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  1. Extending The Realm of Reason: On The Epistemic Profile of Perceptual Experience.Paweł Grad - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-20.
    Are perceptual experiences epistemically appraisable? In this paper, I argue, contra Siegel (Rationality of perception, Oxford 2017) that they are not (§§ 2–3). I also show how the problem of hijacked experience can be solved without endorsing the view that perceptual experience is epistemically appraisable (§§ 4–5). A key idea behind my proposal is a disjunctivist view on rationalising and epistemic powers of perceptual experience.
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  • Intuitional Content or Avoiding the Myth of the Given – A Dilemma for McDowell.Israel Beer-Sheva - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 32 (3):272-293.
    McDowell’s “Avoiding the Myth of the Given” (2008, 2009) attempts to reconcile two claims: 1) what we most fundamentally experience is a fundamental level of invariable simple objects and their sensible properties; experience of these objects and properties is the ultimate ground of our knowledge of the world; 2) experience is through-and-through conceptually structured. This leads McDowell to endorsing the incoherent notion of intuitional content – necessary and thus irrevisable basic empirical conceptually structured contents or empirical categories. The notion requires (...)
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  • Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-luminosity Arguments.David de Bruijn - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (8):3329-3349.
    Epistemological disjunctivists hold that perceiving subjects have “reflective access” to factive perceptual support for belief. However, little has been done to elaborate the intended notion of reflection, or introspective awareness more generally. Moreover, critics have pointed out that the disjunctivist conception of “reflective access” can seem vulnerable to varieties of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. In this paper I defend disjunctivism from this charge, arguing that it holds the resources for a potent defense of the claim that knowledge of perceptual states is (...)
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  • Knowledge‐first perceptual epistemology: A comment on Littlejohn and Millar.David de Bruijn - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):329-345.
    According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), ordinary perceptual experience ensures an opportunity for perceptual knowledge. In recent years, two distinct models of this idea have been developed. For Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012, Oxford University Press; Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing, 2012, Princeton University Press), perception provides distinctly powerful reasons for belief. By contrast, Clayton Littlejohn (Journal of Philosophical Research, 41, 201; Knowledge first, 2017, Oxford University Press; Normativity: Epistemic and practical, 2018, Oxford University Press) and (...)
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  • Taking Skepticism Seriously.Harold Langsam - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):1803-1821.
    Responses to skeptical arguments need to be _serious_: they need to explain not only why some premise of the argument is false, but also why the premise is _plausible_, despite being false. Moorean responses to skeptical arguments are inadequate because they are not serious: they do not explain the plausibility of false skeptical premises (Sects. 2–3). Skeptical arguments presuppose the truth of the following two claims: the requirements for epistemic justification are internalist, and these internalist requirements are never satisfied (with (...)
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  • Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good.Kael McCormack - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (47):1288-1321.
    I propose an account of desire that reconciles two apparently conflicting intuitions about practical agency. I do so by exploring a certain intuitive datum. The intuitive datum is that often when an agent desires P she will seem to immediately and conclusively know that there is a reason to bring P about. Desire-based theories of reasons seem uniquely placed to explain this intuitive datum. On this view, desires are the source of an agent’s practical reasons. A desire for P grounds (...)
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  • Defending Disjunctivism about Perception知覚についての選言説を擁護する.Tomohiro Yamashita - 2022 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 54 (2):71-91.
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  • Dretske & McDowell on perceptual knowledge, conclusive reasons, and epistemological disjunctivism.Peter J. Graham & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):148-166.
    If you want to understand McDowell's spatial metaphors when he talks about perceptual knowledge, place him side-by-side with Dretske on perceptual knowledge. Though McDowell shows no evidence of reading Dretske's writings on knowledge from the late 1960s onwards (McDowell mentions "Epistemic Operators" once in passing), McDowell gives the same four arguments as Dretske for the conclusion that knowledge requires "conclusive" reasons that rule of the possibility of mistake. Despite various differences, we think it is best to read McDowell as re-discovering (...)
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  • Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.
    We review the "Entitlement" projects of Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright in light of recent work from and surrounding both philosophers. Our review dispels three misunderstandings. First, Burge and Wright are not involved in a common “entitlement” project. Second, though for both Wright and Burge entitlement is the new notion, “entitlement” is not some altogether third topic not clearly connected to the nature of knowledge or the encounter with skepticism. Third, entitlement vs. justification does not align with the externalism vs. (...)
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  • Experience and its rational significance I: Contributions to a debate.Anil Gupta - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):324-337.
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  • Empirical reason: Questions for Gupta, McDowell, and Siegel.Bill Brewer - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):311-323.
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  • Replies to critics.Declan Smithies - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-15.
    I reply to my critics in this symposium on my book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.
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  • Frege, the self-consciousness of judgement, and the indefinability of truth.Colin Johnston - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (6):1124-1143.
    ABSTRACT Frege characterizes judgement as the acknowledgement of the truth of a thought, appearing thereby to rule out false judgement. First in this paper I explain Frege’s characterization so that it does not have this consequence. Frege is not saying that for a subject S to judge that p is for S to acknowledge the truth of the thought that p. Rather, he is articulating judgement’s nature within self-consciousness. From within, to judge means to acknowledge a truth. Second, I suggest (...)
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  • Responses to Brewer, Gupta, and Siegel.John McDowell - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):390-402.
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  • La “carencia de límites de lo conceptual” y los pensamientos singulares en McDowell.Juan Manuel Saharrea - 2021 - Revista Filosofía Uis 20 (2):141-164.
    En este trabajo se analiza la propuesta en torno de los pensamientos singulares o “pensamientos de re” del filósofo contemporáneo John McDowell. Nuestra estrategia es abordar dicha reconstrucción a partir de la tesis de “la carencia de límites de lo conceptual” desarrollada en su producción más reciente. El contraste entre algunos aspectos de Mind and World (1994) y los artículos previos consagrados al pensamiento singular, asignan un valor explicativo concreto a la tesis de que lo conceptual no tiene límites.
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  • Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Value of Presence.David de Bruijn - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):319-336.
    Epistemological disjunctivists make two strong claims about perceptual experience's epistemic value: experience guarantees the knowledgeable character of perceptual beliefs; experience's epistemic value is “reflectively accessible”. In this paper I develop a form of disjunctivism grounded in a presentational view of experience, on which the epistemic benefits of experience consist in the way perception presents the subject with aspects of her environment. I show that presentational disjunctivism has both dialectical and philosophically fundamental advantages over more traditional expositions. Dialectically, presentational disjunctivism resolves (...)
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  • Comments on Brewer, Gupta, and Siegel.John McDowell - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):338-347.
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  • McDowell y el realismo ingenuo. Mind and World ante el argumento por la ilusión.Juan Saharrea - 2021 - Cuestiones de Filosofía 7 (28):173-193.
    Mediante el análisis conceptual el artículo reconstruye algunos aspectos de Mind and World de John McDowell, orientados a ampliar el rol explicativo de la tesis de la “carencia de límites de lo conceptual”. Para esto se vincula dicha tesis, que corre el riesgo de ser objeto de la objeción de idealismo en sus variantes “más perniciosas”, con la idea de percepción como “apertura al mundo”, que niega decididamente un idealismo semejante. Si bien la defensa del rol justificatorio del contenido perceptivo (...)
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