Šiame straipsnyje keliamas ir nagrinėjamas klausimas: koks santykis yra tarp Kanto transcendentalinio idealizmo ir Deleuze’o transcendentalinio empirizmo. Šis tyrimas suponuoja ir kitus klausimus: jeigu kartotė galima, kodėl tai negalėtų būti moralės dėsnis? Kaip nutinka, kad dogmatizmo filosofas Kantas tampa dogmatinės minties ženklu Deleuze’o tyrime? Kodėl vidinės proto iliuzijos sukuria prielaidas minties dogmatikai įveikti? Kaip transcendentalinė logika oponuoja formaliajai logikai Deleuze’o prasmės koncepcijoje? Kokia prielaida remdamasis Deleuze’as priešpriešina champ transcendentalkonceptą Kanto ir Husserlio transcendentaliniam idealizmui? Kaip yra įmanoma preferuoti bedugnę transcendentaliniam idealui (...) ir priešpriešinti Kantui Antoniną Artaud? (shrink)

When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. (...) -/- Not all misleading arguments wear their flaws on their sleeve. Each step of a misleading argument might seem compelling and you might not be able to figure out what's wrong with it. Still, even if you can't figure out what's wrong with an argument, you can know that it's misleading. One way to know that an argument is misleading is, counterintuitively, to lack expertise in the methods and evidence-types employed by the argument. When you know that a counterargument is misleading, you shouldn't engage with it open-mindedly and sometimes shouldn't engage with it at all. You shouldn't engage open-mindedly because you shouldn't be willing to reduce your confidence in response to arguments you know are misleading. And you sometimes shouldn't engage closed-mindedly, because to do so can be manipulative or ineffective. -/- In making this case, Jeremy Fantl discusses echo chambers and group polarization, the importance in academic writing of a sympathetic case for the opposition, the epistemology of disagreement, the account of open-mindedness, and invitations to problematic academic speakers. (shrink)

This article approaches Gilles Deleuze's notion of problems through a series of thinkers Deleuze draws on in developing this notion: Heidegger, Plato, Kant, Bergson and Nietzsche. Taking these thinkers as its guide, it sketches six broad characteristics that accompany an investment in problems, ultimately arguing that problems are attained through the activity of critique. It echoes Deleuze's essay ‘How Do We Recognise Structuralism?’ by asking: for whom do problems exist? What does Deleuze recognise in those who recognise problems? And what (...) do those who recognise problems make visible for us? (shrink)

This aim of this study is to investigate the manner in which Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work can be productively understood as being concerned with the question of living well, where it will be suggested that living well necessitates that we not only become aware of, but that we also explore, the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings. In particular, this study will make an original contribution to existing Deleuzian studies by arguing that what legitimises (...) this conception of living well, and what can motivate us to engage in such a practice, is that a life that becomes aware of and explores the open field of present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment engenders is a life that reflects, or that is lived in accordance with, the challenging ontological account that can be discerned throughout Deleuze’s individual and collaborative work; a life lived in accordance with his open, dynamic and thoroughly temporal theory of Being or what I will suggest he came to refer to simply as ‘Life’. In addition, I will argue that in so far as each individual human being is to be understood as an ongoing and immanent expression of Life, an immediate expression of Life understood as a universal, impersonal and pre-individual dynamism, then a life that strives to explore the forever renewed present possibilities for living otherwise that each moment brings - a practice that I shall propose also necessitates that each individual strives to resist the diverse ways in which their present possibilities are continually hindered, thwarted and negated - is not only a life that strives to live in accordance with the temporal dynamism of Life, but is also a life lived in accordance with our own dynamic and thoroughly temporal being. (shrink)

Music theory has to reinvent itself. Century-long paradigms have to be revisited, and recent terminologies and concepts coming from other fields of music have to find room within the traditional frameworks, particularly in connection with electronic music. In this work, I make an attempt at depicting a framework that might turn useful to further advancements in music theory, by representing the relation between electroacoustic and traditional musics within a scenario dominated by the Philosophy of Language. The Philosophy of Language is (...) herein proposed as a possible philosophical asset to counterbalance some limits of Phenomenology, which has dominated the field of electroacoustic music since its appearance. Within this scenario, the work suggests the notions of "mimesis" and "cadence" as two valid terms to help creating a common ground between the two genres, discussing them in detail and proposing new interpretations for both concepts. (shrink)

