Do people tend to disagree over political issues because of conflicting values? Or do they disagree about which policies will most effectively promote shared values? In a previous article, I argued that the issues most people think are most important tend to fall into the latter category. On the issues of greatest importance to the mass public, most citizens agree about the ends that are desirable, but disagree about which policy means would best effectuate those ends. Consequently, disputes about facts—disputes (...) about the actual effects of proposed public policies—lie at the heart of the most important divisions in contemporary American public opinion. However, people do not necessarily interpret their political disagreements this way. If they fail to recognize that facts that they see as self-evident are disputed by their opponents, they may see their opponents as having different values, since there could be few other explanations for their opponents' disagreement with them. However, evidence that disagreements about facts are really driving public opinion can be found by using conditional surveys, which ask respondents if they would support a given policy if they believed that it would cause specific negative consequences. (shrink)

ABSTRACT While democratic states may manipulate public opinion and mobilize society to serve their interests, a focus on such active efforts may distract us from the passive, default condition of ignorance‐based state autonomy. The electorate’s ignorance ensures that most of what modern states do is unknown to “society,” and thus need not even acquire social approval, whether manipulated or spontaneous. Similarly, suggestions that democratic states may be “captured” by societal groups must take cognizance of the factors that enable elites to (...) serve the interests of specific societal groups at the expense of the larger society. Bringing studies of voter ignorance into the analysis of state’s autonomy from society provides a novel approach to the study of democratic states’ autonomy, while also serving to explain how societal “capture” of state policies is possible. (shrink)

Advocates of ?deliberative democracy? want citizens to actively participate in serious dialogue over political issues, not merely go to the polls every few years. Unfortunately, these ideals don't take into account widespread political ignorance and irrationality. Most voters neither attain the level of knowledge needed to make deliberative democracy work, nor do they rationally evaluate the political information they do possess. The vast size and complexity of modern government make it unlikely that most citizens can ever reach the levels of (...) knowledge and rationality required by deliberative democracy, even if they were better informed than they are at present. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Arguments for skepticism about political expertise abound. The skeptics believe that political matters are too unpredictable, experts too dogmatic, social science too imprecise, or the electorate too blind to justify hopefulness about the results of real‐world democracy. Philip Tetlock's empirical research suggests, however, that there is some regularity to the political world, and that while most political experts have a poor grasp of it, some (Isaiah Berlin's “foxes”) do better than others (his “hedgehogs”). And Tetlock's research suggests that our (...) political judgments can be improved if we trust more in mechanical, statistical prediction, which outperforms even “fox‐like” experts. (shrink)

In “Popper, Weber, and Hayek,” I claimed that the economic and political world governed by social democracy is too complex to offer hope for rational social‐democratic policy making. I extrapolated this conclusion from the claim, made by Austrian‐school economists in the 1920s and 30s, that central economic planning would face insurmountable “knowledge problems.” Israel Kirzner's Reply indicates the need to keep the Austrians’ cognitivist argument conceptually distinct from more familiar incentives arguments, which can tacitly reintroduce the assumption of omniscience against (...) which the Austrian economists rebelled. Callahan's Reply illustrates the need to keep in mind the hypothetical, conditional nature of economic arguments. Notturno's Reply changes the subject by asserting the intrinsic value of social‐democratic participation, regardless of its outcomes—even while, like Talisse's Reply, ignoring the evidence that public ignorance and elite dogmatism probably can't be mitigated by more information or by appeals to be open minded. And Hill focuses on the very real imperfections of market and other private‐sphere decision making, without weighing the shortcomings of the political alternatives. Markets and other private‐sphere decision arenas don't have to be perfect for them to improve upon public‐sector processes. In the latter, cognitive demands tend to be much greater, because of the divergence of modern social problems from the conditions that would have faced the hunter‐gatherers whose cognitive apparatus we have inherited. (shrink)

