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  1.  75
    Judgements, facts and propositions: theories of truth in Russell, Wittgenstein and Ramsey.Colin Johnston & Peter Sullivan - 2018 - In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 150-192.
    In 'On the nature of truth and falsehood' Russell offers both a multiple relation theory of judgment and a correspondence theory of truth. It has been a prevailing understanding of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein rejects Russell’s multiple relation idea but endorses the correspondence theory. Ramsey took the opposite view. In his 'Facts and Propositions', Ramsey endorses Russell’s multiple relation idea, rejects the correspondence theory, and then asserts that these moves are both due to Wittgenstein. This chapter will argue that Ramsey’s (...)
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  2. Russell, Wittgenstein, and synthesis in thought.Colin Johnston - 2012 - In José L. Zalabardo (ed.), Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 15.
    Wittgenstein held that Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment fails to explain an atomic judgment’s representation of entities as combined. He demonstrated this failure as follows. Under the multiple relation theory, an atomic judgment is a complex whose relating relation is judgment, the universal, and whose terms include the entities the judgment represents as combined. Taking such a complex we may arrive through the substitution of constituents at a complex whose relating relation is again judgment but whose terms do not (...)
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  3.  82
    The Picture Theory.Colin Johnston - 2017 - In Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 141–158.
    This chapter focuses on picture theory, which is sometimes spoken of as a theory of the proposition. By a proposition, Wittgenstein like Frege means something that determines its sense by means of a correlation between the mode of combination of its constituent symbols and the structure of its sense. It has been an orthodoxy amongst Tractatus interpreters, and continues to be such in the wider philosophical community, that Wittgenstein follows the Russell in offering a correspondence theory of truth. The expression (...)
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  4. Assertion, saying, and propositional complexity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Colin Johnston - 2011 - In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press.
    Wittgenstein responds in his Notes on Logic to a discussion of Russell's Principles of Mathematics concerning assertion. Russell writes: "It is plain that, if I may be allowed to use the word assertion in a non-psychological sense, the proposition "p implies q" asserts an implication, though it does not assert p or q. The p and the q which enter into this proposition are not strictly the same as the p or the q which are separate propositions." (PoM p35) Wittgenstein (...)
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  5.  72
    Zalabardo on Semantic Unity and Metaphysical Unity.Colin Johnston - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):321-326.
    ABSTRACTZalabardo argues that the Tractatus makes an important contribution towards explaining how a representation doesn¹t merely introduce various objects, but furthermore represents them as comb...
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