are increasingly being coupled to discourses on citizenship and citizenship education. In this paper, I consider the premise that human rights might provide a theoretical underpinning for citizenship. I categorise citizenship into five main categories—moral, legal, identity-based, participatory and cosmopolitan. Bringing together theoretical and documentary evidence, I argue that human rights cannot logically be a theoretical underpinning for citizenship, regardless of how citizenship may be conceptualised. This is because human rights discourses are located within a universalist frame (...) of reference, in contrast to that of citizenship, which is located within a more particularist frame. Human rights are conceptually distinct from citizenship, and the conflating of human rights with citizenship not only is conceptually incoherent, but may actually obstruct the empowerment and active participation of individual citizens in the context of a political community. (shrink)

Nearly every major philosophy, from Plato to Hegel and beyond, has argued that democracy is an inferior form of government, at best. Yet, virtually every contemporary political philosophy working today endorses democracy in one variety or another. Should we conclude then that the traditional canon is meaningless for helping us theorise about a just state? In this paper, I will take up the criticisms and positive proposals of two such canonical figures in political philosophy: Plato and Hegel. At first glance, (...) each is rather disdainful, if not outright hostile, to democracy. This is also how both have been represented traditionally. However, if we look behind the reasons for their rejection of (Athenian) democracy and the reasons behind their alternatives to democracy, I believe we can uncover a new theory of government that does two things. First, it maps onto the so-called Schumpeterian tradition of elite theories of democracy quite well. Second, perhaps surprisingly, it actually provides an improved justification for democratic government as we practice it today than rival theories of democracy. Thus, not only are Plato and Hegel not enemies of modern democratic thought after all, but each is actually quite useful for helping us develop democratic theory in a positive, not negative, manner. (shrink)

The thesis of panpsychism is that throughout the natural universe there is mentality, although I prefer the term "mind". We human beings experience this mentality in everyday consciousness and by analogy we are able to assert that mentality is not confined to the human experience alone. The extent to which this mentality penetrates, or is imbued by, our natural world has been a subject for discussion in western schools of philosophy since the ancient Greeks and in the even more ancient (...) eastern schools of theosophy, such as Buddhism and the Hinduism of the Upanishads. I use the term "theosophy" here to bring a sense of esoteric speculation to the panpsychism debate (Oxford English Dictionary). A recent resurgence of interest in panpsychism has recognised the inadequacy of the materialist perspective, and attempts have been made to resolve the main stumbling block, the mind-body/mind-matter problem, and to provide a realistic and adequate account of panpsychism. But, it is generally accepted by most of those interested in the debate and whose works I review, that so far this has not succeeded. Therefore, a new and more radical approach is required. It is the intention of my thesis to demonstrate that only when we break free from our dualistic perspective, a perspective reflective of our thinking mind, our language, and our cultural/social constructs, can we intuitively understand the true nature of the mind-body relationship. I will argue that the truth of this intuitive understanding becomes apparent when we experience what I have termed "personal panpsychic experiences," and that these experiences are epistemologically valid. These experiences give rise to knowledge if reality that I have called the "dual-aspect singularity" perspective. The "dual-aspect singularity" perspective acknowledges the dual nature of reality but asserts that any duality as such is merely aspectivism. As such everything that exists has both a mental and material aspect, neither of which is ontologically real, as together they form a singularity. I will argue that the "dual-aspect singularity" perspective resolves the mind-body mind-brain paradox. (shrink)

The existence of quantum correlates of consciousness (QCC) is doubtful from a scientific perspective. But even if their existence were verified, philosophical problems would remain. On the other hand, there could be more to QCC than meets the sceptic's eye: • QCC might be useful or even necessary for a better understanding of conscious experience or quantum physics or both. The main reasons for this are: the measurement problem (the nature of observation, the mysterious collapse of the wave function, etc.), (...) ostensibly shared features of quantum phenomena and conscious phenomena (e.g., complementarity, nonspatiality, acausality, spontaneity, and holism) and connections (ontology, causation, and knowledge), the qualia problem (subjectivity, explanatory gap etc.). But there are many problems, especially questions regarding realism and the nature and role of conscious observers; • QCC are conceptually challenging, because there are definitory problems and some crucial ontological and epistemological shortcomings. It is instructive to compare them with recent proposals for understanding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). QCC are not sufficient for a quantum theory of mind, nor might they be necessary except perhaps in a very broad sense; • QCC are also empirically challenging. Nevertheless, QCC could be relevant and important for the mindbody problem: QCC might reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. But QCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. QCC restrict accounts of nomological identity. The discovery of QCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone. But there are also problems with QCC in the framework of other ontologies. (shrink)

This article responds to Johan Dahlbeck’s ‘Towards a pure ontology: Children’s bodies and morality’, 2014, pp. 8–23). His arguments from Nietzsche and Spinoza do not carry the weight he supposes, and the conclusions he draws from them about pedagogy would be ill-advised in practice.

