There are those who would argue that, recently, the profession of nursing has made a radical shift, while others believe that a schism has been created among both scholars and clinicians as a result of the emerging dominance of the evidence‐based nursing movement. This paper offers a philosophical critique of this movement using Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s concept of schizoanalysis. As a conclusion, the authors posit that nursing professionals maintain a stance of academic freedom of thought and scientific integrity (...) through the acceptance of multiplicity, diversity, and polyvocality, and by challenging with politically charged concepts the totalizing perspectives that often spread through the profession/discipline of nursing. (shrink)

Modern British nursing developed from the mid‐nineteenth century and was seen as a morally purifying activity and as a potential force for social cohesion. It was also considered an activity fit for women. However, it embodied a fundamental tension within Victorian sensibility between a kind of rationalistic utilitarianism and a faith in transcendent values. This paper explores this tension and suggests that it can be detected in current debates about practice and evidence in nursing in the contemporary context of a (...) rise of managerialism in public services. (shrink)

This paper evaluates attempts to defend established concepts of expertise and clinical judgement against the incursions of evidence‐based practice. Two related arguments are considered. The first suggests that standard accounts of evidence‐based practice imply an overly narrow view of ‘evidence’, and that a more inclusive concept, incorporating ‘patterns of knowing’ not recognised by the familiar evidence hierarchies, should be adopted. The second suggests that statistical generalisations cannot be applied non‐problematically to individual patients in specific contexts, and points out that this (...) is why we need clinical judgement. In evaluating the first argument, I propose a criterion for what counts as evidence. It is a minimalist criterion but the ‘patterns of knowing’, referred to in the literature, still fail to meet it. In evaluating the second argument, I will outline the powerful empirical reasons we have for thinking that decisions based on research evidence are usually better than decisions based on clinical judgement; and show that current efforts to rehabilitate clinical judgement seriously underestimate the strength of these reasons. By way of conclusion, I will sketch the ways in which the concept of expertise will have to be modified if we accept evidence‐based practice as a template for health‐care. (shrink)

Evidence‐based practice (EBP) first appeared on the healthcare horizon just over a decade ago. In 2003 its presence has intensified and extended beyond its initial relation to medicine embracing as it does now, nursing and the allied health disciplines. In this paper, I contend that its appearance and subsequent growth and development are the effects of potent ‘regimes of truth’, four of which bear the names: positivism, empiricism, pragmatism and economic rationalism. My aim is to show how EBP generates the (...) controversy it does because its nature and methods are inextricably interwoven with the way it has become politicised and professionalised. This exegesis is an attempt to outline how the combined effects of the four forms of rationality mentioned above allow for both the methods and objectives of EBP to be constructed as they are, while at the same moment producing the particular effects of knowledge and power in terms of who sells and who buys the idea of EBP in the culture of contemporary healthcare. (shrink)

NAIRN S. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 6–17 A critical realist approach to knowledge: implications for evidence‐based practice in and beyond nursingThis paper will identify some of the key conceptual tools of a critical realist approach to knowledge. I will then apply these principles to some of the competing epistemologies that are prevalent within nursing. There are broadly two approaches which are sometimes distinct from each other and sometimes inter‐related. On one side, there is the view that all healthcare interventions should (...) be judged on the principles of randomised controlled trials and the other is a preoccupation with language in which healthcare interventions are subjected to a discursive interrogation. These debates are configured through the idea of a hierarchy of knowledge that is accorded uncritical acceptance by some and virulent distaste by others. I will argue that the notion of hierarchy is problematic and is largely argued for in unproductive epistemological terms. What is required is a shift towards a theory that emphasises the contextual nature of the ways that knowledge is produced and disseminated. In other words, there is no single hierarchy of knowledge, but there are multiple hierarchies of knowledge. (shrink)