This paper is concerned with notions of consequence. On the one hand, we study admissible consequence, specifically for substitutions of Σ 1 0 -sentences over Heyting arithmetic . On the other hand, we study preservativity relations. The notion of preservativity of sentences over a given theory is a dual of the notion of conservativity of formulas over a given theory. We show that admissible consequence for Σ 1 0 -substitutions over HA coincides with NNIL -preservativity over intuitionistic propositional logic . (...) Here NNIL is the class of propositional formulas with no nestings of implications to the left . The identical embedding of IPC -derivability into a consequence relation has in many cases a left adjoint. The main tool of the present paper will be an algorithm to compute this left adjoint in the case of NNIL -preservativity. In the last section, we employ the methods developed in the paper to give a characterization the closed fragment of the provability logic of HA. (shrink)

We give alternative characterizations of exact, extendible and projective formulas in intuitionistic propositional calculus IPC in terms of n -universal models. From these characterizations we derive a new syntactic description of all extendible formulas of IPC in two variables. For the formulas in two variables we also give an alternative proof of Ghilardi’s theorem that every extendible formula is projective.

We explore a relation we call 'anticipation' between formulas, where A anticipates B (according to some logic) just in case B is a consequence (according to that logic, presumed to support some distinguished implicational connective →) of the formula A → B. We are especially interested in the case in which the logic is intuitionistic (propositional) logic and are much concerned with an extension of that logic with a new connective, written as "a", governed by rules which guarantee that for (...) any formula B, aB is the (logically) strongest formula anticipating B. The investigation of this new logic, which we call ILa, will confront us on several occasions with some of the finer points in the theory of rules and with issues in the philosophy of logic arising from the proposed explication of the existence of a connective (with prescribed logical behaviour) in terms of the conservative extension of a favoured logic by the addition of such a connective. Other points of interest include the provision of a Kripke semantics with respect to which ILa is demonstrably sound, deployed to establish certain unprovability results as well as to forge connections with C. Rauszer's logic of dual intuitionistic negation and dual intuitionistic implication, and the isolation of two relations (between formulas), head-implication and head-linkage, which, though trivial in the setting of classical logic, are of considerable significance in the intuitionistic context. (shrink)

A one-premiss rule is said to be archetypal for a consequence relation when not only is the conclusion of any application of the rule a consequence of the premiss, but whenever one formula has another as a consequence, these formulas are respectively equivalent to a premiss and a conclusion of some application of the rule. We are concerned here with the consequence relation of classical propositional logic and with the task of extending the above notion of archetypality to rules with (...) more than one premiss, and providing an informative characterization of the set of rules falling under the more general notion. (shrink)

This paper presents a simple decidable logic of functional dependence LFD, based on an extension of classical propositional logic with dependence atoms plus dependence quantifiers treated as modalities, within the setting of generalized assignment semantics for first order logic. The expressive strength, complete proof calculus and meta-properties of LFD are explored. Various language extensions are presented as well, up to undecidable modal-style logics for independence and dynamic logics of changing dependence models. Finally, more concrete settings for dependence are discussed: continuous (...) dependence in topological models, linear dependence in vector spaces, and temporal dependence in dynamical systems and games. (shrink)

A form (or pattern) of inference, let us say, explicitlysubsumes just such particular inferences as are instances of the form, and implicitly subsumes thoseinferences with a premiss and conclusion logically equivalent to the premiss and conclusion of an instanceof the form in question. (For simplicity we restrict attention to one-premiss inferences.) A form ofinference is archetypal if it implicitly subsumes every correct inference. A precise definition (Section 1)of these concepts relativizes them to logics, since different logics classify different inferences ascorrect, (...) as well as ruling differently on the matter of logical equivalence which entered into the definitionof implicit subsumption. When relativized to classical propositional logic, we find (Section 2) thatall but a handful of `degenerate' inference forms turn out to be archetypal, whereas matters are verydifferent in this respect for the case of intuitionistic propositional logic (Sections 3 and 4), and an interestingstructure emerges in this case (the poset of equivalence classes of inference forms, with respect tothe equivalence relation of implicitly subsuming the same inferences). Thus a more accurate, if excessivelylong-winded title would be 'Archetypal and Non-Archetypal Forms of Inference in Classical andIntuitionistic Propositional Logic'. Some left-overs are postponed for a final discussion (Section 5).The overall intention is to introduce a new subject matter rather than to have the last word on thequestions it raises; indeed several significant questions are left as open problems. (shrink)

We give alternative characterizations of exact, extendible and projective formulas in intuitionistic propositional calculus IPC in terms of n-universal models. From these characterizations we derive a new syntactic description of all extendible formulas of IPC in two variables. For the formulas in two variables we also give an alternative proof of Ghilardi’s theorem that every extendible formula is projective.