Contemporary developed western economies are commonly referred to as ?knowledge-based? economies, which compete through drawing on the innovative and creative capacities of their local populations. Economic policy-makers must invest in and conserve the social, cultural and public resources that underpin dynamic and disruptive competitive activities, namely technological innovation and entrepreneurship, which bring new ideas and products to market. But these resources defy orthodox forms of economic knowledge and quantification. Their trajectories and outcomes are intrinsically uncertain. The paper draws on interviews (...) with experts who advise governments on innovation and competitiveness, to understand what expert strategies are used to deal with this epistemological problem. Such experts must project and retain epistemological authority, but without lapsing too far into quantitative, economistic and bureaucratic forms of reason. The paper identifies three ways in which knowledge of the future can be validated, but without disguising uncertainty: it can be presented as practically useful; as aesthetically appealing; and as hinting at some ?ultimate? form of ontological knowledge. (shrink)

Bryan Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter treats several immensely important and understudied topics—public ignorance of economics, political ideology, and their connection to policy error—from an orthodox economic perspective whose applicability to these topics is overwhelmingly disproven by the available evidence. Moreover, Caplan adds to the traditional and largely irrelevant orthodox economic notion of rational public ignorance the claim that when voters favor counterproductive economic policies, they do so deliberately, i.e., knowingly. This leads him to assume (without any evidence) (...) that “emotion or ideology” explain mass economic error. Straightforward, unchosen mass ignorance of economic principles—neither “rational” nor “irrational,” but simply mistaken—is a more coherent explanation for economic error, and it is backed up by the vast body of public‐opinion research. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The financial crisis was caused by the complex, constantly growing web of regulations designed to constrain and redirect modern capitalism. This complexity made investors, bankers, and perhaps regulators themselves ignorant of regulations promulgated across decades and in different “fields” of regulation. These regulations interacted with each other to foster the issuance and securitization of subprime mortgages; their rating as AA or AAA; and previously their concentration on the balance sheets (and off the balance sheets) of many commercial and investment (...) banks. As a practical matter, it was impossible to predict the disastrous outcome of these interacting regulations. This fact calls into question the feasibility of the century‐old attempt to create a hybrid capitalism in which regulations are supposed to remedy economic problems as they arise. (shrink)

The partisan and ideological polarization of American politics since the 1970s appears to have affected pubic opinion in striking ways. The American public has become increasingly partisan and ideological along liberal-conservative lines on a wide range of issues, including even foreign policy. This has raised questions about how rational the public is, in the broad sense of the public's responsiveness to objective conditions. Widespread partisan disagreements over what those conditions arei.e., disagreements about the factssuggest that large proportions of the public (...) may be perceiving the facts incorrectly. The facts in question are important enough that these partisan disagreements may translate into sub-optimal policy preferences and electoral decisions. (shrink)

Hayek's later work on the possibility of socio-economic order in decentralized market economies is an exercise in contrastive causal explanation as conceptualized by realist social theorists and philosophers. This interpretation of Hayek's work lends support to the view that Hayek's post-1960 writings can be thought of as an example of comparative institutional analysis. It also provides a means of reinforcing Hayek's own efforts to establish the scientific credentials of his work.

In “Popper, Weber, and Hayek: The Epistemology and Politics of Ignorance,” Jeffrey Friedman argues that markets are superior to democratic institutions because the price system doesn't require people to make the kind of difficult counterfactual judgments that are necessary in order to evaluate public‐policy alternatives. I contend that real‐world markets require us to make all kinds of difficult counterfactual judgments, that the nature of these judgments limits the effectiveness of the price system in coordinating our activities, and that the market (...) participant who is capable of making reasonably good economic judgments can also become the kind of well‐informed citizen who is essential to democratic self‐government. (shrink)