This is a draft of the written version of comments on a paper by David Cole, presented orally at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meeting in New Orleans, 27 April 1990. Following the written comments are 2 appendices: One contains a letter to Cole updating these comments. The other is the handout from the oral presentation.

The present work is a chapter from my Ph.D thesis to be submitted in January 2006. Economists generate economic ideas, which are then spread to and impact on the very economic systems that they are ostensibly 'objectively' modelling. I term this dynamical relationship between economic theory and economic reality "ideational reflexivity," and show that various important contributions in economic theory such as the Lucas Critique and Merton's option-pricing theory may be identified as special cases of ideational reflexivity. I then argue (...) that ideational reflexivity, pursued to its logical conclusions, raises serious methodological issues for economic science as a science. In particular the notion of a "positive" body of economic knowledge independent from the reality it describes becomes problematic, and all three "traditional" goals of science - explanation, prediction, and control, become problematic. (shrink)

The oil crisis, risk and evidence‐based practice Evidence‐based practice has risen to prominence over the last 20 years. Different professions have taken it up in different ways and for different purposes. It has been seen as holding both threats and advantages to professionalising endeavours and professional identity. It has engendered controversy but some criticisms of it have been unconvincing. It is possible to account for its rise as a response to tightening financial constraints on state spending in the west, as (...) a sign of a culture increasingly concerned with risk, distrust of professionals and experts, as well as a way for professionals themselves to maintain control over their activity in the face of growing managerialism. This paper reviews the literature of some of the movement's proponents as well as criticism from various professional groups. It concludes that more useful than either arguing for or against it, is to understand the policy background and sociological reasons for its emergence and spread. (shrink)

Peter Brössel and Franz Huber in 2015 argued that the Bayesian concept of confirmation had no use. I will argue that it has both the uses they discussed—it can be used for making claims about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are, and it can be used to measure the epistemic value of experiments. Furthermore, it can be useful in explanations. More generally, I will argue that more coarse-grained concepts can be useful, even when we have more fine-grained concepts available.

Nursing as a profession has a social mandate to contribute to the good of society through knowledge-based practice. Knowledge is built upon theories, and theories, together with their philosophical bases and disciplinary goals, are the guiding frameworks for practice. This article explores a philosophical perspective of nursing's social mandate, the disciplinary goals for the good of the individual and society, and one approach for translating knowledge into practice through the use of a middle-range theory. It is anticipated that the integration (...) of the philosophical perspective and model into nursing practice will strengthen the philosophy, disciplinary goal, theory, and practice links and expand knowledge within the discipline. With the focus on humanization, we propose that nursing knowledge for social good will embrace a synthesis of the individual and the common good. This approach converges vital and agency needs described by Hamilton and the primacy of maintaining the heritage of the good within the human species as outlined by Maritain. Further, by embedding knowledge development in a changing social and health care context, nursing focuses on the goals of clinical reasoning and action. McCubbin and Patterson's Double ABCX Model of Family Adaptation was used as an example of a theory that can guide practice at the community and global level. Using the theory-practice link as a foundation, the Double ABCX model provides practising nurses with one approach to meet the needs of individuals and society. The integration of theory into nursing practice provides a guide to achieve nursing's disciplinary goals of promoting health and preventing illness across the globe. When nursing goals are directed at the synthesis of the good of the individual and society, nursing's social and moral mandate may be achieved. (shrink)

Kelly’s work was formed and developed in the context of the American philosophical movement known as pragmatism. The major figures to which this tradition is attributed are Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. In Personal Construct Psychology, Dewey was acknowledged by Kelly and by subsequent writers as perhaps his most important influence. It has recently become increasingly apparent, however that Peirce was a much more pervasive and crucial influence on James and Dewey than has previously been recognized. Kelly (...) did not mention Peirce but a close reading of the two writers reveals a remarkable correspondence and relationship between their two bodies of work. To set these two thinkers side by side proves to be an interesting and productive exercise. In this paper, after introducing Peirce and examining the relationship between him and Dewey, Kelly’s basic philosophical assumptions, as outlined at the beginning of Volume 1 of the Psychology of Personal Constructs, are used as a framework for exploring their similarities and differences. The result is an enrichment of our understanding of Kelly’s philosophy which allows us to make links with many different subsequent thinkers’ ideas and provides a basis for exploring the psychological aspects of the two men’s work. The latter forms the subject of Part II of this series which is in preparation. (shrink)

