In this article we review several paraconsistent logics from different authors to ‘close the gaps’ between them. Since paraconsistent logics is a broad area of research, it is possible that equivalent paraconsistent logics have different names. What we meant is that we provide connections between the logics studied comparing their different semantical approaches for a near future be able to obtain missing semantical characterization of different logics. We are introducing the term RC-type logics to denote a class of logics that (...) extends Cω and satisfies the RC rule. (shrink)

Axiomatic systems can be understood as subsets of syntactic systems. By a process of increasing abstraction, the notion of a syntactic system can become useful for understanding Meillassoux’s concept of hyper-Chaos.

One of the oldest systems of paraconsistent logic is the set of so-called C-systems of Newton da Costa, and this has been generalized into a family of systems now known as logics of formal inconsistencies by Walter Carnielli, Marcelo Coniglio and João Marcos. The characteristic notion in these systems is the so-called consistency operator which, roughly speaking, indicates how gluts are behaving. One natural question then is to ask if we can let not only gluts but also gaps be around (...) and generalize the notion of consistency into classicality. This is already considered by Andréa Loparić and da Costa in the style of C-systems. The aim of this paper is to develop a family of systems that generalizes the system of Loparić and da Costa which may be called logics of formal classicality. (shrink)

Dialetheism is the metaphysical claim that there are true contradictions. And based on this view, Graham Priest and his collaborators have been suggesting solutions to a number of paradoxes. Those paradoxes include Russell’s paradox in naive set theory. For the purpose of dealing with this paradox, Priest is known to have argued against the presence of classical negation in the underlying logic of naive set theory. The aim of the present paper is to challenge this view by showing that there (...) is a way to handle classical negation. (shrink)

The present note offers a proof that systems developed by Majkić are actually extensions of intuitionistic logic, and therefore not paraconsistent.

We compare the logic HYPE recently suggested by H. Leitgeb as a basic propositional logic to deal with hyperintensional contexts and Heyting-Ockham logic introduced in the course of studying logical aspects of the well-founded semantics for logic programs with negation. The semantics of Heyting-Ockham logic makes use of the so-called Routley star negation. It is shown how the Routley star negation can be obtained from Dimiter Vakarelov’s theory of negation and that propositional HYPE coincides with the logic characterized by the (...) class of all involutive Routley star information frames. This result provides a much simplified semantics for HYPE and also a simplified axiomatization, which shows that HYPE is identical with the modal symmetric propositional calculus introduced by G. Moisil in 1942. Moreover, it is shown that HYPE can be faithfully embedded into a normal bi-modal logic based on classical logic. Against this background, we discuss the notion of hyperintensionality. (shrink)

We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results. Given a fixed-point model $\mathcal {M}$, or an axiomatization S thereof, we find a modal logic M such that a modal sentence $\varphi $ is a theorem of M if and only if the sentence $\varphi ^*$ obtained by translating the modal operator with the truth predicate is true in $\mathcal {M}$ or a theorem of S under all such translations. (...) To this end, we introduce a novel version of possible worlds semantics featuring both classical and nonclassical worlds and establish the completeness of a family of noncongruent modal logics whose internal logic is nonclassical with respect to this semantics. (shrink)

The issue of what consequences to draw from the existence of non-classical logical systems has been the subject of an interesting debate across a diversity of fields. In this paper the matter of alternative logics is considered with reference to a specific belief system and its propositions :the Azande are said to maintain beliefs about witchcraft which, when expressed propositionally, appear to be inconsistent. When the Azande have been presented with such inconsistencies, they either fail to see them as such (...) or else accept them as non-problematical. Is our knowledge of logical truths a relative and culturally determined phenomenon, or is there some (transcendent) criterion that allows us to adjudicate between alternative logical systems? The authors propose an approach for resolving disputes about the status of Azande reasoning which assumes a paraconsistent framework, thus providing a new perspective on this debate. (shrink)