In Free Market Fairness, John Tomasi defends classical-liberal principles not because of real-world considerations but on ideal-theoretic grounds. However, what constitutes a sufficiently “ideal” ideal theory is debatable since, as Tomasi shows, regimes that range from laissez faire to heavily interventionist can all be classified as legitimate from the perspective of ideal theory. Conversely, if ideal theory can allow for realistic constraints, as Rawls does, then we should recognize that even under ideal-theoretic conditions, political actors face logistical, epistemic, and motivational (...) challenges that only intensify in the real world, where questions of feasibility become paramount. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy is a noble project: an attempt to make citizens philosophize. Critics of deliberative democracy usually claim either that the proposed deliberation threatens an existing moral consensus or, instead, that deliberation is impossible amid power imbalances that oppress the weak. But another problem is that combining democracy and deliberation is inherently an attempt to engage publicly in a private activity—where sensitivity to each interlocutor may require a special form of address. Can this be done? Yes, in some contexts. The (...) tradition of esoteric writing has demonstrated that it is possible to layer one's discourse in such a way that all citizens can partake at a level that suits them. But writing for a public is not really deliberation among equals; it is leadership by the writer of the readers. Genuine dialogue among equals that takes account of their differences is, in contrast, inherently a private affair. (shrink)

Over recent years support for deliberative democracy as a regulative ideal against which political and economic institutions should be judged has become the dominant tradition within political theory. Deliberative democrats such as Amy Guttman and Dennis Thompson argue that deliberative public decision making would bring with it important epistemological and ethical gains. Closer inspection of these claims, however, suggests that deliberative democratic arrangements are not only impractical but are fundamentally at odds with the epistemic and ethical goals that their supporters (...) seek to advance. Arrangements based on ?exit? rather than ?voice? may be better placed to meet these challenges in a world characterized by complexity and conflicting moral values. (shrink)

Jeffrey Friedman credits Popper for calling attention to our scientific ignorance, but faults him for failing to recognize that we are at least as ignorant about politics as we are about science. He also credits Hayek for realizing that the public could not successfully engage in piecemeal economic regulation, but faults him for not recognizing that this is due to the public's ignorance of economic theory. Friedman suggests that the types of ignorance overlooked by Popper and Hayek compromise the very (...) possibility of democracy—or at least social democracy. He assumes, however, that the success of social democracy and “piecemeal social engineering” depend upon their ability to produce “good” policies. This does not do justice to Popper's views about democracy and piecemeal engineering, and it also presumes an underlying economism that Popper criticized—but to which Friedman and Hayek adhere. (shrink)

In his remarkably meticulous and even-handed 2005 book, Expert Political Judgment, Philip E. Tetlock establishes that the only thing we can count on in the political experts' predictions is that they will underperform-in some cases significantly-the predictions made by mechanical statistical procedures, including random chance. Experts have many uses and Tetlock does not claim that they have no value. However, Tetlock zeroes in on experts' important political role-as prognosticators. Tetlock does not attempt the impossible by trying to judge experts on (...) their ability to prognosticate the effects of public policies; this would require that Tetlock himself could know what those effects were, and even in retrospect, it isn't that simple. Experts' failure to predict much simpler matters, however, such as GDP growth within a broad range, strongly suggests that technocracy is worse than putting dart-throwing chimps in charge of public policy. (shrink)

American democracy is not unconstrained or autonomous, but instead achieves what could be termed value representation. Rather than affording representation on policy issues, elections transmit priorities among competing normative ends, while elite politics address the more complex matching of ends and means within the value boundaries established by voters. This results in neither policy representation nor state autonomy, but instead in a specific and limited form of democratic representation.

Several distinct epistemic states may be properly characterized as states of ?ignorance.? It is not clear that the ?public ignorance? on which Jeffrey Friedman bases his critique of social democracy is objectionable, because it is not evident which of these epistemic states is at issue. Moreover, few extant theories of democracy defend it on the grounds that it produces good outcomes, rather than because its procedures are just. And even the subcategory of democratic theories that focus on epistemic issues take (...) the state of epistemic justification, not the condition of reaching the truth, to be the touchstone of democratic legitimacy. (shrink)

For Murray Edelman, political realities are largely inaccessible to the public, save by the mediation of symbols generated by elites. Such symbols often create the illusion of political solutions to complex problems—solutions devised by experts, implemented by effective leaders, and undemonstrably successful in their results.