Henri Bergson and William James were great admirers of each other, and James seemed to think he got valuable ideas from Bergson. But early critics were right to see in Bergson the antithesis of pragmatism. Unfolding this antithesis is a convenient way to study important concepts and innovations in Bergson's philosophy. I concentrate on his ideas of duration and intuition, and show how they prove the necessity of going beyond pragmatism. The reason is because knowledge itself goes beyond the utilitarian (...) limitations in which pragmatism confines it. Knowledge is more than utility, more than adaptation, more than pragmatism, because our cognitive powers prove capable of more than any naturally selected service to survival. (shrink)

This paper articulates a feminist poststructural philosophy of education by combining the work of Luce Irigaray and Michel Foucault. This acts as an underpinning for a philosophy of desire (McWilliam, 1999) in education, or as a minor philosophy of education where multiple movements of bodies are enacted through theoretical methodologies and research. These methods include qualitative analysis and critical discourse analysis; where the conjunction Irigaray-Foucault is a paradigm for dealing with educational phenomena. It is also a rigorous materialism (Braidotti, 2005) (...) that opens up the way in which we think about philosophical bodies in education with language. This simultaneously creates gaps in our thinking about the problems associated with philosophical bodies in education, where the imagination may intercede and Eros can do his work, ‘For if Eros possessed all that he desires, he would desire no more’ (Irigaray, 1993, p. 22). (shrink)

This paper has a twofold objective. First, it engages with the interrelation of time, space, and matter in Kant, Heidegger, and Derrida and questions whether and how this interrelation effects the possibility of self-relation. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger suggests that the very structure of subjectivity is constituted by what he calls the ‘pure self-affection’ of time and thus the possibility of self-relation is intimately bound up with the temporalizing of time. In his 1964–65 seminar, Heidegger: the (...) Question of Being and History, Derrida translates this pure affection of time into the more generic term ‘auto-affection,’ which will remain a pivotal reference point for his deconstruction of the metaphysical privileging of time as presence. Derrida shows how the (im)possibility of auto-affection is bound up not only with time but also with space, or rather with the ‘spacing of time’ that he also refers to as ‘the trace.’ Second, the paper moves across the frontiers of philosophy and physics posing anew the question concerning the interrelations of temporality, spatiality, and materiality. With reference to what in general relativity is called ‘the curvature of spacetime,’ the efficacy of materiality in the movement of auto-affection is called into question. (shrink)

This essay investigates the transformation of the faculty of understanding in Kant’s Transition from Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics drafts found in Opus postumum. I argue that in fascicles X and XI Kant implicitly reverses the architectonic order of sensibility and understanding. Without an account of this reversal, Kant’s critique of Isaac Newton’s conception of phenomena and the so called Selbstsetzungslehre in fascicle VII fall apart. I argue that what is at stake is a challenge Kant makes to (...) his own presuppositions and a challenge to the Kantian philosopher who wishes to stay with a strictly ‘critical’ Kant. (shrink)

Understanding the exact nature of Deleuze's debt to Kant forms a large part of contemporary Deleuzian scholarship, a project made all the more urgent since the publication of Meillassoux's critique of correlationism in 2007. These Kantian readings present Deleuze as someone who continues Kant's transcendental project by reconsidering the nature of ‘immanent critique’. Immanent critique is no longer seen here as part of the critical enquiry into the possible conditions of experience, but as a staging of an encounter with the (...) genetic principle constituting these conditions, the real condition common to both the human subject and the world in which he or she lives. Such is the implicit demand of genetic recasting: that critique in its immanent form is something we can experience and learn. Presented with this demand, this essay addresses the problem of staging this immanent form of critique. It looks to Deleuze's essay on the work of Samuel Beckett, ‘The Exhausted’, to suggest a possible site for such an encounter with constitutive principle. Specifically, in Deleuze's discussion of … but the clouds … it finds a theory of the image, which can be understood in genetic terms, as a theory of the virtual. Thus the essay puts forward the thesis that Beckett, in constructing the image through the exhaustive process, recreates the virtual plane, in its openness and flux. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore why Deleuze takes up Hamlet's claim that ‘time is out of joint’. In the first part of this paper, I explore this claim by looking at how Deleuze relates it to Plato's Timaeus and its conception of the relationship between movement and time. Once we have seen how time functions when it is ‘in joint’, I explore what it would mean for time to no longer be understood in terms of an underlying (...) rational structure. The claim can be understood as about a relationship between time and action. In the second part of this paper, I want to relate this new understanding of time to Hamlet itself, in order to see how temporality operates within the play. I will conclude by relating these two different conceptions of time out of joint to one another through Nietzsche's eternal return. (shrink)

