Karl Popper's methodology highlights our scientific ignorance: hence the need to institutionalize open‐mindedness through controlled experiments that may falsify our fallible theories about the world. In his endorsement of “piecemeal social engineering,” Popper assumes that the social‐democratic state and its citizens are capable of detecting social problems, and of assessing the results of policies aimed at solving them, through a process of experimentation analogous to that of natural science. But we are not only scientifically but politically ignorant: ignorant of the (...) facts that underpin political debate, which are brought to our attention by theories that, as Max Weber emphasized, can be tested only through counterfactual thought experiments. Public‐opinion and political‐psychology research suggest that human beings are far too unaware, illogical, and doctrinaire to conduct the rigorous theorizing that would be necessary to make piecemeal social engineering work. F.A. Hayek realized that the public could not engage, specifically, in piecemeal economic regulation but failed to draw the conclusion that this was due to a specific type of political ignorance: ignorance of economic theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The common claim that American foreign policy is “imperial” is contradicted by the fact that the actual, definable historical empires have characteristically exercised formal, as well as decisive, control over their peripheral dependencies—properties that the keenest analysts do not ascribe to the geopolitical system that has been constructed by the United States. Why, then, the ascription of “empire” to the United States? One reason is to condemn American foreign policy by linking it to the unjust, destructive, and self‐destructive tendencies (...) that are held to be inherent in a nation’s quest for, and maintenance of, “empire.” The variant of this anti‐imperial thesis that has been the special province of certain conservatives and libertarians appropriates the “empire” thesis to invent non‐security motives for American foreign policies, and correspondingly to denigrate security threats to the United States. Yet—ironically—as with the more characteristic left‐wing anti‐imperialism, the conservative‐libertarian version exemplifies a cultural dimension of the strategic situation of the United States: Far from being an “empire,” or even an accomplished hegemon, America is better described (metaphorically) as the object of a multi‐pronged “siege.”. (shrink)

American democracy is not unconstrained or autonomous, but instead achieves what could be termed value representation. Rather than affording representation on policy issues, elections transmit priorities among competing normative ends, while elite politics address the more complex matching of ends and means within the value boundaries established by voters. This results in neither policy representation nor state autonomy, but instead in a specific and limited form of democratic representation.

ABSTRACT While Samuel DeCanio is correct to maintain that the state has considerable autonomy due to the public’s vast ignorance of the government’s affairs, he neglects to consider that the public’s ignorance also stems from the deceptions of the politically powerful, who withhold and distort information in a variety of ways. This can take the form of outright lies; anonymous leaks; press and video releases that don’t mention the originating group or its interests; giving reporters access to otherwise inaccessible information, (...) so that they will report favorably on a certain program or event; publicity stunts from groups as far afield as nasa and the Los Angeles Homeless Service Authority; or the financing of periodicals that are sympathetic towards one’s cause. State autonomy induced by public ignorance may thus be generated by the state itself. (shrink)

A truly inclusive democratic politics must be understandable, or cognitively tractable, for ordinary people busy with the rest of their lives. This extends not only to everyday politics and policy, but to constitutional politics as well—non-specialist democratic citizens should be able to grasp the fundamental law that governs them and imagine their own role in shaping it as political agents. Yet these requirements raise a difficulty: in many countries, including the United States, constitutions are treated as the exclusive domain of (...) lawyers and judges. As a result, constitutional matters are typically discussed using legalistic jargon that is inscrutable even to non-specialist lawyers, let alone ordinary citizens. How then can constitutional politics be made legible to ordinary citizens? In this essay, I argue this challenge is partly one of political ideas—specifically, the ideas ordinary citizens use to think about their constitutions, or their folk constitutionalism. This may sound strange because insofar as constitutions are treated as lawyers’ exclusive turf, the problem may seem to be one of practice, not merely ideas. But popular practices of what scholars like John Finn and Elizabeth Beaumont call popular or civic constitutionalism involve citizens and social movements in transforming constitutions. These transformations often occur behind the backs of everyone involved, as new frames and understandings come to gradually transmute constitutional meaning, which in turn pervades the public political culture and reshapes the public’s constitutional imagination. I suggest we need ideas that more closely reflect what democratic citizens already do in democratic constitutional politics, so that they can do it more self-consciously and dispel the impression of an anti-democratic lack of control that recent constitutional innovations reveal to be illusory. I explore the utility of ideas of unwrittenness and functional multi-textuality to the end of a folk constitutionalism appropriate for democracy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the pages of this journal, Samuel DeCanio and colleagues have advanced the proposition that public ignorance (PI) can lead to state autonomy (SA), inasmuch as the public cannot constrain state actions of which it is unaware. The pisa framework, while original and deserving of further research, needs to take account of complicating factors on both the public ignorance and the state autonomy sides of the equation. ?Knowledge,? and thus ?ignorance,? is a matter of diverse interpretations, so what seems (...) like ignorance may actually be a form of fragmented knowledge that buttresses state autonomy. Conversely, public ignorance of state actions that would be popular if they were widely known might diminish state autonomy, by undermining the legitimacy of the state bureaucracy in question. (shrink)