- Justice as a Competence. The Normative Relevance of Empirical Research on Judgements of 'Greatness'.Geert Demuijnck - 1994 - Philosophica 53:39-56.details
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Is irrationality systematic?Robyn M. Dawes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):491.details
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The plasticity of human rationality.Norman Daniels & George E. Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):490.details
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The controversy about irrationality.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):510.details
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Status of the rationality assumption in psychology.Marvin S. Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):332-333.details
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Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.details
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Are there any a priori constraints on the study of rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.details
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The epistemological status of lay intuition.Christopher Cherniak - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):489.details
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Conceptual re-engineering: from explication to reflective equilibrium.Georg Brun - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):925-954.details
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Discrepancies between human behavior and formal theories of rationality: The incompleteness of Bayesian probability logic.Lea Brilmayer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):488.details
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Rational animal?Simon Blackburn - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331-332.details
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The rationality of the scientist: Toward reconciliation.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):487.details
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Unphilosophical probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.details
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Cohen on contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-358.details
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Competence, performance, and ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.details
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The importance of cognitive illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.details
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Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.details
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L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.details
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From the descriptive to the normative in psychology and logic.Paul Thagard - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (1):24-42.details
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The Role Played by the Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Moral Epistemology.Christine Swanton - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (4):575-.details
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Reflective equilibrium, analytic epistemology and the problem of cognitive diversity.Stephen Stich - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):391-413.details
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Inferential competence: right you are, if you think you are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353-354.details
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Some questions regarding the rationality of a demonstration of human rationality.Robert J. Sternberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-353.details
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Rationality and reflective equilibrium.Edward Stein - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):137-72.details
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Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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20 Years of Moral Epistemology: A Bibliography.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):217-229.details
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A theory of probability should tutor our intuitions.Glenn Shafer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):508.details
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Moral intuitions and justification in ethics.Stefan Sencerz - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (1):77 - 95.details
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Human rationality: Misleading linguistic analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350-351.details
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Human inference: The notion of reasonable rationality.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):507.details
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Lay arbitration of rules of inference.Richard E. Nisbett - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-350.details
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L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.details
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Can philosophy resolve empirical issues?Clifford R. Mynatt, Ryan D. Tweney & Michael E. Doherty - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):506.details
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The irrational, the unreasonable, and the wrong.Avishai Margalit & Maya Bar-Hillel - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):346-349.details
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Propensity, evidence, and diagnosis.J. L. Mackie - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):345-346.details
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“Is” and “ought” in cognitive science.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344-345.details
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Performing competently.Lola L. Lopes - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):343-344.details
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Who commits the base rate fallacy?Isaac Levi - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):502.details
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Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342-343.details
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Intuition, competence, and performance.Henry E. Kyburg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):341-342.details
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Improvements in human reasoning and an error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340-340.details
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Flawed Like Us and the Starry Moral Law: Review of Machines Like Me by Ian McEwan. [REVIEW]Tae Wan Kim - 2021 - Journal of Business Ethics 170 (4):875-879.details
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Using people – scope, role and justification of a Common Sense concept.Kaufmann Paulus - unknowndetails
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Who shall be the arbiter of our intuitions?Daniel Kahneman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):339-340.details
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The armchair and the trolley: an argument for experimental ethics.Guy Kahane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):421-445.details
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Norms, competence, and the explanation of reasoning.Gary S. Kahn & Lance J. Rips - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):501.details
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Can irrationality be intelligently discussed?Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):509.details
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Inductive reasoning: Competence or skill?Christopher Jepson, David H. Krantz & Richard E. Nisbett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):494.details
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Intuitions and semantic theory.Henry Jackman - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (3):363-380.details
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