Although it is not clear that Deleuze and Guattari were simply and unambiguously Jungians, they extensively engaged with Jung’s depth psychology in both affirmative and critical ways. It is striking that Deleuze expresses a strong affinity between his work and that of Jung in several texts; Jung’s influence on Deleuze has not tended to be emphasised by scholars, though there is a rapidly growing ‘Jungian turn’ in Deleuze and Guattari studies. This article briefly extracts the influence of Jung on Deleuze (...) and Guattari and, more extensively, explores profound resonances between Deleuze's Difference and Repetition and James Hillman's Re-Visioning Psychology. (shrink)

The French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, is emerging as one of the most important and influential philosophers of the 20th century, having published widely on philosophy, literature, language, psychoanalysis, art, politics, and cinema. However, because of the ‘experimental’ nature of certain works, combined with the manner in which he draws upon a variety of sources from various disciplines, his work can seem difficult, obscure, and even ‘willfully obstructive’. In an attempt to resist such impressions, this paper will seek to provide an (...) accessible introduction to Deleuze's work, and to begin to discuss how it can be employed to provide a significant critique and reconceptualization of the theoretical foundations and therapeutic practices of psychiatry, psychotherapy, and mental health nursing. In order to do this, the paper will focus upon Deleuze's masterwork, and the cornerstone to his philosophy as a whole, Difference and Repetition; in particular, it will discuss how his innovative and challenging account of time can be employed to provide a conception of human life as a ‘continuity’, rather than as a series of distinct ‘moments’ or ‘events’. As well as discussing the manner in which his work can provide us with an understanding of how life is different and significant for each human being, this paper will also highlight the potential importance of Deleuze's work for logotherapy, for the recent ‘turn’ to ‘narrative’ as a psychotherapeutic approach and for contemporary mental health care's growing interest in ‘social constructionism’. As such, this paper also seeks to stimulate further discussion and research into the importance and the relevance of Deleuze's work for the theory and practice of psychiatry, psychotherapy, and mental health nursing. (shrink)

To view a work knowingly gives understanding but not hope Rorty, "The Necessity of Inspired Reading" I cannot count one. I know not the first letter of the alphabet. Thoreau, Walden.

The topic of this paper is the concept of originality as it relates to the concept of genesis developed by Deleuze in his early essay ‘The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Esthetics’. Using the exhibition of Tim Bennett's as a starting point, it brings together two accounts of originality, the first postmodern one represented by Rosalind Krauss's ‘The Originality of the Avant-garde’ and the second genetic kind found in Deleuze's aforementioned essay, to show how originality and genesis might correspond, paying (...) close attention to the transcendental innovations of Kant's aesthetic tradition to which both concepts belong. (shrink)

This article examines the reception of Roy Bhaskar amongst some contemporary Deleuzians. It proceeds by rejecting the all too often predilection of opposing realism to ‘postmodernism’ or ‘post-structuralism’ arguing instead for the need to bring one into dialogue with the other. To this end, the paper explores the resonances and points of departure between the work of Gilles Deleuze and Roy Bhaskar. In particular, it examines the language of causation, object-oriented versus process-oriented ontologies, as well as the charge by Deleuzians (...) that Bhaskar is an essentialist. Through this engagement it attempts to develop and rethink explanation and causation in terms of a more chaotic ontology of machines, centered around the concept of structure, process, and production in an open, heterogeneous, and dynamic world. The end result is a more chaotic concept of realism. (shrink)

Deleuze reworks Marxist concepts in order to identify those that represent discontinuity and produce a theory of revolution. Marx is important because, along with Spinoza and Nietzsche, he is a part of a project to leave behind concepts such as transcendence and univocity which underlie the totalitarianism of traditional philosophy. Deleuze is looking for concepts that might form a different theory, within which the structures of production are not organised vertically by the domination of universal concepts, such as ‘being’ or (...) ‘essence’, but flow horizontally through a multiplicity of relations of conceptual singularity. The production of a different series of concepts is a strategic and tactical operation that, in confronting prior notions of transcendental philosophy, turns philosophy itself into a battlefield. Marx provides the general methodology for this tactical approach through two fundamental categories: production and conflict. Deleuze practises Marx's theoretical method and by using Marx's own central concepts challenges traditional Marxism, to arrive at a totally different and revolutionary philosophical structure based on concepts such as those of force, variation, difference, singularity, production and the war machine. (shrink)

