- Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476-491.details
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The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way.Andrés G. Garcia - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):681-692.details
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The Weight of Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2573-2596.details
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Pursuit and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 94 (C):17-30.details
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Decisions, Reasons and Rationality.Garrett Cullity - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):57-95.details
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Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value.Antoine C. Dussault - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.details
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Brentano's Fallacy: Moore's Arguments Against Brentano's Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value.Krister Bykvist - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (3):243-259.details
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Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude.Krister Bykvist & Jonas Olson - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2):1-8.details
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Reasons as explanations.John Brunero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.details
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Consequentialism and the wrong kind of reasons: A reply to Lang.John Brunero - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (3):351-359.details
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Goodness, Values, Reasons.Johan Brännmark - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):329-343.details
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Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.details
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Coalitions of reasons and reasons to be moral.Sam Black - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 33-61.details
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A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Is there reason to be theoretically rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2017 - London and New York: Routledge.details
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Reasons and Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Fittingness: A User’s Guide.Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2020 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers (eds.), Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. Springer. pp. 171-184.details
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Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account of.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Aspects of Blame: In which the nature of blame, blameworthiness, standing to blame and proportional blame are discussed.Marta Johansson Werkmäster - 2023 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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Fitting attitudes and welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Franz Brentano: An Invitation to Philosophy.Uriah Kriegel - manuscriptdetails
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.Daniel Jacobsen - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Non-Consequentialism Demystified.John Ku, Howard Nye & David Plunkett - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15 (4):1-28.details
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Against the 'First' Views (formerly Not fittingness, not reasons, not value) [Chapter 5 of A New Theory of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief (Under Contract with OUP)].Andrew Reisner - manuscriptdetails
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Value, Fittingness and Partiality : On the Partiality Problem for Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value.Nils Sylvan - 2021 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome. Oxford University Press.details
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Norms for emotions: intrinsic or extrinsic.Stéphane Lemaire - 2014 - Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
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Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
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Combining Pragmatic and Alethic Reasons for Belief [Ch. 3 of The true and the good: a new theory of theoretical reason].Andrew Reisner - manuscriptdetails
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Ambidextrous Reasons (or Why Reasons First's Reasons Aren't Facts).Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (30):1-16.details
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Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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What is Value? Where Does it Come From? A Philosophical Perspective.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Value Handbook: The Affective Sciences of Values and Valuation. pp. 3-22.details
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Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano’s and Reid’s.Olson Jonas - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):106-119.details
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