The main thrust of this essay is to examine how Maduabuchi Dukor’s theory of theistic or spiritual or comprehensive humanism (2010:p.77) or what I choose to call theistic pluralism, can be made the basis for deconstructing and resolving the crisis created by monistic and monotheistic orientations in the African psyche and on the African continent. The need for such demolition and resolution exercise is intensified by the fact that theistic or pluralistic humanism promotes the temperament of—live and let live(i.e. the (...) Igbo onye biri ibeya biri) as against the monistic and monotheistic orientations which propagate a “thread bare kind of humanism” (p. 63).Consequently, my critique of monotheism is basically focused on the African condition. As of today and with the aftermath of double strands of colonization Africa is beset with the Triple Heritage problem. The razor of my critique is pointedly directed at the expression triple heritage, which not only portrays the psychological state of the African, but in actual fact determines the totality of the African condition in contemporary times. In launching my attack on the triple heritage concept, I go through the window of monotheism. Therefore, my critique of monotheism is intended for the following reasons:1) to explore the metaphysics of monotheism, which I hereafter refer to as theistic monism, and bring to the open the consequences of such orientation in a pluralistic society;2) to examine the metaphysics of Traditional African Religion (ATR), which in agreement with Maduabuchi Dukor, I hereafter christen theistic humanism or theistic pluralism, with a view to showing that African traditional thought system is antithetical to the monotheistic culture of the Arab and the Caucasian;3) to query the rationale behind juxtaposing metaphysical systems that are antithetical to one another, in the name of triple heritage;and4) to suggest way(s) of drastically ameliorating the anomaly on ground. (shrink)

In this thesis I scavenge the history of philosophy for answers to the question ‘How are claims to knowledge justified?’. I argue that Plato’s psychological doctrine of knowledge marks the starting point of a philosophical inquiry motivated by the possibility to discover foundations of knowledge through investigating the nature of mind. At the core of this inquiry lies the hypothesis that if the psychological mechanisms that govern the capacity for knowledge acquisition is fully understood, then answers will follow about why (...) judgements are true or false. The prospective result of the inquiry is a theory of universal epistemic justification which demarcates epistemically warranted beliefs from unwarranted beliefs. I suggest that there is a historically persistent case of cognitive dissonance within the epistemological enterprise — a tension between two of its central theses — which is caused by the persistence of the of the hitherto unsuccessful but ongoing quest for universal epistemic justification, and its inciting promises. The contradicting theses are those of certain justification (that one is justified in believing that p only if p is entailed by evidence) and proportional justification (that one is proportionally justified in believing that p to the extent that evidence makes p credible). I discuss the consequences of giving up one of the respective theses. I conclude that the thesis of certain justification cannot be given up unless an adequate theory of proportional justification is proposed, and that the legacy of searching for universal epistemic justification will continue unless epistemologists are able to construct one. (shrink)

Controversy over the epistemology of disagreement endures because there is an unnoticed factor at work: the intrinsic value we give to self-trust. Even if there are many instances of disagreement where, from a strictly epistemic or rational point of view, we ought to suspend belief, there are other values at work that influence our all-things considered judgments about what we ought to believe. Hence those who would give equal-weight to both sides in many cases of disagreement may be right, from (...) the perspective of pure rationality. But their critics are right too, in seeing something undesirable in the consequences of giving equal weight. Among epistemologists, there is a tendency to set aside trust and other such non-epistemic factors, on the grounds that these are not germane to their topic. But ultimately, the value of self-trust shows signs of encroaching on the strictly epistemic question of when our beliefs may be said to be justified. Hence again, even if the equal-weighters are right about what is rational, they may be wrong about what knowledge requires. (shrink)

Professor Dowding has written an interesting and stimulating book on the relevance (R) of general philosophical insights for the conduct of political science enquiry. In this paper, I challenge his positive analysis due to the relevance (R) difficulty. The social sciences have to struggle with a set of philosophical questions, but they hardly belong to general ontological or epistemological theories.