This paper criticises necessitarianism, the thesis that there is at least one necessary truth; and defends possibilism, the thesis that all propositions are contingent, or that anything is possible. The second section maintains that no good conventionalist account of necessity is available, while the third section criticises model theoretic necessitarianism. The fourth section sketches some recent technical work on nonclassical logic, with the aim of weakening necessitarian intuitions and strengthening possibilist intuitions. The fifth section considers several a prioristic attempts at (...) demonstrating that there is at least one necessary proposition and finds them inadequate. The final section emphasises the epistemic aspect of possibilism. (shrink)

This paper begins an analysis of the real line using an inconsistency-tolerant (paraconsistent) logic. We show that basic field and compactness properties hold, by way of novel proofs that make no use of consistency-reliant inferences; some techniques from constructive analysis are used instead. While no inconsistencies are found in the algebraic operations on the real number field, prospects for other non-trivializing contradictions are left open.

Paraconsistent logics are characterized by rejection of ex falso quodlibet, the principle of explosion, which states that from a contradiction, anything can be derived. Strikingly these logics have found a wide range of application, despite the misgivings of philosophers as prominent as Lewis and Putnam. Such applications, I will argue, are of significant philosophical interest. They suggest ways to employ these logics in philosophical and scientific theories. To this end I will sketch out a ‘naturalized semantic dialetheism’ following Priest’s early (...) suggestion that the principles governing human natural language may well be inconsistent. There will be a significant deviation from Priest’s work, namely, the assumption of a broadly Chomskyan picture of semantics. This allows us to explain natural language inconsistency tolerance without commitment to contentious views in formal logic. (shrink)

El presente trabajo es un resumen de los resultados preliminares obtenidos por el autor en el marco de un estudio sistemático de sistemas modales y deónticos de base para consistente. Se exponen consideraciones sobre la no-trivialidad y sus diferencias con el concepto de consistencia. Se da una exposición sobre algunas de las razones por las cuales una base para consistcnte es la más natural para lógicas deónticas y afines.

What is the fundamental insight behind truth-functionality ? When is a logic interpretable by way of a truth-functional semantics? To address such questions in a satisfactory way, a formal definition of truth-functionality from the point of view of abstract logics is clearly called for. As a matter of fact, such a definition has been available at least since the 70s, though to this day it still remains not very widely well-known. A clear distinction can be drawn between logics characterizable through: (...) (1) genuinely finite-valued truth-tabular semantics; (2) no finite-valued but only an infinite-valued truthtabular semantics; (3) no truth-tabular semantics at all. Any of those logics, however, can in principle be characterized through non-truth-functional valuation semantics, at least as soon as their associated consequence relations respect the usual tarskian postulates. So, paradoxical as that might seem at first, it turns out that truth-functional logics may be adequately characterized by non-truth-functional semantics . Now, what feature of a given logic would guarantee it to dwell in class (1) or in class (2), irrespective of its circumstantial semantic characterization? (shrink)

According to Fogelin’s account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin’s thesis is a claim about real-life, and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in order to test Fogelin’s thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin’s concept of deep disagreement and shows there are several different breeds (...) of such disagreements. Thus, to fully assess Fogelin’s thesis, it will be necessary to seek out cases of each breed to evaluate their rational irresolvability. Secondly, it begins this task by looking at a significant debate within the logical literature over the truth of contradictions. We demonstrate that, while the debate exemplifies a breed of deep disagreement, the parties involved can supply one another with rationally compelling reasons. (shrink)

Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it’s understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there’s been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This paper aims to correct that error, by arguing for a (...) practice-based approach to logical epistemology. By looking at the types of evidence logicians actually appeal to in attempting to support their theories, we can provide a more detailed and realistic picture of logical epistemology. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of a practice-based approach, we look to a particular case of logical argumentation—the dialetheist’s arguments based upon the self-referential paradoxes—and show that the evidence appealed to support a particular theory of logical epistemology, logical abductivism. (shrink)

This paper first offers a standard modal extension of dialetheic logics that respect the normal semantics for negation and conjunction, in an attempt to adequately model absolutism, the thesis that there are true contradictions at metaphysically possible worlds. It is shown, however, that the modal extension has unsavoury consequences for both absolutism and dialetheism. While the logic commits the absolutist to dialetheism, it commits the dialetheist to the impossibility of the actual world. A new modal logic AV is then proposed (...) which avoids these unsavoury consequences by invalidating the interdefinability rules for the modal operators with the use of two valuation relations. However, while using AV carries no significant cost for the absolutist, the same isn't true for the dialetheist. Although using AV allows her to avoid the consequence that the actual world is an impossible world, it does so only on the condition that the dialetheist admits that she cannot give a dialetheic solution to all self-refe.. (shrink)

