Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 2, February 2022.

One solution to the problem of moral knowledge is to claim that we can acquire it a posteriori through moral experience. But what is a moral experience? When we examine the most compelling putative cases, we find features which, I argue, are best explained by the hypothesis that moral experiences are emotions. To preempt an objection, I argue that putative cases of emotionless moral experience can be explained away. Finally, I allay the worry that emotions are an unsuitable basis for (...) moral knowledge. I conclude that those who believe in moral experience should hold that it consists of emotion. (shrink)

Anger dominates debates in the public sphere. In this article I argue that there are diverse forms of anger that merit different responses. My focus is especially on two types of anger that I label respectively arrogant and resistant. The first is the characteristic defensive response of those who unwarrantedly arrogate special privileges for themselves. The second is often a source of insight and a form of moral address. I detail some discursive manifestations of these two types of anger. I (...) show that arrogant anger is responsible for attempts to intimidate and humiliate others with whom one disagrees. Whilst resistant anger can be intimidating, it is also essential in communicating moral demands. (shrink)

I argue that there is an interesting and underexplored sense in which some negative reactive attitudes such as anger are often absurd. I explore implications of this absurdity, especially for our understanding of forgiveness.

The emotion of anger has a long love–hate relationship with morality. On the one hand, anger often motivates us to sanction wrongdoing and uphold demanding moral standards. On the other hand, it can prompt aggression behaviors that are at odds with morality and even lead to moral disasters. This article describes this complex relationship. I argue that the intensity of anger elicited by moral transgressions is highly sensitive to key variables, including the identity of the person wronged, the nature of (...) the wrongdoing, and expectations about what should and will be done. Depending on the context, we sometimes experience more anger than would be commendable and sometimes less. These characteristics of anger, in turn, explain the ubiquity of norms and discourses aimed at governing the expression of this emotion. (shrink)

Suppose that Linda, Brian’s partner, is on a business trip. Brian cannot wait for her to come home. It would be plausible to construe his attitude as impatience, and claim that it is called for in this type of situation. But if this is indeed the case, then patience is uncalled for. However, it seems that patience cannot be uncalled for, as it is considered a virtue. So goes the common expression, and so attest all of the philosophical analyses of (...) patience in recent decades. Discussing them, I claim that patience is not always the right attitude. Enthusiasm and excitement, which might be impatient, have their own merits. Furthermore, as patience involves not only waiting, but also enduring or persevering, it might also be the case that one endures too much and thus allows vice to flourish. Being truly virtuous has to do with knowing when and how to be patient, but also when and how to be impatient. (shrink)

Tanaka, K. (2014) Anger and moral judgment. Australas J Philos 92:269–286 -/- should be: -/- Pettigrove, G. and Tanaka, K. (2014) Anger and moral judgment. Australas J Philos 92:269–286.