ABSTRACTThe common way of speaking of patristic thought is as theology. Disuse of the appellation ‘patristic philosophy’ is the result of separationist taxonomies in both philosophy and theology. Returning to the meanings of the terms theologia and philosophia in ancient and late ancient thought, this paper argues, with an eye toward Orthodox thought, for the reasonableness of speaking of patristic thought as philosophy.

The controversy surrounding Popper's proposed solution to the problem of induction is beginning to display many of the symptoms of being interminable. For decades the discussion has continued, apparently without any progress being made. Again and again, Popperians and their critics have accused each other of ‘missing the point’. The essay attempts to explain what exactly is ‘the point’ of the problem of induction, and asks whether Popper does indeed miss it. An answer is proposed, and on this basis an (...) explanation for the puzzling interminability and emptiness of the above dialogue is put forward. (shrink)

As the ideological constructor of the destruction of colonised peoples and knowledge, Western philosophy must bear its burden for complicity. Decoloniality is amid the discourses of critique contra modernity and its denigration of the colonised. In the South African academy, for instance, much support has been validly rendered to decoloniality, consequently those employing “Western” frameworks should be challenged to constant re-evaluation. Here, the virtues and vices of decoloniality will not be considered. Rather a discernment will be undertaken of the “epistemic (...) worth” of conducting – specifically mediaeval and Western – philosophical research amid calls for the decentring of Western epistemological dominance, within the tradition of Saint Thomas Aquinas in the decolonial milieu. The argument is proffered – from multifold perspectives – that Aquinas, as both pre-modern and pre-colonial, does have relevance to the decolonial academic climate. The case is defended that Arabic philosophers importantly influenced Aquinas’ work, thus, demonstrating his openness to non-Western thought. Furthermore, from an epistemological perspective, it is contended that Aquinas’ placing of the subject at the focal point of adequations to truth by credencing the situatedness of the perceiver, deconstructs modern objectivity, which in itself has caused considerable damage to non-Western epistemologies. Aquinas’ epistemic relevance in this context, it is argued, may contribute to a median between demonstrable science and the multi-layered context of the epistemic subject. (shrink)

Prof. Haack answers a series of questions on pragmatism, beginning with the origins of this tradition in the work of Peirce and James, its evolution in the work of Dewey and Mead, and its influence beyond the United States in, for example, the Italian pragmatists and the radical British pragmatist F. C. S. Schiller. Classical pragmatism, she observes, is a rich and varied tradition from which there is still much to be learned—as the many ways her own work in logic, (...) epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law has been informed by the old pragmatists testify. Of late, however, this tradition has been misunderstood, impoverished, and vulgarized by self-styled neo-pragmatists; here, Haack turns her attention specifically to the conception of pragmatism as essentially a political philosophy, and the near-vacuous equation of pragmatism with “problem-solving.”. (shrink)

The influences large corporations have on the lives of most citizens is huge. In the developed world the relationships between corporations and citizens is generally close, with top corporate managers making decisions that shape the societies which they share with their fellow citizens. Individuals in Western society may be trained to accept the status quo, which allows business leaders significant influence over the allocation of society’s assets, and thereby over societal developments. Formal education systems often encourage the maintenance of the (...) status quo, whereas they could encourage students to challenge it. This paper argues the need to help business students develop an understanding of critical theory, independent thought and self-improvement. The paper employs a case study approach which focuses on the development of one person, its author. He argues that those responsible for education today must encourage their students to think holistically about the consequences of business behaviour on society. If managers view business life through a scientific lens, focused primarily on the maximisation of financial returns, they will continue to encourage unsustainable behaviour, which damages the ecosystems and the social cohesion in society. Managers must learn to approach their business decisions as whole human beings. This will make it more likely they will manage in a sustainable way, and help them find meaning and happiness in their roles. (shrink)

Abstract:Much of Western speculative metaphysics has subscribed to what has been called “explanatory rationalism,” which holds that there is a reason for everything that is and for the way everything is. Theodicies, or metaphysical attempts to solve the problem of evil, have relied on a special application of this principle of explanatory rationalism, namely, the principle of plenitude, which holds that the evil in the world is a necessary ingredient in the world's overall perfection or degree of reality. This essay (...) argues that the principle of plenitude is aesthetically motivated, and that only in art and perhaps in revealed religion can the demands of explanatory rationalism be satisfied. (shrink)