In this paper we propose substructural propositional logic obtained by da Costa weakening of the intuitionistic negation. We show that the positive fragment of the da Costa system is distributive lattice logic, and we apply a kind of da Costa weakening of negation, by preserving, differently from da Costa, its fundamental properties: antitonicity, inversion, and additivity for distributive lattices. The other stronger paraconsistent logic with constructive negation is obtained by adding an axiom for multiplicative property of weak negation. After that, (...) we define Kripke-style semantics based on possible worlds and derive from it many-valued semantics based on truth-functional valuations for these two paraconsistent logics. Finally, we demonstrate that this model-theoretic inference system is adequate—sound and complete with respect to the axiomatic da Costa-like systems for these two logics. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the class of truth-functional modal many-valued logics with the complete lattice of truth-values. The conjunction and disjunction logic operators correspond to the meet and join operators of the lattices, while the negation is independently introduced as a hierarchy of antitonic operators which invert bottom and top elements. The non-constructive logic implication will be defined for a subclass of modular lattices, while the constructive implication for distributive lattices (Heyting algebras) is based on relative pseudo-complements as in (...) intuitionistic logic. We show that the complete lattices are intrinsically modal, with banal identity modal operator. We define the autoreferential set-based representation for the class of modal algebras, and show that the autoreferential Kripke-style semantics for this class of modal algebras is based on the set of possible worlds equal to the complete lattice of algebraic truth-values. The philosophical assumption is based on the consideration that each possible world represents a level of credibility, so that only propositions with the right logic value (i.e., level of credibility) can be accepted by this world, then we connect it with paraconsistent properties and LFI logics. The bottom truth value in this complete lattice corresponds to the trivial world in which each formula is satisfied, that is, to the world with explosive inconsistency. The top truth value corresponds to the world with classical logics, while all intermediate possible worlds represent the different levels of paraconsistent logics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We are concerned with the theorem proving in annotated logics. By using annotated polynomials to express knowledge, we develop an inference rule superposition. A proof procedure is thus presented, and an improvement named M- strategy is mainly described. This proof procedure uses single overlaps instead of multiple overlaps, and above all, both the proof procedure and M-strategy are refutationally complete.

In this paper we present a new hierarchy of analytical tableaux systems TNDC n, 1≤n<ω, for da Costa's hierarchy of propositional paraconsistent logics Cn, 1≤n<ω. In our tableaux formulation, we introduce da Costa's “ball” operator “o”, the generalized operators “k” and “(k)”, for 1≤k, and the negations “~k”, for k≥1, as primitive operators, differently to what has been done in the literature, where these operators are usually defined operators. We prove a version of Cut Rule for the TNDC n, 1≤n<ω, (...) and also prove that these systems are logically equivalent to the corresponding systems Cn, 1≤n<ω. The systems TNDC n constitute completely automated theorem proving systems for the systems of da Costa's hierarchy Cn, 1≤n<ω. (shrink)

H. Post's conception of quantal particles as non-individuals is set in a formal logico-mathematical framework. By means of this approach certain metaphysical implications of quantum mechanics can be further explored.

S. Jakowski introduced the discussive prepositional calculus D 2as a basis for a logic which could be used as underlying logic of inconsistent but nontrivial theories (see, for example, N. C. A. da Costa and L. Dubikajtis, On Jakowski's discussive logic, in Non-Classical Logic, Model Theory and Computability, A. I. Arruda, N. C. A da Costa and R. Chuaqui edts., North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977, 37–56). D 2has afterwards been extended to a first-order predicate calculus and to a higher-order logic (cf. the (...) quoted paper). In this paper we present a natural version of D 2, in the sense of Jakowski and Gentzen; as a consequence, we suggest a new formulation of the discussive predicate calculus (with equality). A semantics for the new calculus is also presented. (shrink)

S. Jaśkowski introduced the discussive propositional calculus D₂ as a basis for a logic which could be used as underlying logic of inconsistent but nontrivial theories. D₂ has afterwards been extended to a first-order predicate calculus and to a higher-order logic. In this paper we present a natural version of D₂, in the sense of Jaśkowski and Gentzen; as a consequence, we suggest a new formulation of the discussive predicate calculus. A semantics for the new calculus is also presented.