In this article I attempt to reveal some continuities between the anti-psychoanalytic stance adopted by Gilles Deleuze in his later work and Henri Bergson's early philosophy. On account of these continuities I hope to provide a glimpse into what I believe is a century-old tangent of philosophical resistance to the methods and theories of Freudian psychoanalysis. In order to achieve this, I start with a brief meditation on the challenges and benefits of cross-generational inheritance and collaboration in philosophy. The purpose (...) of this is twofold – to explore some general conditions for such collaboration and to tease out some of the implications of these conditions for the substantive argument my specific reading of Bergson via Deleuze occasions. I then expound on Bergson's theory of duration and some of the uses to which Deleuze puts it in the latter part of his career. In this I outline several fecund similarities between Bergson's critique of associationism and Deleuze's attack on Freud. Finally, I attempt a partial evaluation of Freudian psychoanalysis from the joint, albeit naturally disjointed, perspective of my primary sources. (shrink)

What should be the primary aims of education? How might these aims be realized? These are foundational questions which Plato raised long ago in his Republic. The first of these questions is a normative, and profoundly philosophical, one which provides guidance to the whole endeavor of education. The second of these questions is a pedagogical one which informs educators as to how their work can be best conducted. In this work I endeavor to answer these interlocking educational questions. I follow (...) most closely in the footsteps of John Dewey. I believe that Dewey had it right when, decades ago, he argued that education ought to be concerned with the cultivation of good judgment. But here a difficulty arises. For "good judgment" is a complex philosophical concept which spills over into considerations of thinking, knowing, deciding, and acting. Despite the efforts of philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, and Dewey, there is a lack of agreement about the precise meaning of good judgment. Before moving into matters of education, then, I first endeavor to vanquish this lack of conceptual clarity. What is good judgment? What are its elements? Can it, for that matter, even be cultivated? Having gotten clear on what good judgment is, I turn to matters of education. First, I argue that a vital task of education is the cultivation of good judgment. I then turn to the practical matter of how one might go about cultivating good judgment. The community of inquiry approach employed by The Philosophy for Children Program, I contend, is an effective pedagogical means through which to cultivate good judgment. (shrink)

In the Kantian symbolism, it seems that there is a different kind of rule or modes of presentations, which sheds new light on a variety of concepts of understanding with references to ideas of reason. In this way, the type of presentation is indicated by the description of the various types of concepts that are presented in intuition in the process of cognition in Kant’s philosophy. The first step is the introduction and identification of all kinds of concepts and intuitions (...) in Kant’s philosophy so that we can clarify the role of mark and characteristics in his thought. Schematisation is explained through emphasis relation between concepts and pure intuition or spatiotemporal determination in the mechanism of cognition so that the distinction of the schema from the symbol is designated. In the next step, we clarify the role of symbol in the judgment of taste with an emphasis on free and adherent beauty. Consequently, we make bright the judgment like “beauty is the symbol of the morally good”. Finally, let’s also clarify how the symbol evolves, with emphasis on two types of natural and artistic symbolism. To define the symbol in Kant’s thought, two negative and positive ways have been used. Relying on aesthetics and art is to understand its implications. The result is that the symbol is a kind of reflective rule which will form in a different situation, in Kant’s thought. over pure concepts of understanding, ideas of reason with a reflection on the form of new referent or special schema or new intuition and with reference to concepts of understanding lead to an extension in the meaning of the different concepts of understanding in the light of ideas of reason. (shrink)

This article calls for a rethinking of critical sociology. Representing classical critical sociology, the Bourdieusian paradigm illustrated domination, but its negative foundation removed actors’ power, privileging sociological knowledge as capable of identifying (social) transcendental categories of thought. Latour’s constructivism challenged this privilege, giving actors the political power of aggregating collectives around their common concerns at the cost of emphasizing domination and critique. We propose a critical approach that evades a transcendental perspective reliant on pure negation, producing a more positive critical (...) sociology founded on processualist phenomenological and pragmatic perspectives, principally Merleau-Ponty and Dewey. Actors and researchers can collectively ruminate on their perspectives and concerns to challenge power structures and transform their worlds. At the center of this is the social-mien, a creative reimagination of habitus. A brief discussion of the protests and scholarship surrounding the Notre-Dame-des-Landes activists’ practice of democracy highlights the utility of the approach and serves as a model for future application. (shrink)