ABSTRACT Both classical and modern liberals tend to treat freedom of choice as if it is intrinsically valuable—regardless of what is chosen. They fear that treating freedom as, instead, instrumental only to good choices might open the door to paternalism if a polity were to decide that people were making bad choices. A middle course would be to treat freedom as independently valuable. On the one hand, the independent value of freedom does not treat all choices as good as long (...) as they are freely made. On the other hand, it does not reduce the value of freedom to the known, or predictable, good ends to which a free action may be conducive. Following from Hayek’s acknowledgement that we are often ignorant of what the future may hold, freedom may have value because it will allow us to make decisions whose positive consequences cannot now be predicted. (shrink)

Marcel Gauchet's theory of democracy focuses on the secularization of Western societies and the emergence of “autonomy” in them—Weber's “disenchantment of the world.” The nineteenth-century liberalism that resulted failed to generate a sense of collective purpose that could fill the gap left by the retreat of religion. Totalitarian ideologies achieved this by harnessing the passions unleashed by World War I, but at the cost of radicalization. Conversely, the (unexpected and lasting) post-1945 “social state” set the groundwork for modern individualism and (...) established new legitimacy for the regulatory and protective nation-state, conceptually bonded directly with its voter-citizens. Democracy is thus impossible to disentangle from social democracy—regardless of its actual effectiveness. If Gauchet is right, the left's embrace of “voice” over “exit” mixes a deep insight with flawed prescriptions, as it overlooks the national nature of the experience of citizenship, whereas classical liberals favoring the “exit” option risk undermining the core of the democratic compact. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Twenty years ago Leif Lewin made the case that altruistic motives are more common than selfish motives among voters, politicians, and bureaucrats. We propose that motives and beliefs emerge as reactions to immediate feedback from technical-causal, material-economic, and moral-social aspects of the political task environment. In the absence of certain kinds of technical-causal and material-economic feedback, moral-social feedback leads individuals to the altruism Lewin documents, but also to righteousness (moralized regard for the in-group and disregard for the out-group) and (...) myopia (disregard for distant consequences). The mix of altruism, righteousness, and myopia increases the focus on winning the next high-stakes election rather than on discovering or enforcing socially productive institutions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Social‐scientific data, such as those found in Philip E. Converse's 1964 essay, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” have led some to question whether basic assumptions about democratic legitimacy are unfounded. However, by another set of criteria, we have the “democracy” that was intended by the Framers—namely, a liberal representative system that avoids strong civic engagement by the citizenry. At its deepest level, the American system has been designed to ensure elite influence over the main ambitions of (...) American policy: the expansion of public and private power. When social scientists accumulate findings of civic disengagement and ignorance, it is wrongly supposed to be an indictment of the citizenry; rather, those findings should be understood as the expected result of a certain set of commitments throughout American political history, of which civic apathy and ignorance are the desired outcomes. (shrink)

Parties are back, and many are cheering. Party polarization has voters seeing stark differences between Democrats and Republicans and demonstrating more ideological constraint than previous generations. But these signs of a more “responsible” electorate are an illusion, because the public is no more knowledgeable than ever about the type of “information” it needs if it is to exercise effective control over the public‐policy outcomes it cares the most about. Indeed, polarization has produced a political environment where both voters and policy (...) makers may be less likely to learn about the potential consequences of their governing choices. The result is that holding elected politicians to account for policies treated as divisive ends in themselves has become easier—but that holding them accountable for policies intended as means to the achievement of consensual ends has become harder. (shrink)

. References. Critical Review: Vol. 18, Democratic Competence, pp. 331-360.

Hayek's case for the limits of economic agents’ knowledge does not, as Greg Hill seems to suggest, imply that government should be in the business of engaging in countercyclical fiscal policy or paternalistic corrections of people's pursuit of “imaginary goods.” In the latter case, markets have corrective learning mechanisms for consumer mistakes. In the former, public‐choice and public‐ignorance problems plague government efforts to correct the business cycle. The problem of public ignorance is, in turn, Jeffrey Friedman's topic, but he is (...) unfair in condemning Hayek's abandonment of this problem in order to develop his thesis that a “planning mentality” was the source of the leftist ideas with which Hayek disagreed. Hayek was confronted by widely popular planning schemes that were endorsed by a great many of his colleagues, who were not ignorant of economics. (shrink)