Belnap-Dunn logic, sometimes also known as First Degree Entailment, is a four-valued propositional logic that complements the classical truth values of True and False with two non-classical truth values Neither and Both. The latter two are to account for the possibility of the available information being incomplete or providing contradictory evidence. In this paper, we present a probabilistic extension of BD that permits agents to have probabilistic beliefs about the truth and falsity of a proposition. We provide a sound and (...) complete axiomatization for the framework defined and also identify policies for conditionalization and aggregation. Concretely, we introduce four-valued equivalents of Bayes’ and Jeffrey updating and also suggest mechanisms for aggregating information from different sources. (shrink)

While the analytical philosophy of science regards inconsistent theories as disastrous, Chomsky allows for the temporary tolerance of inconsistency between the hypotheses and the data. However, in linguistics there seem to be several types of inconsistency. The present paper aims at the development of a novel metatheoretical framework which provides tools for the representation and evaluation of inconsistencies in linguistic theories. The metatheoretical model relies on a system of paraconsistent logic and distinguishes between strong and weak inconsistency. Strong inconsistency is (...) destructive in that it leads to logical chaos. In contrast, weak inconsistency may be constructive, because it is capable of accounting for the simultaneous presence of seemingly incompatible structures. However, paraconsistent logic cannot grasp the dynamism of the emergence and resolution of weak inconsistencies. Therefore, the metatheoretical approach is extended to plausible argumentation. The workability of this metatheoretical model is tested with the help of a detailed case study on an analysis of discontinuous constituents in Government-Binding Theory. (shrink)

Discursive (or discussive) logic, D₂, introduced by Jaśkowski, is widely recognized as a first formal approach to paraconsistency. Jaśkowski applied a quite extraordinary technique at that time to describe his logic. He neither gave a set of the axiom schemata nor presented a direct semantics for D₂ but used a translation function to express his philosophical and logical intuitions. Discursive logic was defined by an interpretation in the language of S₅ of Lewis. The aim of this paper is to present (...) a modified system of the discursive logic that allows some of the weaker versions of Duns Scotus's thesis to be valid. The initial idea is to consider a different characteristic of the connective of negation. We introduce both a direct semantics and an axiomatization of the new system, prove the key metatheorems, and describe labeled tableaux for the system. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The concept of paraconsistent logical consequence is usually negatively defined as a validity semantics in which not every sentences is deducible or in which inferential explosion does not occur. Paraconsistency has been negatively characterized in this way because paraconsistent logics have been designed specifically to avoid the trivialization of deductive inference entailed by the classical paradoxes of material implication for applications in a system that tolerates syntactical contradictions. The effect of the negative characterization of paraconsistency has been to encourage (...) an unsystematic development of distinct versions of paraconsistent logic. It has also contributed to a restricted overview of the full range of paraconsistent formalisms. After reviewing a standard negative characterization of paraconsistency and commenting on its limitations, I propose a positive characterization that makes possible a constructivistic description of the complete spectrum of distinct families of paraconsistent logics, and the description of a new type of maximally relevant paraconsistency, which I argue compares favorably with previously identified categories of paraconsistent logics. (shrink)

The notion of an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi [3] is generalized to that of a possibly infinitely algebraizable, for short, p.i.-algebraizable logic by admitting infinite sets of equivalence formulas and defining equations. An example of the new class is given. Many ideas of this paper have been present in [3] and [4]. By a consequent matrix semantics approach the theory of algebraizable and p.i.-algebraizable logics is developed in a different way. It is related to the (...) theory of equivalential logics in the sense of Prucnal and Wroski [18], and it is extended to nonfinitary logics. The main result states that a logic is algebraizable (p.i.-algebraizable) iff it is finitely equivalential (equivalential) and the truth predicate in the reduced matrix models is equationally definable. (shrink)

Genuine Paraconsistent logics \ and \ were defined in 2016 by Béziau et al, including only three logical connectives, namely, negation disjunction and conjunction. Afterwards in 2017 Hernández-Tello et al, provide implications for both logics and define the logics \ and \. In this work we continue the study of these logics, providing sound and complete Hilbert-type axiomatic systems for each logic. We prove among other properties that \ and \ satisfy a restricted version of the Substitution Theorem, and that (...) both of them are maximal with respect to Classical Propositional Logic. To conclude we make some comparisons between \ and \ and among other logics, for instance \ and some \s. (shrink)

Logics that have many truth values—more than just True and False—have been argued to be useful in the analysis of very many philosophical and linguistic puzzles. In this paper, which is a followup to, we will start with a particularly well-motivated four-valued logic that has been studied mainly in its propositional and first-order versions. And we will then investigate its second-order version. This four-valued logic has two natural three-valued extensions: what is called a “gap logic”, and what is called a (...) “glut logic”. We mention various results about the second-order version of these logics as well. And we then follow our earlier papers, where we had added a specific conditional connective to the three valued logics, and now add that connective to the four-valued logic under consideration. We then show that, although this addition is “conservative” in the sense that no new theorems are generated in the four-valued logic unless they employ this new conditional in their statement, nevertheless the resulting second-order versions of these logics with and without the conditional are quite different in important ways. We close with a moral for logical investigations in this realm. (shrink)

In 1880, when Oliver Wendell Holmes (later to be a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court) criticized the logical theology of law articulated by Christopher Columbus Langdell (the first Dean of Harvard Law School), neither Holmes nor Langdell was aware of the revolution in logic that had begun, the year before, with Frege's Begriffsschrift. But there is an important element of truth in Holmes's insistence that a legal system cannot be adequately understood as a system of axioms and corollaries; and (...) this element of truth is not obviated by the more powerful logical techniques that are now available. (shrink)

A rejection system, also referred to as a complementary calculus, is a proof system axiomatising the invalid formulas of a logic, in contrast to traditional calculi which axiomatise the valid ones. Rejection systems therefore introduce a purely syntactic way of determining non-validity without having to consider countermodels, which can be useful in procedures for automated deduction and proof search. Rejection calculi have first been formally introduced by Łukasiewicz in the context of Aristotelian syllogistic and subsequently rejection systems for many well-known (...) logics have been proposed. In this paper, we deal with rejection systems for so-called non-deterministic finite-valued logics, a special case of non-deterministic many-valued logics which were introduced by Avron and Lev as a generalisation of traditional many-valued logics. More specifically, we introduce a systematic method for constructing sequent-style rejection systems for any given non-deterministic finite-valued logic. Furthermore, as special instances of our method, we provide concrete calculi for specific paraconsistent logics which can be characterised in terms of non-deterministic two- and three-valued semantics, respectively. (shrink)

We present a Hilbert-style axiomatization of a recently introduced logic, called G'3 G'3 is based on a 3-valued semantics. We prove a soundness and completeness theorem. The replacement theorem holds in G'3. As it has already been shown in previous work, G'3 can express some non-monotonic semantics. We prove that G'3can define the same class of functions as Lukasiewicz 3 valued logic. Moreover, we identify some normal forms for this logic.

With each proposition P we associate a set of proposition (a hyperproposition) which determines the order in which one may retreat from accepting P, if one cannot fully hold on to P. We first describe the structure of hyperpropositions. Then we describe two operations on propositions, subtraction and merge, which can be modelled in terms of hyperpropositions. Subtraction is an operation that takes away part of the content of a proposition. Merge is an operation that determines the maximal consistent content (...) of two propositions considered jointly. The merge operation gives rise to an inference relation which is, in a certain sense, optimally paraconsistent. (shrink)

A conjectural inference is proposed, aimed at producing conjectural theorems from formal conjectures assumed as axioms, as well as admitting contradictory statements as conjectural theorems. To this end, we employ Paraconsistent Informational Logic, which provides a formal setting where the notion of conjecture formulated by an epistemic agent can be defined. The paraconsistent systems on which conjectural deduction is based are sequent formulations of the C-systems presented in Carnielli-Marcos [CAR 02b]. Thus, conjectural deduction may also be considered to be a (...) tool for investigating the properties of paraconsistency in general. (shrink)

In this paper we study families of resource aware logics that explore resource restriction on rules; in particular, we study the use of controlled cut-rule and introduce three families of parameterised logics that arise from different ways of controlling the use of cut. We start with a formulation of classical logic in which cut is non-eliminable and then impose restrictions on the use of cut. Three Cut-and-Pay families of logics are presented, and it is shown that each family provides an (...) approximation process for full propositional classical logic when the control over the use of cut is progressively weakened. A sound and complete semantics is given for each component of each of the three families of approximated logics. One of these families is shown to possess the uniform substitution property, a new result for approximated reasoning. A tableau based decision procedure is presented for each element of the approximation families and the complexity of each decision procedure is studied. We show that there are families in which every component logic can be decided polynomially. (shrink)

Paraconsistent extensions of 3-valued Gödel logic are studied as tools for knowledge representation and nonmonotonic reasoning. Particularly, Osorio and his collaborators showed that some of these logics can be used to express interesting nonmonotonic semantics. CG’3 is one of these 3-valued logics. In this paper, we introduce Fidel semantics for a certain calculus of CG’3 by means of Fidel structures, named CG’3-structures. These structures are constructed from enriched Boolean algebras with a special family of sets. Moreover, we also show that (...) the most basic CG’3-structures coincide with da Costa–Alves’ bi-valuation semantics; this connection is displayed through a Representation Theorem for CG’3-structures. By contrast, we show that for other paraconsistent logics that allow us to present semantics through Fidel structures, this connection is not held. Finally, Fidel semantics for the first-order version of the logic of CG’3 are presented by means of adapting algebraic tools. (shrink)

In the field of logics of formal inconsistency, the notion of “consistency” is frequently too broad to draw decisive conclusions with respect to the validity of many theses involving the consistency connective. In this paper, we consider the matter of the axiom 0—i.e., the schema ◦ ◦ϕ—by considering its interpretation in contexts in which “consistency” is understood as a type of verifiability. This paper suggests that such an interpretation is implicit in two extracanonical LFIs—Sören Halldén’s nonsense-logic C and Graham Priest’s (...) cointuitionistic logic daC—drawing some interesting conclusions concerning the status of 0. Initially, we discuss Halldén’s skepticism of this axiom and provide a plausible counterexample to its validity. We then discuss the interpretation of the operator in Priest’s daC and show the equivalence of 0 to the intuitionistic principle of testability. These observations suggest that it may be fruitful for members of the LFI community to look outside the canon for evidence concerning the adoption of principles like 0. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new hierarchy of analytical tableaux systems TNDC n, 1≤n (...) and also prove that these systems are logically equivalent to the corresponding systems Cn, 1≤nshrink)

There is a relatively recent trend in treating negation as a modal operator. One such reason is that doing so provides a uniform semantics for the negations of a wide variety of logics and arguably speaks to a longstanding challenge of Quine put to non-classical logics. One might be tempted to draw the conclusion that negation is a modal operator, a claim Francesco Berto, 761–793, 2015) defends at length in a recent paper. According to one such modal account, the negation (...) of a sentence is true at a world x just in case all the worlds at which the sentence is true are incompatible with x. Incompatibility is taken to be the key notion in the account, and what minimal properties a negation has comes down to which minimal conditions incompatibility satisfies. Our aims in this paper are twofold. First, we wish to point out problems for the modal account that make us question its tenability on a fundamental level. Second, in its place we propose an alternative, non-modal, account of negation as a contradictory-forming operator that we argue is superior to, and more natural than, the modal account. (shrink)

Some strategies to turn any logic into a paraconsistent system are examined. In the environment of universal logic, we show how to paraconsistentize logics at the abstract level using a transformation in the class of all abstract logics called paraconsistentization by consistent sets. Moreover, by means of the notions of paradeduction and paraconsequence we go on applying the process of changing a logic converting it into a paraconsistent system. We also examine how this transformation can be performed using multideductive abstract (...) logics. To conclude, the conceptual notion paraconsistent orbit of a logic is proposed. (shrink)